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INTRODUCTION
This thesis aims to demonstrate and account for the role
played by the Italian state institutions in the rise of
Fascism.	 It is based on a case-study of Bologna's police
forces.	 While most historical accounts of Italian Fascism
mention the collusion of the police and judiciary with the
Fascist movement during the period 1920-22, my thesis attempts
to provide a clearer definition of 	 the part played by the
prefect, Questore,	 Regie Guardie and Carabinieri during the
years of serious and prolonged civil disturbance and to
provide convincing motives for such conduct.	 I hope to
demonstrate that there are many hypothetical explanations for
the connivance of Bologna's police forces with 	 local
squadristi. These range from anti-Socialism and opportunism
to numerical weakness, the physical, psychological and moral
pressure of Fascism and the ambiguous attitude of the central
government towards Mussolini's movement. I aim, above all, to
show that the relationship of Bologna's police forces with the
provincial Fascist movement may be linked back to several
traditional internal and external factors inherent in Italian
policing, the most crucial of which was Italy's weak and out-
moded police system itself, and that from an institutional
point of view Fascism may be considered a 'revelation' of
Italy's past in spite of the 'revolutionary' desires of many
of its exponents for an end to Liberal politics and a break
with the past.
The first of two introductory 	 chapters	 considers the
origins and development of the Italian police system, the
roots of which are to be found in the Napoleonic occupation of
the peninsula at the beginning of the nineteenth century and
the pre-unification monarchic dynasty of Piedmont. Using
mostly secondary sources, it refers particularly to the two
main police corps, the Carabinieri and the Guardie di PS., the
Napoleonic figure of the chief representative of the state in
the provinces, the prefect, nineteenth-century preventive
police	 legislation	 and	 traditional	 internal	 weaknesses
inherent in the Italian police system. 	 This chapter	 is
fundamental in explaining the role of the police 	 in the rise
of Fascism.
The second chapter traces social, political and economic
developments in the province of Bologna between 1890 and 1926.
Based again on secondary sources, many of which are the works
of local historians, it aims to point out those aspects of
Bolognese history directly involving the provincial police
authorities, such as development of the peasant Socialist
movement, the agrarian strikes which dominated the period
researched, the growth of agrarian employers' defensive
associations, the effects of the First World War, the founding
of the Fascist movement and the struggles between provincial
and state Fascism during the years immediately following the
March on Rome.
Chapter III is a case-study, using primary sources, of
policing in Bologna between 1897 and 1918. 	 It is roughly
divided into three periods.
	
The first (1897-1900) examines
traditional	 nineteenth-century	 policing	 methods	 and	 the
effects of prevention laws as epitomized in the repression of
Molinella's braccianti strikes in 1898. The second period
(1901-1914) questions the success of Giovanni Giolitti in
promoting social and political peace and changing the role
played by the police in syndical disputes. It particularly
aims to demonstrate that the failure of the prime minister to
give the police less of a repressive and more of a mediatorial
outlook may be directly linked to his failure to update and
enlarge an archaic police system. The third and final part
of the chapter considers the Interventionist crisis of 1915
and the role of the police forces in this as well as the
restrictions which the	 First World War placed on local
Socialist political and syndical power. This chapter
generally questions the relationship of the provincial police
authorities with the Socialist movement, its attitude towards
strikes,	 the development of trade unions,	 revolutionary
Socialism and Anarchy. In doing this it seriously calls
into question whether police collaboration with the Fascist
movement during the post-war period may have stemmed from an
anti-Marxist tradition which was so much in evidence between
1897 and 1918. It also examines the weak and inefficient
nature of the police forces and the negative repercussions
which this had on policing.
The fourth chapter firstly questions the social and political
effects of the First World War in Bologna in 1919 and 1920.
(iv)
It examines the manner
	 in which the provincial
	 police
authorities dealt with both the threat of Socialist
revolution, as epitomized in braccianti land occupations and
the metalworkers' occupation of the factories in September
1920, and the founding and development of the Bolognese
'Fascio di Combattimento'. The second half aims to show, as
accurately as possible, how many members of Bologna's police
forces collaborated with the Fascist movement and how the
state did or did not attempt to overcome both Fascist violence
and police connivance in this. Particular attention is
paidhere to the role of the prefect of Bologna, Cesare Mori,
probably one of the last state representatives to oppose
Fascism. The final part of the chapter outlines possible
motives for police connivance with the Fascist movement.
Special emphasis is placed here on the importance of Fascism
as a physical, psychological and moral influence on police
conduct and the ambiguous nature of government directives
concerning the Fascist movement so that the phenomenon of
connivance cannot alone be attributed to anti-Socialism.
Chapter V starts by examining the effects of Mussolini's
rise to power on the police system. Considerable attention is
given to the founding of the Milizia Volontaria per la 
Sicurezza Nazionale in 1923 and its relationship to the
traditional	 police	 system.	 It then	 questions	 whether
connivance between provincial Fascism and the police
authorities altered after the March on Rome and particularly
whether such collaboration was political or opportunist, that
(v)
is, whether the police organs became Fascist or simply
'Fascistized'. Much consideration is given to the attitude of
the police towards the conflict during the period 1923-6
between state and provincial Fascism, particularly during the
Matteotti crisis, as well as the role of the police in ousting
opposition to the Fascist government, particularly following
Mussolini's speech of 3 January 1925 which put Italy on the
road to dictatorship. By examining the role of Bologna's
police forces this chapter tries to demonstrate that from an
institutional point of view Fascism was a continuation or
indeed development of Italy's 'Liberal' regimes of the past.
My main sources for Chapters III, IV and V were the Interior
Ministry police documents from the Archivio di Stato di
Bologna and the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome. These
were supported where possible by local and national newspapers
dating back to the period researched. The use of this primary
material
	 posed	 several	 difficulties.	 Firstly,	 the
documentation was of such a vast quantity	 that it was
physically impossible to consult all of it in the time
available to me. This meant that I tended to examine those
files which, by the nature of their title, seemed relevant to
my research, unless my attention had been drawn to them
specifically by some other source. Experience gained
from these documents showed me, however, that often the most
relevant documents were found by chance in the 'wrong' files.
Hence a letter concerning events in 1921 might be found in a
1925 file.	 Similarly, for example, 	 a document concerning
)(vi
the Fascist movement might be found in a file entitled
'Personale di Pubblica Sicurezza'.
	 This in itself suggests
that I may have overlooked	 certain documents of great
significance to my research.
Having stated that the vast quantity of documents posed
difficulties for me on occasions, it must be additionally
pointed	 out	 that	 in	 places	 documentation	 was	 scanty,
particularly from the 1925 files onwards.	 Some of the
documents sought after were, as outlined above, located in the
'wrong' files.	 Others may have been mislaid, lost or even
damaged and destroyed over many years.
	
The bombing of the
Archivio di Stato di Bologna during the Second World War may
be a significant factor here. It is also equally possible
that certain documents may never have been released by the
police authorities for confidential or political motives.
This may well have been the case with regard to incidents
which risked putting the police in a bad light. The Bolognese
journalist and historian,	 Nazario Sauro Onofri, claims, for
example, that the police file concerning the Palazzo
d'Accursio massacre on 21 November 1920 (described in Chapter
IV) is not available at the Archivio di Stato but is sure of
its existence, at least at one time, because copies of some of
the documents from it have been found in other files.1
I should also emphasise that I did on occasions encounter
interpretation problems because of the very nature of the
documents themselves. Many were undated, illegible or
damaged. It was sometimes impossible to identify the writers
i
or the persons to whom the documents were 	 addressed.
Often they were incomplete so that it 	 was almost impossible
to follow the progression of events accurately. 	 Obviously,
I could not always count on the objectivity of their authors.
A police report, for example, to the prefect, Cesare Mori, on
Fascist violence in the Bolognese countryside almost certainly
unders.hifed the extent of such violence. This was because
policemen feared reprimand for their failure to prevent the
violence and possibly punishment for their support of Fascist
illegalities.	 In places the documentation may have been
supported with newspaper articles, but once again these may
hardly be considered politically impartial. Left-wing
newspapers almost certainly exaggerated the extent of police
connivance with the Fascist movement, for example, and their
accounts, no matter how enlightening had to	 be taken with a
degree of caution.
The	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	 lay,	 above	 all,	 in
familiarizing myself with the social and political context to
which the documents belonged.
	
In many instances it was
necessary, therefore, to attempt to 'read the mind' of the
person who wrote a particular document, by taking into
consideration such side-factors as the political climate of
the time and	 the political attitudes of the writer and the
person to whom the document was addressed. By increasing my
familiarity with the personality behind the pen I was able, at
least in part, to better understand the true message between
the lines of official police rhetoric.
NOTES
1. Nazario Sauro Onofri, La strage di Palazzo d'Accursio. 
Origine e nascista del fascismo bolognese 1919-20 (Milan,
1980), p. 286. According to the author: 'All'Archivio di
Stato di Bologna non esiste il fascicolo con le relazioni e
i documenti relativi a quanto avvenne a Bologna il 21
novembre 1920. Di alcune relazioni del prefetto e del
questore abbiamo trovato delle copie in altri fascicoli
dell'Archivio, inclusi nei carton! nel 1921. 	 Dove siano
finiti gli originali non si sa'.
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CHAPTER ONE: POLICE, PREFECTURE AND PREVENTION;
A HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM, 1800-1926
The first of two introductory chapters to the thesis aims to
trace the development of the Italian police system from its
origins in the first half of the nineteenth century to the
year 1926, marked by Mussolini's police laws, popularly known
as	 'Leggi Fascistissime' and defining the authoritarian
character of the Fascist regime.	 This should ideally
facilitate comprehension of those factors inherent in the
role of the police forces,
	 if not the Italian state
institutions as a whole,	 during the Fascist ascendancy
between 1920 and 1926.
Three particular aspects of Italian police history are
taken into consideration. Firstly the development of the two
main Italian police corps, the Guardie di PS and the
Carabinieri Reali, and the traditional phenomenon of dualism
caused by the co-existence of two or more police forces with
conflicting civilian and military hierarchies is examined.
Other problems in the internal organization of the police
system recurring throughout the years under investigation are
taken into account. Secondly consideration is given to the
prefect who combined the roles of provincial police chief,
government electoral agent and periphery state administrative
2representative during the period concerned. This indeed
reflects controversial state restrictions on the growth of
local political and administrative power as very much evident
in the documentation consulted for the case-study of Bologna.
In close relation to the above the third aspect of police
history studied here concerns the predominance of preventive
policing in Italy from its unification onwards, as reflected
in its penal codes and public security legislation. This
illustrates the traditional tendency of the Piedmontese and
later Italian ruling houses to safeguard state political
power in the face of democratic advancement. This should
provide better perception of the nature of the police system
to which the execution of such legislation was entrusted.
Examination of legislation governing the evolution of the
Italian police system during the nineteenth century reveals a
whole series of complex hierarchical dependencies and the co-
existence of several rival police forces. 	 This indeed is a
reflection of power struggles,	 dominating the first decades
of Italian unification but still unsolved throughout the
period the case-study of Bologna covers, between military -
representing the traditional aristocratic forces - and
civilian
	 -	 representing	 the	 emerging	 bourgeoisie
ministries. The origins of the Italian police forces may
be traced back to the Piedmontese dynasty, several decades
before the unification of Italy, when a royal decree (Regie 
3Patenti of 13 July 1814) founded the corps of the Carabinieri 
Real!, the first capillary police network in the monarchy,
consisting of 776 men (1,200 by 1816, 3,100 by 1823 and 9,000
by 1848) and territorially divided into legions (Legion!),
divisions
	 (Division!),	 companies	 (Compagnie)	 and
lieutenancies(Tenenze). Modelled on the French Gendarmerie,
it formed an integral part of the army though distinguished
from other military corps by the denomination 'Real!' and the
prestige of 'primo corpo dell'esercito'. As Renato explains,
the corps formed part of the 'Buon Governo' or Ministry of
Police - founded by the same legislation - which 'concentrb
sul piano unitario e generale, sia attribuzione di polizia,
sia poteri	 amministrativi e anche giudiziari'. 	 Police
executive powers were initially placed in the hands of
military governors (Governatori). Indeed the first
Carabinieri commander was in fact the governor of the city,
citadel and province of Turin and 'Presidente capo' of the
'Buon	 Governo' (as stipulated by the legislation of 13 July
1814).1
Though the first Italian police corps was military, article
114 of the Regie Patenti of 16 October 1822 stated that the
Carabinieri were hierarchically dependent on the	 war
ministry in terms of recruitment, discipline, arming,
administration and training and on the interior ministry for
police duties. This clause in fact came to represent the
basis of ministerial conflict over control of the corps
dominating Italian police history. 2	Police administration
4itself moved several times between ministries during the
first half of the nineteenth century, illustrating such
conflict. Placed under the shortlived 'Ministry of Police'
on 5 October 1816, police powers were devolved to the
interior ministry in 1821. In 1841, as stipulated by the
Regie Patenti of 5 August that year they passed to the war
ministry	 under the command of a Carabinieri officer (Fried,
p. 32). Finally, in October 1847, with the founding of a
constitutional monarchy in Piedmont, control of policing was
placed under the 'Direzione Polizia' of the interior ministry
reflecting in Renato's words the realization of the problems
caused by 'L'abnorme sottoposizione dei servizi di polizia,
che	 costituiscono	 essenzialmente
	 una	 funzione	 civile
nell'ambito di un Dicastero Militare'. At the periphery level
police powers were placed in the hands of intendants
(Intendenti) and intendants general (Intendenti Generali) in
the geographical divisions (Divisioni) of Genoa and Turin,
thereby unifying the two previous roles of intendant
(entrusted with state administrative tasks) whose role in the
pre-unification states is described below, and military
governor (Renato, pp. 336-7). The former military police
commanders had in fact, through their violent and often
arbitrary use of police powers, their general ignorance of
laws and civil rights, become unpopular and the role of
military governor was abolished, therefore (Fried, p. 39).
The following year the founding of the interior ministry
5police administration (Law 798 of 30 September 1848) marked,
according to Renato:
Le basi fondamentali della struttura unitaria che
l'Amministrazione, di massima, salvo modifiche e sviluppi
futuri, ha in generale sino ad oggi conservato e che
corrisponde	 a	 quel	 concetto	 unitario	 e	 nazionale
dell'esercizio della funzione di polizia in Italia.
The 'Direzione Polizia' of the interior ministry took on the
denomination 'Amministrazione di Pubblica Sicurezza' in order
to dissociate itself from the less noble activities of the
'Polizia'. Its tasks were to 'Vegliare e provvedere
preventivamente all'ordine e alla osservanza delle leggi
nell'interesse pubblico e privato', whilst its personnel was
exclusively civilian. 	 In confirmation of Law 612 of 8
October	 1847,	 police	 executives	 were	 -	 according	 to
administrative territorial	 demarcations - the	 intendant
general in the division, the intendant in the province
(Provincia), the police delegate (Delegato) in the district
(Mandamento) and the mayor (Sindaco) in the municipality
(Comune) The intendants general of Turin and Genoa were each
assisted by a Questore who became police chief within the
jurisdiction of the provinces of Turin and Genoa. Delegati 
could be appointed police chiefs of towns in the division or
province, with the exception of provincial or divisional
capitals,	 and in municipalities, with the exception of
6district capitals.	 These police funzionari (officials) were
required to possess a law degree. According to Renato
Questori were chosen from judicial circles and delegates
needed to have worked in state administration for at least
two years.	 Public Security orders were executed by the
Carabinieri.	 Carabinieri Veterani, police funzionari and,
if necessary, the national guard (Guardia Nazionale) 	 -
founded in 1848 as a bourgeois counterpoise to the
royalist/aristocratic regular army and Carabinieri - had
similar functions in division capitals and highly populated
towns (Renato, pp. 336-8).
Law 1404 of 11 July 1852 increased bourgeois/civilian
executive powers with the relegation of the Carabinieri to
the countryside and the abolition of the Carabinieri Veterani 
and their replacement in urban areas by	 public security
guards. (Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza). Territorially
divided into companies (Compagnie), brigades (Brigate) and
sub-brigades (Sottobrigate), this military style corps was
distinguished from the Carabinieri in that it came
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry
(Fried, p. 41, Renato, p. 338). The founding of the public
security guards, if a step forwards for bourgeois/civilian
forces, marked also the beginning of conflict and rivalry
between Italy's two main police corps. The relative autonomy
which the Carabinieri maintained from the interior ministry
indeed reflected the desire of military hierarchies to
protect the corps from civilian dominance and control. The
7Public Security decree of 21 June 1865 (2336) only formally
guaranteed the cooperation of the corps with the intendants.
Carabinieri could be requested 	 'in writing'	 for police
duties. 3
 In reality, as the case-study of Bologna reveals,
the corps was able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy
which allowed it where necessary to avoid the fulfilment of
its duties.
	 Similarly - revealing the presence of a third
and a fourth shortlived and relatively insignificant
hierarchy in police operations - article 18 of the decree
allowed the police authorities to ask, 'in writing' once
again, the military authorities for the use of troops for
police duties and the mayor to resort to the use of the
Guardia Nazionale.4
The Public Security Laws (Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza) of
1859	 and	 1865	 confirmed	 the	 dependence	 of	 police
administration on the interior ministry. 	 The 1859 law
founded
	 Questure	 (police	 headquarters)	 in	 provincial
capitals with over sixty thousand inhabitants. 	 The Questore 
was	 police chief within the provincial capital district
(Circondario).	 He was	 assisted by inspectors (Ispettori)
and delegates. The intendant general, later prefect
(Prefetto), had the assistance of delegates. The sub-prefects
- replacing the intendant - were directly dependant on the
prefect, had both administrative and policing
responsibilities, were assisted by delegates and placed in
charge of districts (with the exception of those run by
Questori).5
8The 1865 police laws were better explained by the
Istruzioni pei funzionari di pubblica sicurezza issued by the
Presidente	 del	 Consiglio	 dei	 Ministri	 (prime-minister)
Ricasoli in April 1867 with the aim of clarifying 	 to the
advantage of police funzionari, their tasks, competences and
hierarchical dependencies. According to article 6, the
prefect was 'primo rappresentante del potere esecutivo nella
provincia' and:
il solo che per l'autorita conferitagli della legge regola e
dirige l'azione governativa e la politica, e prende o provoca
tutti i provvedimenti, che sono richiesti non solo dai
bisogni e dalle esigenze dell'ordine e della tranquillitA
pubblica ma ancora dai voti della pubblica opinione.
Ultimately, therefore, public security and Carabinieri 
officers were responsible to him. Within the jurisdiction of
the district they were responsible to the sub-prefect, or
Questore who were responsible to the prefect. Article 10
stated that each authority was to report to that authority
immediately above it on the public security conditions in its
area of jurisdiction. In this manner a rural Carabinieri 
commander could pass news of events in an isolated area of
the province to the prefect via the nearest delegate or
mayor, and in turn the sub-prefect or Questore. Both the
prefect and the CarabinierilAgion commander were expected to
report to the interior minister on the state of public
9security in the province every month. 	 Article 19 reiterated
that:
Continue e reciproche debbono essere le relazioni tra i
funzionari di pubblica sicurezza ed i reali carabinieri, al
quale uopo ii comandante della stazione dovra recarsi
quotidianamente presso ii delegato di sicurezza pubblica o
sindaco nel rispettivo ufficio, il comandante la luogotenenza
o compagnia presso il sottoprefetto o questore, ed
comandante la divisione presso ii prefetto 	 per comunicarsi
reciprocamente le opportune notizie, prendere i debiti
concerti, e procedere con quell'unita d'indirizzo e di
azione, che sola puO assicurare ii buon andamento del
servizio al quale debbono essere rivolte le cure di tutti gli
ufficiali di pubblica sicurezza di ogni categoria.6
The Istruzioni revealed another important characteristic
again reflecting the conflicting hierarchies to which the
police organs belonged. It stipulated that police officers
and agenti had double qualities; that of preventive policing,
better known as polizia ordinaria or amministrativaand that
of officials of the judicial police polizia giudiziaria, for
the collection of evidence for the sentencing of crimes in
the courts, under the dependence of the Procuratore (public
prosecutor).
	 In particular article 22 stated that the
prefect and sub-prefect would designate a delegate or
- 1 0 -
inspector from their offices for daily conference with the
public prosecutor:
Per riceverne le istruzioni ed informarlo di cià che si
riferisce all'accertamento dei reati nonchê allo scoprimento,
alle ricerche ed all'arresto degli autori.
Article 23 stipulated:
Nella	 trattazione	 degli	 affari	 relativi	 alla	 polizia
giudiziaria, i questori, ispettori o delegati di prima classe
che reggono gli uffizi provinciali o circondariali di
pubblica sicurezza corrisponderanno direttamente col Pubblico
Ministero (office of public prosecutor) (Correa, p. 505,
Renato, p. 344).
The significance of this double role lies in the
controversial dependence of police personnel on the Pubblico 
Ministero as officials of the polizia giudiziaria and on the
Questore as normal policemen, especially from 1907 with the
removalfromthe Questore of the qualification of 'ufficiale
di polizia giudiziaria' (through Testo Unico 690 of 31 August
1907) which allowed him to act over and above the orders of
the judicial authorities.	 What is more the lack of
distinction between the roles of judicial police officials
and examining magistrates up to 1 .906 (the latter dependent on
were
the Pubblico Ministero as / officials of the judicial police
until that year) meant that the police had an excessive role
in the preliminary phases of trials and and that the
judiciary was, therefore, not totally independent from state
executive power in the execution of justice.7
Playing a key role in the police system was the periphery
state executive, the prefect. 	 The controversy surrounding
this omnipotent figure lies in the powers he had as
provincial police chief to limit local government autonomy
and the development of political 'subversion', particularly
during the period researched. The origins of his office date
back to the Napoleonic invasion of the Italian peninsula in
1800 and the combination imposed in the majority of the
occupied states by the First Consul of two previously
separate offices. In Piedmont, for example, the former
military governor (periphery police chief) and intendant
(government administrative representative) were united in the
office of the 'Prffet' who represented government authority
within the 'Departement'.8
The Law on the Organization of Administrative Authorities
promulgated in the neighbouring Republic of Italy (a union
of the Duchy of Milan and Republic of Venice under Napoleon)
defined the role of the prefect as follows:
(Art. 7) The Prefect is the immediate organ of the Government
in the Departement. He dispatches the laws and regulations
to all the communes, publishes them and has them executed.
- 1 2 -
(Art 8).	 The administration of all	 those assets	 and
liabilities of the nation in the Departement is exclusively
entrusted to him.
(Art 9). He superintends the police and supervises the
preservation of public tranquillity.
(Art 10). The prefect prepares each year the budget of
national expenditures in his Departement for the coming year
and transmits it to the respective ministers with the
deadline fixed by the government.9
The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the restoration of the
former ruling houses saw the separation of the roles of
intendant and governor until 1848 when with the founding of a
constitutional monarchy they were re-united in the intendant
general - governor (Governatore) in 1859 and prefect
(Prefetto) in 1861 - hierarchically dependent on the interior
minister." Though continuing to perform important
administrative tasks for all ministries as his Napoleonic
predecessor" the start of democratic advancement in Italy
placed notable restrictions on the governor's control of
local government.
	 The Provincial and Communal Law (Legge 
Provinciale	 e	 Comunale)
	 of	 1848	 rendered	 provincial,
divisional and municipal councils elective, whilst the
similar law of 1859 abrogated his former position of 'Capo
dell'amministrazione e della divisione e delle provincie che
lo compongono' (as previously stipulated by article 196 of
the 1848 law) to that of president of the Deputazione 
Provinci ale 
- 13 -
which had discretionary powers over municipal councils but
over which the prefect only had 'controllo di legittimitA' .12
New emphasis was placed on the political role of a state
executive figure with the aim of controlling local government
from the outside, reflecting the desire of the ruling classes
to safeguard their political power whilst formally permitting
democratic advancement.
	 Of importance was his task of
'informatore', to the central government on the state of
politics and public opinion in the province (Fried, p. 42),
but even more significantly he became a political electoral
agent with the job of winning over political consensus for
the government at the local level in order to maintain its
majority in the Chamber of Deputies and keep local councils
in the hands of government supporters or 'ministeriali' as
they were called. He was able to use both formal powers and
informal political influence to this end (Fried, p. 134).
Francesco Crispi, prime minister for several long periods
during the 1880s and 1890s, decentralized state political
power in 1888, by amplifying the representative basis of
local government. The electorate was increased to 11% of the
population and mayors became elective for the first time. He
counteracted this democratic move, however, by increasing the
prefect's powers of control by removing him from the
presidency of the Deputazione Provinciale and making him
president of the Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa, (GPA), a
council of state field agent, with control over the financial
decisions of municipal and charitable institutions. 	 If again
- 14 -
formally the prefect's position was merely that of 'controllo
di legittimita' - the GPA committee was elected by the
Deputazione Provinciale - the obligatory presence of two
1 consiglieri di prefettura' on the committee, according to
Ragionieri, in reality allowed the prefect discretionary
powers over local governments. According to Ernesto
Ragionieri:
Da un corpo totalmente elettivo - poteva rilevare a ragione
il radicale Salaris - di cui faceva parte un solo ufficiale
del governo che era il prefetto, che ne era il presidente, e
che qualche volta piegava all'opposizione, siamo passati ad
un corpo di cui fanno parte tre membri governativi. Ora chi
6 che non veda che quando ci sono tre membri di questa
giunta, che saranno quelli che prepareranno i lavori, gli
altri quattro membri elettivi non faranno che mettere la
sabbia su cid che hanno fatto questi tre? Chi 6 . che non veda
che questi tre assorbiranno gli altri quattro?13
The prefect could always use legal powers to dissolve
municipal councils which opposed the government line as
provincial police executive. Article 3 of the Provincial and
Communal	 Act	 of	 1859	 (renewed	 in	 1888)	 allowed	 the
dissolution of municipal councils, as indeed political
associations, if they were a threat to public order. Indeed,
such a pretext was not hard to come by, especially during the
latter two decades of the nineteenth century when new
i
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legislation aimed to limit the activities of the so-called
'subversive' organizations, as described below. The PSI,
which very much relied on the success of local-level politics
for its advancement, saw the prefect as a serious threat in
this sense. 14 Indeed Massimo Giannini states that:
Era sufficiente che una pratica comunale acquistasse un
colore politico, perchê il prefetto perdesse la sua qualitA
di consigliere tecnico per divenire istanza decisionale
tendente a sovrapporsi al comune.	 E dipeso e dipende da
circostanze vane, di giuochi di forze politiche, di
compattezza della forza politica rappresentata dal comune, il
risultato, ossia l'effettivo sovrapporsi e sostituirsi della
istanza	 decisionale	 prefettizia
	 all'istanza	 decisionale
comunale.15
According to Fried (p. 134), it was normal practice for the
prefect to dissolve municipal councils, temporarily replacing
them with Commissari Prefettizi (prefectoral commissioners)
until new elections arranged a more favourable outcome, as
this case-study reveals (p. 134). Vivarelli states that once
local government had been firmly placed in the hands of
government sympathisers, the prefect usually connived with
the	 'administrators'	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the
'administered' 16
It was in election periods, however, that the prefect
principally demonstrated the extent to which state corruption
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was capable of reaching. According to Fried, he received
special funding from the government to enable him to
intimidate opposition candidates, suspend opposition mayors,
dissolve opposition municipalities and intimidate or bribe
opposition supporters to the advantage of the 'ministerial!'.
In the south of Italy bribery, intimidation and even murder
were resorted to, while in central and northern regions
greater discretion was required (pp. 122-4). The archival
documentation revealed in this study indeed demonstrates the
importance of the role of the prefect in the manufacture of
central and local government majorities, with the aid of his
police powers.
The government's desire for exclusive control of the
nomination of prefects was from the very first years of
unification evident in legislative moves. Article 24 of the
Regio Decreto of 24 October 1866 stipulated that the cabinet
nominated administrative top officials on the proposal of
those ministers concerned while article 1 of Regio Decreto 
3629 of 27 March 1867 'dichiard competente il Consiglio dei
Ministri
	 per	 le	 deliberazioni
	 concernenti	 Prefetti,
Sottoprefetti, Segretari Generali dei Ministri (...) 'etc.
Finally article 5 of Regio Decreto 3925 of 25 June 1877
stated that rank superiority in ministerial administration
was not a necess q r9
 qualification for nomination to the post
of prefect (Casula, p.94).
Another question emerging from the last decades of the
nineteenth century and the initial years of the twentieth
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century was the type of prefect, whether political non-
bureaucratic figures (parliamentary deputies, for example) or
career prefect (usually qualified members of the interior
ministry administration). Though Law 105 of 7 March 1897
stipulated that 'le promozioni al grado di prefetto dovessero
essere fatte, fra gli iscritti in uno speciale ruolo di
merito, compilato da apposita commissione e comprendente
funzionari giudicati ottimi del grado immediatamente
inferiore a quello del prefetto', indicating according to
Casula, the attempt of the bureaucratic class to limit the
possibilities for the promotion of political figures to the
post (p. 101), article 37 of Regio Decreto 26 of 2 February
1902:
eccettuO	 le promozioni	 ai	 posti	 di	 prefetto da ogni
intervento della commissione il cui parere era obbligatorio
per le altre promozioni. L'art. 25 stabill che il Ministro
non era tenuto a rispettare la trafila dei gradi per le
nomine a prefetto e a direttore generale.
while article 7 'riaffermava che a tali posti potevano essere
nominati estranei all'amministrazione', confirming the return
of the decisional power of the Consiglio dei Ministri 
(cabinet) (Casula, p. 104).
In reality, however, if the possibility of the use of
political prefects was not excluded, the legislative evidence
suggests that governments aimed to rely principally on career
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prefects who were put in such tight career positions that
their collaboration with the political will of the government
was guaranteed. As early as 1887 Crispi introduced
'collocamento a riposo per motivi di servizio' (retirement
made necessary by professional responsibilities), over and
above normal regulations on pensions, maximum age, etc.,
through Law 4711 (mentioned above) (Casula, p. 108). 	 In 1901
with Regio Decreto 466 of 14 November Giolitti legalized
'collocamento a disposizione' (temporary discharge), a
mechanism allowing the government to hold a temporarily
removed prefect for years, under various terms to a maximum
of 6 months 'disposizione', 1 year 'aspettativa' and 2 years
'disponibilitA' (Casula p.112). The law fixed the maximum
number of prefects 'a disposizione' or 'in aspettativa' at
ten (Casula, p. 145). According to the historian:
la possibilitA di una sanzione cosi drastica ed inappellabile
opera come tacito mezzo di persuasione, assicurando
positivamente la corrispondenza dell'operato dei prefetti
alle esigenze del governo (p. 166).
This may be appreciated if one is to consider that it took at
least 20 years for a functionary to reach the office of
prefect. He would be too old, therefore, to find other
professional employment should he lose this position (Casula,
pp. 167-8).
If,	 therefore,	 after the unification of Italy the
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majority of prefects were not initially from the career
class, the reinforcement of administration gradually
overturned the balance so that by the end of the nineteenth
century three-fifths of the posts were reserved to career
prefects (Casula, pp. 175-6). Casula adds that the 'scarse
garanzie giuridiche ed economiche, commesse tradizionalmente
alla carica prefettizia, non potevano certamente facilitare
candidature da parte di personalita di rilievo estranee
all'Amministrazione' (p. 177).	 Yet at the same time the
conservative sociological composition of the administrative
class was ideal for the use of career prefects. Though the
political prefect was useful during certain moments of
political orientation, in theory career prefects reponded to
the intentions of any political government since they were
politicizzabili' (p. 182). The author states, however,
that purges of the prefectoral class usually followed the
change in political regime, though this was less a reflection
of prefectoral dissent towards the new political class and
more the result of 'la compromissione e l'allineamento che
avevano caratterizzato i rapporti della classe prefettizia
col precedente regime' (p. 167).
The controversial political role of the prefect - career or
political - is indeed the object of debate among many
historians.	 If Ragionieri sees the role of the provincial
executive representative as mere suffocation of local
government (pp. 156-7), Aquarone maintains, in his study of
the first years of unification, that 'troppo di frequente Si
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sia stati e si continui ad essere eccessivamente inclini a
sopravvalutare l'onnipotenza, o quasi, del prefetto'. If
it was true that the first prefects were often top political
figures and close friends of the prime minister/interior
minister, very much conscious of their task to defend the new
bourgeois ruling class from 'clerico-reazionari', their
positions could be limited by the public prosecutor and
neutralized by the local council, aristocracy, senators,
parliamentary deputies, etc. 17
 True cases of excess and
corruption in elections were rare and due less to government
directives and more to overzealousness on the part of
individual prefects.
	 If on occasions the prefect over-
interfered in local government this was often necessary
because of acts of corruption and abuse of power by municipal
administrators, particularly in southern Italy. According to
Aquarone what should be deplored were not so much their
'inframmentenze'	 but	 more	 their
	 failure	 to	 intervene
sufficiently on occasions. This indeed suggests possible
local level political connivance on the part of the prefect
against the central government.18
It was with the constitution of a parliamentary system on
the basis of true political parties - coinciding more or less
with the succession of the Liberal 'left' over the 'right' in
1876 - that the role of the prefect inevitably became
more controversial. This is because the interference powers
(whether formal or informal) which he maintained represented
less the defence of the state (and of its citizens) against
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the corruption of local administrators and	 more the
suffocation, often under the same pretexts, however, of the
development of mass political power. As demonstrated in the
case-study of Bologna references in prefectoral reports to
Socialist bullying during elections, for example, or the
excessive or illegal spending of their municipal councils,
etc., simply concealed the reality of a transformist system
whereby the government continued to buy votes from its
deputies in exchange for administrative favours over and
above	 the	 dictates	 of	 local
	 political	 administration.
According to Gaetano Salvemini, for example, under Giolitti
particularly local government lost all power under the
prefect while deputies faithful to the government were able
to receive such services from him as the dissolution of anti-
government municipalities and the provision of electoral
funds to the detriment of local opposition parties.19
For a firm understanding, however, of the motives behind
the political role of the Italian police system it is
necessary to turn back once again to the initial unification
years and follow the development of police activities and the
legislation governing them. The reluctance of the emerging
bourgeois ruling classes to better share their power is well
perceivable when- examining the 1859 Piedmontese penal code
(written in preparation for the unification process) and in
the 1859 and 1865 Public Security laws, which according to
Berselli were to a great extent rooted in the absolutist
i
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dynasties of Piedmont, Lombardy, etc. According to the
historian the impression gained from reading Ricasoli's
Istruzioni is that of a dominating theme:
"Pordine, l'ordine pubblico con tutti i suoi sinonimi:
H tranquillitA pubblica H , "sicurezza dello stato", "sicurezza
interna H , "sicurezza generale", "ii buon ordine pubblice,
H il bene pubblico", "la pace sociale, "Parmonia delle
classi",	 "l'inviolabilitA	 del	 diritto	 di	 proprietr,
"l'integritA	 della	 famiglia",	 e	 cos(	 via.	 L'ordine
costituisce ii limite al diritto di	 libertA nelle sue
estrinsecazioni e quindi anche al diritto di riunirsi
pacificamente e senz'armi riconosciuto dall' 32 dello statuto
(1859 penal code).20
The significance of these laws lies in those articles
prohibiting acts threatening the security and integrity of
the state and granting exceptional powers to the police.
Article 26 of the 1865 PS legislation, for example, allowed
the dissolution of public meetings if they were hostile in
character towards the law and the authority of the state and
thereby compromising to public order (Correa, pp. 520-22).
Ricasoli's Istruzioni stated that police officials on duty
during public meetings were to check that no speeches
inciting hatred or contempt towards the government or
compromising	 the	 government's	 diplomatic	 relations	 or
slandering public officials or causing 'disordini' because of
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their generally sediUous character were made (Correa, p.
523). If repeated warnings on the part of officials to the
speakers failed the hall or square where the meeting took
place was to be emptied. Article 35 of the Regolamento per 
l'Esecuzione della Legge di Pubblica Sicurezza (Regio Decreto 
2336 of 18 May 1865 stated that no theatrical production
could take place without the permission of the police and
that it could be banned if inopportune or liable to cause
disorder. Articles 36 and 38 allowed the police to be present
during performances which could 'in caso di gra y	disordini'
be suspended. Giovanni Bolis, Questore of Rome during the
1870s, referring to	 the above legislation stated that a
meeting could be banned even if it aimed to discuss possible
new	 forms	 of	 government,	 deliberations	 in	 themselves
constituting 'attentato contro la sicurezza interna/esterna
dello stato o contro la pubblica tranquillitA'. Similarly
the discussion of laws, or criticism of the government or
incitement to strike (ironically permitted by article 386 of
the penal code unless H senza ragionevole causa H ) were
considered such that 'cessa la pacifica riunione acconsentita
dallo Statuto e diventando faziosa ed illegale, devesi
vietare ed impedire preventivamente' (Berselli, p. 188).
This legislation naturally controlled the political
activities of associations which under articles 78 - 81 of
the 1859 PS law could be dissolved 'per motivi di pubblica
sicurezza' under article 3 of the 1859 Provincial and
Communal Law. The prime minister Peruzzi, in justifying for
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example, the dissolution of the Societa di Solidarieta
Democratica in June 1863 stated, 'Chiunque voglia mutare il
patto scritto C....) 6 un ribelle, e come tale lo tratterel'
(Berselli, p. 194). During moments of extreme disorder such
as the development of associations of brigands and 'mafiosi'
in Sicily in 1874, 'provvedimenti straordinari' were resorted
to. These allowed preventive arrests on suspicion only of
participation in criminal acts, unlimited house perquisitions
and ultimately up to five years domicilio forzato (internal
exile) for members of criminal associations.21
Both the 1859 and 1865 PS laws gave the police authorities
firm control of the press which again in the opinion of
Boils, 'Eccitando l'odio fra i cittadini, getta la diffidenza
e il disordine nel paese' (Berselli, p. 189). Article 52 of
the 1859 law necessitated the possession of a licence
(granted by the police authorities) for journalism, while
article 84 of the 1865 law prohibited the printing of false
Information.
Another aspect of the 1859 and 1865 PS laws fundamental to
Italian police history was the use of ammonizione (warning)
to control persons suspected of or prone to committing
crimes. The legislation particularly applied to oziosi 
(persons living by criminal means) and vagabonds, but, as
pointed out by Barile, the category was extended to thieves,
forgers, 'mafiosi' etc. 22 Indeed article 50 of the 1859
penal code allowed their arrest and trial on the basis of
suspicion of having taken part in a crime, while article 76
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of the 1965 PS law allowed internal exile for recidivi 
(habitual criminals)
(Correa, pp. 525-26). Following release from prison or exile
these subjects remained under the strict surveillance of the
police authorities. They could not change their place of
residence without special permission (articles 73-74 of the
1865 PS law) and their residence itself was confined to
specific areas (article 76).23
The	 above	 legislation	 has	 particularly	 important
implications if one is to consider that with the growth of
the	 Socialist/Anarchist	 movement	 from	 the	 1870s	 the
designation of these political groups under articles 426 and
427 of the 1859 penal code as 'associazioni di malfattori'
allowed their ammonizione under article 5 of the 1865 PS
law 24 so rendering them liable to the same punishments
(internal exile, etc) as criminal suspects. This is
important because it demonstrates the criminalization of
political opposition to the ruling classes, and the refusal
to recognise socialists, anarchists, etc. as political.
Following the attempt on king Umberto I's life by
Internationalists in December 1878 and the succession of the
left Liberal regime over the right, it was generally felt
that legislation was insufficient in dealing with this new
threat to state integrity, especially since judges often
found themselves having to treat perfectly upright, honest
citizens	 as	 criminals	 because	 of	 their	 political
identification (Canosa/Santosuosso p. 31). 	 The 1889 new
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penal code and PS legislation perfected, therefore, the
instruments founded with unification.	 Indeed, in the words
of Canosa/Santosuosso (p.9), the penal code:
mantenne tuttavia in vita e perfezioni5 tutta una serie di
strumenti idonei a rendere assai 'difficile' non solo le
azioni che fossero dirette sul piano concreto contro il
sistema ma anche le manifestazioni di pensiero aventi lo
stesso obiettivo.	 Non solo: il codice fu 'opportunamente'
accompagnato da una legge di PS emanata nello stesso giorno
la quale ancorch6 migliore 'et par cause' di quella
precedentemente in vigore, conservava alcune istituzioni di
prevenzione assai dure, come il domicilio coatto (replacing
domicilio forzato), e poneva una grave limitazione alla
libertA di riunione (stabiliva l'obbligo di preavviso di
almeno 24 ore alle autoritA le quali avevano la facoltA di
divieto e di scioglimento).
Articles 2 - 6 of the PS law in fact allowed the dissolution
of public meetings for 'manifestazione o grida sediziosa' and
the imprisonment of those responsible for up to three months
unless they could be better incriminated under the following
articles of the penal code. Article 247 punished with up to
a year's prison sentence those responsible for 'incitamento
all'odio tra le classi sociali in modo pericoloso per la
pubblica tranquillitA"apologia del reato' and 'incitamento
alla disobbedienza'. 	 Article 251 more specifically punished
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with a prison sentence of between six and eighteen months
'Chiunque
	 prende	 parte	 ad	 un'associazione	 diretta	 a
commettere i delitti preveduti nell'articolo 247'.	 Article
252 punished those responsible for inciting civil war with
between three and fifteen years imprisonment and between ten
and eighteen years
	
if they were successful	 in their
intentions.
	
Article 246 carried a prison sentence of up to
five years for those encouraging crimes.
	
Article 248
punished with up to five years imprisonment those accused of
'associazione a delinquere when five or more persons formed
an association with the aim of committing crimes against
public morality, the family, property, the state, etc. Those
responsible had increased sentences if they detained arms and
if they were the main promoters or leaders of the
association. Article 96 of the 1889 PS law in fact placed
those designated as habitually responsible for associazione a 
delinquere, arson, theft, etc., in the category of ammoniti.
The clearer definition of political criminals and their
placing in the same category as normal criminals may be
considered, therefore, a perfection of the 1859 and 1865 PS
laws in terms of political persecution.
	 Article 123
allowed the punishment of internal exile (now known as
domicilio	 coatto)	 for	 'ammoniti'	 and	 'condannati	 alla
vigilanza speciale', for violating the	 special regulations
under which they lived and for crimes against property and
persons, etc., if committed on more than one occasion.
According to article 124 of the PS law of 1889, internal
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exile lasted between 1 and 5 years and would take place in a
colony or designated location on the peninsula, while article
125 stated that a special provincial commission - consisting
of the prefect (who presided over it), president of the law
courts, public prosecutor, Questore or delegate and local
Carabinieri commander - emanated such sentences which would
then be communicated to the interior minister.
Crispi's	 Leggi
	 Eccezionali
	 of	 19	 July	 1894	 were
particularly aimed at repressing the Anarchist movement. Law
314	 entitled 'Repressione contro le mene anarchiche'
illegalized the possession or use of explosives. 25 Law 315
'Sulla istigazione a delinquere e sulla apologia del reato -
a mezzo della stampa' increased by a half prison sentences
for violation of articles 246 and 247 of the penal code and
article 6 of Law 314 when committed through the press.
Encouragement of contempt towards the
	 army, or mutiny,
through the press was punished with between three and thirty
months imprisonment.	 Law 316 'Provvedimenti Eccezionali di
PS' sentenced those	 condemned for crimes or even the
intention of committing crimes against public order, the
state, public safety, etc.	 to internal exile.	 Article 5 of
the law sentenced to up to six months internal exile those
simply belonging to subversive associations. According to
Amato, Crispi justified this law, which punished on the mere
suspicion of subversion, on the grounds that it guaranteed
the punishment of those criminals who otherwise would have
been acquitted in the courts for lack of evidence (p. 83).
i
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The true legitimate applicability of the above legislation
with regard to the Anarchists and even Socialists was at
times	 questioned	 in	 the	 courts	 and	 criticised	 by
intellectuals in the judicial field.	 To what extent could
articles 247, 248 and 251, for example, be applied to the
anarchist programme?	 Indeed the	 'Classical School'	 of
jurists, worried about the fate of public freedom, was
contrary to the manner in which article 248 , which
categorized anarchists as delinquents, was applied. They
argued that:
le associazioni di malfattori prevedute nell'art 248 non
vogliono soppressa la proprietA, la vogliono anzi mantenute
saldamente, ma vogliono spogliare il proprietario tizio per
arrichire dell'altrui roba: non uccidono mai ai fini di
abbattere chi rappresenti il sistema della proprietA, ma
uccidono tizio, caio, sempre, vuoi per derubarlo, vuoi per
vendicare un rifiuto a un tentato ricatto o una denuncia
all'autoritA (...) concetti e scopi assolutamente estranei al
programma anarchico' (Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 36).
Opposed to this line of thought and in agreement with
Crispi's opinion, the 'Positivist School', strongly
influenced by Lombroso's theory of the 'born delinquent' ,26
claimed that in reality an anarchist was simply a common
delinquent who aimed to profit materially from the movement's
political programme. It was on these grounds, naturally, that
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the	 state
	 persecuted	 anarchists	 and	 socialists.	 This,
however, was done less on the basis of true 	 acts of
delinquency and more on the implications of their political
programmes.	 On these grounds all 'subversive' associations
were abolished in October 1894.	 According to the Milanese
prefect, responsible for this measure, the PSI programme
aimed	 to	 demolish	 every	 'organismo	 giuridico-sociale
stabilito e garantito dalla attuale legislazione' (Canosa, p.
53). As a result of this a situation was created in which
the simplest phrase could be condemned as 'eccitamento
all'odio fra le classi' or 'istigazione a delinquere' or
'apologia del reato', even if expressed in an empty room.
According to Canosa and Santosuosso (p. 107), referring in
particular to article 247:
Si tratta di un complesso di norme che, anche se compreso nel
titolo dei delitti contro l'ordine pubblico e non in quello
contro i poteri dello stato, aveva una chiara impostazione
politica. Erano, cioe sostanzialmente costruite in modo da
consentire di colpire gli oppositori, sia partiti che singoli
militanti e cittadini, sia nelle manifestazioni politiche pi0
minute: finanche l'affermazione fatta in una osteria ormai
deserta.
As an example of this, the director of the democratic
newspaper, Il Lamone, was imprisoned for five months and seven
days for publishing an article in July 1894 criticising the
.)
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new measures of internal exile on the grounds that the
article was considered not only offensive towards the law but
also a form of incitement to law-breaking (Canosa/Santosuosso
pp. 116-118). Similarly the Circolo Socialista of Legnano in
the Venetian region was accused of 'eccitamento all'odio fra
le classi' simply because it had taken part in the 1893 PSI
congress in Reggio Emilia in which delegates from other
regions of the country had expressed solidarity towards the
mass rebellion in Sicily that year.	 The Socialist 'Inno dei
Lavoratori' was also 	 an easy victim of the legislation
(Canosa/Santosuosso, pp. 128-135).
Indeed, the authors point out that it was very easy to
confuse 'eccitamento all'odio di classe' with 'eccitamento
alla guerra civile' which carried a higher prison sentence,
just as it was possible to interpret social criticism as
'eccitamento all'odio' etc., so that:
C'era un evidente utilizzo dell'elasticitA ed
indeterminatezza delle formule legislative per colpire chi in
qualche modo era gia deciso che dovesse essere colpito (pp.
120-121).
On occasions, however, the provincial courts clearly moved
against the desires of the executive. In this sense the
appeal court of Lucca declared on 7 February 1895 that:
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la sola adesione di una associazione al congresso socialista
di Reggio Emilia non era sufficiente per ritenere che essa
fosse costituita per eccitare alla disobbedienza delle leggi,
ed all'odio tra le classi sociali e che, per
l'inapplicabilitA dell'art. 5 della legge 316, 1894, era
necessario la prova concreta che l'associazione avesse lo
scopo di sovvertire con vie di fatto gli ordinamenti sociali
(Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 61).
Such liberal orientation was usually corrected, however, by
the Cassation Court which , closely tied to the minister of
justice, tended to confirm sentences and revise acquittals
(Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 136).
Berselli notes a certain continuity between the pre and
post-unification regimes
	 in terms
	 not only
	 of police
legislation but also police personnel so that with the
coming of legislation the first to enrol in the Italian
police forces were policemen from ex-dynasties. In the Papal
states, for example:
sono le vecchie guardie ponteficie a chiedere di essere
assunte e talvolta accompagnano la domanda con una
raccomandazione del parocco che attesta la moralitA e
soprattutto la necessitA di ordine materiale (Berselli, pp.
178-9).
i
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This is significant if one is to consider the barbarous
nature of pre-unification police systems inherited by the new
kingdom of Italy. Canosa notes the brutality of both
Carabinieri and Guardie di PS of Piedmont which, of course,
was the forerunner in the process of unification, so that:
gli interrogatori dell'uno come degli altri si equivalevano
per brutalita, scarsa umanita, tentativi di aggravare la
posizione degli arrestati, spingendoli a difendersi per poter
imputarlo il reato di resistenza, violenza, false promesse,
minacce, ecc. C...) I rapporti tra polizia e magistratura
erano totalmente sbilanciati a favore della prima la quale
era solita trattenere in carcere gli imputati assolti dal
giudici' (Canosa, La polizia, cit., p. 13).
Tarantini similarly describes the network of spies set up in
the Papal states to control the movements of the so-called
'classe del pensatori'. Viola mentions that police massacres
were the most popularly used repressive methods in Europe
especially in the Papal states and the Two Sicilies. The
pope's soldiers employed such methods in Forli (Romagna) on
21 January 1832 in order to intimidate would-be rebels.27
It is clear, therefore, that with unification the public
continued to consider police 'thugs', especially since the
new regime in no way altered the generally impoverished and
illiterate state of the forces, so Berselli claims (p. 179).
Canosa also states that:
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la sostituzione del nuovo ordine all'antico era avvenuto in
modo da turbare 11 meno possibile gli antichi assetti del
potere (ii dislocamento di posizioni tra nobilitA e borghesia
sarebbe venuto in modo assai pit) indolore) anche se le
burocrazie della nuova Italia erano destinate a distinguersi
assai poco da quella della vecchia (Canosa, La polizia, cit.,
pp. 14-15).
The preventive police system characterising unified Italy
was in in reality a better defined and coordinated version of
the pre-unification instrument of the absolutist regimes,
somewhat intent on the restiction of liberal advancement and
with little desire for humanitarian progression.
In this light the use of Carabinieri alongside the regular
army for the repression of such democratic movements as
southern Italian 'Brigandage' whose exponents were portrayed
as 'cutthroats' against whom the Carabiniere l figlio del
popolo, protettore dei deboli, difensore della societal
risked his life, concealed the reality of cruel suffocation
of mass political advancement.	 Indeed according to Canosa:
La	 repressione	 del	 brigantaggio	 (I l assetto	 politico
giuridico nel cui quadro i governi della destra moderata,
incapaci di uscire altrimenti della posizione minoritaria in
cui si trovarono nel sud, fecero ricorso alla dittatura
militare per battere ii movimento democratico) concorse
validamente ad imprimere fin dall'inizio all'apparato dello
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stato unitario un'impronta burocratico-poliziesca in funzione
anti-contadina e antipopolare.28
Similarly the police system was particularly brutal and
corrupt in the repression of Anarchy. If the legislation of
1889 perfected the instruments necessary for suffocating the
movement Questori were well capable of fabricating or
provoking anarchist terrorist attacks, using false witnesses
and 'agenti provocatori' (usually criminals who received a
suspended prison sentence in return for favours to the
Questura)	 to that end."
	 D'Orsi claims, for example, that
it was the Questore of Florence, Serafini, who organized the
assassination attempt on Umberto I in 1878.
	 The Florentine *
Internationalist Cesare Batacchi, imprisoned for life for the
crime, was acquitted in 1901 following declarations from most
witnesses that they had been forced to provide false
testimonies. An equally tragic case was that of the
republican Frezzi, arrested following another attack on the
sovereign in 1897, simply because he appeared alongside the
anarchist and suspected author of the plot, Acciarito.
Alleged to have committed suicide in his cell, contradictory
declarations by the Questura in Rome made it clear that he
had been murdered. The impunity of the police forces in such
affairs (in the Frezzi case all police officers and officials
were acquitted, whilst the prime minister Rudini even
attempted to exempt the Questore of Rome from giving evidence
at the trial) demonstrates the connivance of the judiciary in
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the persecution of anarchists.3°
Explanations of excesses on the part of the police towards
the Anarchist movement lie in both the desire to justify
stronger forms of government with the use of 'leggi
eccezionali' and the obvious prestige successful operations
bestowed upon them. According to D'Orsi, the bomb attack on
Umberto I of 1878, for example, aimed to put an end to plans
of the Cairoli government to reverse policing policies (p.
15) and Coletti indeed hints at the success of the plot which
forced the government to resign (p. 27). The Questure, aware
of their weaknesses and deficiencies, obviously desired to
put their hands on any element capable of conviction (with
the use of false witnesses, etc.) in order to win over
recognition from public opinion for either punishing
terrorists or preventing attacks at the last moment (Coletti,
pp. 16-7). This explanation reflects a far more deeply rooted
phenomenon, particularly evident in the Italian police system
from the end of the nineteenth century: an archaic, badly
organized and undermanned force, as considered below.
The late 1890s, from where the case study of policing in
the province of Bologna takes its course, are demonstrative
of the heritage of prevention legislation and a politically
conscious police system in Italy. Though the effects of the
anti-Socialist/Anarchist legislative instrument have been
examined, attention should now be drawn towards those mass
protests - in the form of strikes and demonstrations -
dominating the period researched on and the relationship of
I
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the	 police	 and	 judiciary	 towards	 such	 democratic
expressions. If, according to Neppi Modona, prior to the
1889 penal code the 'ragionevole causa' of article 386 of the
1859 penal code generally allowed the punishment of the
strike weapon on every occasion, the acrobatics often required
to	 ensure	 this,	 together
	 with	 increasingly	 liberal
expectations of public opinion, saw the need for legislative
alterations.	 The author points out, however, that articles
165 and 166 of the 1889 code, which judged the legality of
the strike weapon in terms of possible acts of violence and
intimidation accompanying it, represented, rather than
progress in the liberal sense 'un perfezionamento delle
finalitA
	 repressive	 che	 si	 erano	 venute	 sviluppando
attraverso l'interpretazione giurisprudenziale dell'art 386
del codice sardo'. 31
 Leonida Bissolati, a prominent
Socialist figure at the end of the nineteenth century indeed
warned in Critica Sociale of 15 January 1891 that the effects
of the legislation were such that:
Se fra gli scioperanti sorga alcuno a parlare additando nella
costituzione sociale le cause della miseria dei lavoratori e
inculcando le necessitA che questi abbiano a riunirsi in
lotta contro lo sfruttamento capitalista, tutti i buoni
procuratori regi e tutti i buoni giudici troveranno che si
incita all'odio fra le classi sociali in modo pericoloso per
la pubblica tranquillitA e interverranno con la forza.
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Here he was, of course, referring to the possible use of
article 247 of the 1889 code in the repression of strikes.
The 1890s, therefore, saw little change in the severity
with which the courts dealt with the strike. This was also
due to increasing doubts on the part of the judiciary as to
the possibility of peaceful Socialist development.	 The
period	 was	 dominated	 by	 the	 dissolution	 of	 worker
organizations	 (too	 often	 associated	 with	 Anarchist
aspirations), the repression of strikes and demonstrations
through police intimidation, indiscriminate mass arrests and
the substitution of strikers with soldiers - as revealed in
Chapter III - illustrating the continued failure of the
ruling classes to distinguish between the PSI and the
Anarchists, political and economic demonstrations as well as
the continued alignment of the judiciary to the will of the
executive. This culminated in the brutal military repression
of bread riots in Milan in May 1898 causing the deaths of 80,
and injury of 450 demonstrators. The prime minister
Rudini was forced to declare a state of martial law, with the
use of military tribunals, as most of the nation rioted in
response to the massacre.
	
His immediate successor General
Pelloux	 decreed	 the	 dissolution	 of	 all	 subversive
associations on 22 June (D'Orsi, p. 20, Modona, p. 88).
According to Canosa/Santosuosso, such manifestations had
mostly been spontaneous and dictated by hunger rather than
true desire for insurrection (p. 89). Many eminent
politicians and jurists recognised the brutal reaction of
1
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government forces towards the demonstrations which, even if
in some way influenced by the subversive parties, were in
reality caused - in the words of Rivista Penale- by:
il malcontento, il disgusto delle popolazioni per il modo con
cui sono governate, per l'eccesso e la sperequazione del
balzelli, per il trionfo della immoralitA e della corruzione,
per la mala amministrazione della giustizia (...).
The periodical ridiculed the role of military tribunals in
condemning 'una continua sfilata di femminucce e di
adolescenti imputati di aver fatto e promosso la guerra
civile' (Canosa/Santosuosso, pp. 89- 90).
The repression of 1898 convinced many members of the ruling
classes, urged on by public opinion in general, that the
advancement of the masses could not be halted.
The policies of Giovanni Giolitti (interior minister from
February 1901 to November 1903 and then prime minister almost
uninterruptedly until April 1914) were certainly based on the
need for a new policing strategy, alongside economic and
administrative reforms, though there are varying opinions as
to his true intentions and success in this. In his
parliamentary speech of 4 February 1901, ten days before
becoming interior minister in the Zanardelli government, he
recognised the advancement of the masses and their necessary
integration into the 'alvea istituziona10. 32
 In this light,
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at least initially, faithful 110 the new alignment between
Turati's Reformist Socialism and his government, he urged
distinction between Socialism and Anarchy, between political
and economic strikes, the latter of which could be considered
legal as long as they were not accompanied by acts of
violence (Neppi Modona, p. 90), relaxing excessive
interpretation of already existing legislation, rather than
changing the penal code, and implementing social legislation
to the benefit of the masses.33
According to D'Orsi, Giolitti did not intend to renounce
using the police organs for the defence of the ruling classes
but accentuated 'gli aspetti e i metodi meno appariscenti,
pi0 approssimativamente legalitari'. He gave preference to
the police over the army, the PS over the Carabinieri,
prefects over army generals, etc. (D'Orsi, p. 22). This
would indeed account for legislative moves during the
Giolittian decade to increase the force and prestige of both
police corps, particularly the Guardie di PS, though, as
described in Chapter III, such moves were apparent rather
than real, reflecting the reluctance of the prime minister to
oppose military hierarchies by totally excluding them from
police services. They also denoted the limits of his
pacifist/mediatory policies towards the Socialist movement,
especially following his break with Turati in March 1903 and
the PSI's	 dominance by revolutionary factions, from 1904
onwards.	 The politically motivated general strike, which
came to dominate the decade was usually declared by the PSI
i
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in protest at continued police massacres. According to
D'Orsi (p. 22), there were 50 deaths and 500 injuries, mostly
at the hands of the Carabinieri, on official records between
1901 and 1904 alone.
Similarly, the role of 'mediator' instilled in the
Giolittian prefect, who, according to Fried, was no longer to
side automatically with the employers during disputes and was
to study wage rather than troop figures, had severe
limitations.	 Many were reluctant to break their personal
solidarity with the ruling classes or found having to mediate
among 'subversives' or workers degrading. 	 Others were
unconvinced that giving the socialists greater political
freedom	 would put an end to the threat of revolution (pp.
147-8). D'Orsi claims that the traditional repressive and
policeman-like mentality of the prefect posed automatic
resistance to Giolitti's efforts (p. 21). Fried again points
out the ambiguities of Giolittian 'trasformismo'. The
prefect retained his traditional role of electoral agent,
especially in the south where, according to the author,
election	 rigging	 reached	 unprecedented	 heights	 of
brutality.34
If initially Giolitti and the judiciary did not agree over
the application of more liberal policies in the courts, the
changed political climate from 1903 saw a return to
collaboration between the two over the repression of the most
revolutionary of PSI activities 	 (Neppi Modona, p. 97).
Indeed the use of article 154 of the penal code (violenza
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privata), carrying between three and five years'
imprisonment, for the punishment of violence committed during
general strikes and the most radical forms of boycotting -
mentioned in Chapter III - instead of articles 165 and 166,
which carried	 lighter prison sentences, signified, in Neppi
Modona's	 opinion,	 their	 political	 alignment	 with	 the
government. 35
	Similarly Giolitti had the support of the
judiciary in his militarization of railway workers in 1902
and their categorization as 'pubblici ufficiali' in 1905
(article 18 of Regio Decreto 137 of 22 April 1905) so that an
organized strike could be penalized under article 181 of the
penal code (delitto di rifiuto d'atti d'ufficio) - also
extended to state employees by law 693 of 22 November 1908.
This is demonstrated by their prosecution of most railway
strikers under that article even if the necessary condition
of 'previo concerto' (ie on the orders of the union) was
mostly overlooked.36
An important factor in Giolitti's failed police strategy
was	 his	 incapacity,	 like	 his	 predecessors,
	 to	 alter
sufficiently a police system which by the end of the
nineteenth century was out of date and no longer adapted to
the social and political realities of the nation. During the
1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century new
legislation aimed, though with little effect, to improve the
quality and organization of police administration and the two
police corps.	 Legislation concerning the Guardie di PS is
particularly significant because it suggests efforts on the
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part of the state to increase the prestige and military
nature of the corps, almost certainly reflecting the desire
to remove its sense of inferiority towards the Carabinieri.
Law 7321 of 21 December 1890 increased the corps, under the
new name of Guardie di CittA, to a total of five thousand.37
Law 173 of 31 march 1892 allowed the transfer of army
officers to the corps on the condition that they passed an
examination 'al fine di mostrare che erano in possesso delle
cognizioni	 indispensabili	 per	 l'esercizio	 delle	 nuove
funzioni'.	 The law confirmed the incorporation of Guardie 
into 'compagnie di disciplina' as well as the application
of sanctions prescribed by the military penal code for
desertion or insubordination (Arista, pp. 23-24). The
decree law of 27 June 1897 was also fundamental because
whereas previously PS officials led Guardie police
operations, this task was now assigned to Guardie officers
(Arista, p. 28). Under Giolitti, Law 269 of 30 June 1901
brought the corps to a total of 7,555 men, who were
recruited, in order of preference, from the Carabinieri and
the army.	 Similarly Law 318 of 8 July 1906 increased its
numerical strength to 10,855. Both the 1901 and 1906
legislation aimed, along with several ministerial circulars
to encourage greater recruitment with salary increase, better
promotion possibilities and pension scales. Again of notable
importance was the 'equiparazione' of the Guardie di CittA to
the Carabinieri and army in 1903 in terms of ranks and
military salutes which in the words of Giolitti 'dimostra in
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quale conto e tenuto dal Governo 11 corpo delle Guardie di
CittA' in his 'Circolare' of 14 August 1903.38
Legislative moves also aimed to improve the Carabinieri.
On 17 May 1884 a "Scuola per aspiranti a grado di
sottotenente" was founded alongside the Legione Allievi with
the intention of:
allargare le cognizioni 	 letterarie e scientifiche degli
aspiranti	 ufficiali	 e	 dar	 loro mezzo	 di	 perfezionare
l'istruzione militare e di impratichirsi nell'equitazione.
This	 was	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 future	 Scuola	 ufficiali 
Carabinieri.	 On 21 April 1887 the corps increased in number
to a total of 622 officers and 24,004 troops. 39	Under
Giolitti, Law 647 of 30 December 1906 'concernante
provvedimenti per L'Arma del Reali Carabinieri' clearly aimed
to increase the attraction of the corps for recruitment
purposes, with pay rises, an increased number of officers, a
training school for promotion possibilities and financial
bonuses for those renewing their contracts. The above
legislative moves reflect Giolitti's desire for the use of
both Carabinieri and Guardie di CittA as an alternative to
the army for policing duties, the former particularly for the
more repressive aspects of crowd control (usually undertaken
by the army).
	
This was almost certainly a consequence of
growing fear of the unreliability of the army during
demonstrations	 whether	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 possible
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fraternization with the demonstrators or in terms of the
fatal consequences of their employment as illustrated by the
events of 1898.
Within the Amministrazione di Pubblica Sicurezza 
legislative moves from the end of the nineteenth century
clearly aimed to improve the position of its dependants.
With Regio Decreto 226 of 12 May 1881 its ranks were aligned
with those in other administrative bodies.
	 Promotion on
merit prevailed over 'anzianita' (number of years' service)
for officials. On 4 February 1883 a special 'corso di
perfezionamento' was founded for 'aspiranti alla carriera di
funzionari di PS' and promotions within the ranks of police
funzionari (Renato, pp. 346-7). Again under Giolitti Regio 
Decreto 512 of 12 December 1901 improved the career prospects
for officials, quickening promotion possibilities. The
decree law of 25 October 1903 made a forensic police course
obligatory for a PS career, whilst Law 3187 of 8 July 1906
founded a new rank of Vice-Questore with the task of
assisting the Questore (Renato, pp. 347-8).
The frequency of intellectual criticism of the police
forces at the end of the nineteenth century well illustrates
the inadequacy of the new legislation, however . 	 In 1890 an
ex-interior minister stated that the multiplicity and the
variability of ministerial instructions, often counteracted
by secret circulars, placed the police official in a position
where he no longer felt that his action would be supported by
his superiors, so that 'é appunto questa certezza che gli
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manca sovente e tale mancanza lo rende fiacco, esitante, e
gli vieta di prendere iniziative che possono in qualsivoglia
guisa comprometterlo' .40 Alongi in his 1895 article in Nuova
Antologia lamented about the incompetence of interior
ministry officials in the Direzione Generale di Pubblica 
Sicurezza because of their passing so easily from one
ministry to another. At the provincial level prefects and
sub-prefects had no police-training unless they had been
promoted from the rank of Questore. Continuous transfers and
role changes in the personnel we 're the natural cause of
deficiencies so that:
Ii funzionario rivelatosi abile a Roma nel servizio
investigativo tramutato a Napoli, si trova condannato a far
permessi d'arma e fogli di via. Le guardie prestano oggi
servizio in divisa, domani in borghese, i carabinieri sono
addetti indistintamente al servizio preventivo, senza
distinzione di territorio, di centri abitati, e, starci per
dire, di latitudine.
The situation was worsened by the failure of the police
organization to divide and distinguish between various
administrative mandates and active police services, so that
young , active funzionari often found themselves doing desk-
work when they could have been a greater asset on the
streets. To this he added the persistence of inadequate
promotion opportunities and salary increase schemes so that
3
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too many years 	 service were required to achieve promotion.
Bureaucratic pettiness only obstructed police officers in the
course of their duty. It took 24 hours for an official to
obtain permission to leave his place of residence on mission,
giving, for example, a criminal he was searching for a 24
hour head start. Such physical deficiencies as lack of
telephones and telegraphic facilities only heightened these
difficulties.41
Alongi	 also	 saw police	 deficiencies in terms of an
underdeveloped forensic police system.
	
Better training
facilities were essential. He criticised the lack of
academic qualifications possessed by police officials and the
habit on compromising on these when admitting candidates to
the career of police funzionario. 	 He added that following
admission at least a years / training should take place (p.
256). Lack of literature 	 and library facilities for the
study of policing techniques was the fault of the interior
ministry which had neve considered nominating a technical
commission to the above ends. Officials only had reference to
Ricasoli's Istruzioni of 1867, by now well out of date, so
that '6 lasciata all'iniziativa personale, donde l'empirismo
dominante gli errori e gli insuccessi ovunque deplorati ed
addossati al personale'	 (pp. 130-37).	 Fiorentino justly
points out that the usually double role of prime minister
and interior minister under one and the same person naturally
restricted the time and energy available to him for the above
considerations. 42
4
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These deficiencies naturally placed the police in an inferior
position towards the army and the judiciary which had all the
necessary facilities and 	 scientifically and technically
advanced methodologies (p. 250).
Both Codronchi (1895) and Alongi (1897) consider low police
numbers and a low ministerial budget key factors in the
police	 crisis.	 Codronchi compared a total of 600 Guardie 
di CittA allocated to the city of Naples to over fifteen
thousand policemen in London.
	 Similarly
	 if the last
national PS budget totalled nearly 14 million lire, the 1894
Paris city budget alone totalled almost twice as much.43
Indeed, according to Alongi, with little more than one
policeman to a thousand citizens and an annual average of
607,000 crimes, the punishment of 45% of crimes could be
considered praiseworthy (p. 142).
Finally the phenomenon of dualism between two or more
police forces was in no way saved from criticism.
	 In urban
areas the presence of Guardie di CittA and Guardie Municipali 
(municipal police) had the effect of failing to repress or
prevent crime since neither of the two corps claimed that any
particular task lay under their legal competences (Ex-
Ministro dell'Interno, p. 736). Codronchi saw the attempted
militarization of the Guardie di citta, characterized by
their accomodation in barracks and the impossibility of
marrying (later abrogated, however), as counterproductive to
the requirements of a police force since it rendered the
guards passive soldiers only capable of obeying orders, when
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in reality spontaneity and initiative were required of him.
He suggested the unification of the Guardie di citta and the
municipal police (p. 219). Sciacca in his 1905 essay opposed
moves to demilitarize the police on the grounds that, unlike
other European nations where civilian police forces
functioned successfully the indisciplined nature of the
Italian character, especially within the social classes from
which policemen were recruited, militarisation was necessary
in order to maintain a disciplined police force.44
Alongi again criticised the disunity of the police system
and the illusions created by Article 1 of the 'Legge sul
servizio e attribuzioni degli ufficiali ed agenti di PS' of
21 December 1890 which reiterated 1865 norms on the immediate
subordination of all policemen to the prefect, stating that
in reality:
l'azione del centro 6 sentito piD o meno intensamente dalle
sole prefetture, perch6 le unita inferiori sfuggono agli
impulsi direttivi. I carabinieri obbediscono ad un loro
ordinamento autonomo ed inflessibile e le polizie municipali
	 a nessuno (p. 252).
That Giolitti's new legislation was recognised by Sciacca as
something of an asset to the desired improvement of the
police system in Italy is expressed in his 1905 essay, though
he still stressed that there was plenty of room for further
change.	 He acknowledged that the 	 1901 legislation improved
,t
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the careers of PS officials, giving them faster promotion
prospects, for example, as well as the increase in Guardie 
and Carabinieri, but added that the few financial resources
available for policing were being wasted on too many corps
and that the officials needed to be better organized in terms
of rank and areas of responsibility. There were not enough
Questori to assist prefects - Law 409 of 21 August 1901
designated them to cities with a population of over a hundred
thousand - whilst the third class of commissars needed to be
abolished since it proved itself to be less capable than
the rank of delegates immediately below it in the hierarchy.
There were still too many transfers whilst bonuses and
rewards were granted more as a stimulus than for outstanding
qualities.
	
Unjust	 punishments	 often	 disorientated
funzionari, destroying any faith they had in their superiors
(pp. 320-24). The founding of agent! ausiliari (Law 269 of
30 June 1901) for office work left much to be desired. While
it was true that officials were relieved of bureaucratic
tasks, Sciacca suggested that it would be more efficient if
'ausiliari' were used for active police investigative work
alongside normal officials and retiring to office work when
they reached the age at which they were no longer fit for
active service (p. 325). Indeed with the coming of Law 618
of 30 December 1906 the agenti ausiliari were abolished
(Arista, p. 26).
According to Sciacca the number of Carabinieri though
increased was still inadequate.	 If another three thousand
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were voted by the Chamber of Deputies in 1904 (taking the
total to well over 28,000) in reality at least 30,000 were
needed. The author also maintained that if the number of
service renewals had increased from 2,500 to 3,500 per year,
in reality 5,000 per year were necessary. He added that the
manner in which renewals were obtained was counterproductive
in that pension prospects for Carabinieri refusing renewal
were so depressing that they could be considered almost
punitive in character, and this, according to the author,
accounted for the failure to obtain sufficient enrolments.
Again the author stressed that Carabinieri should be placed
into auxiliary services once they were no longer fit for
active work,fernlitting them an extra 15 years service and an
improved pension. He also criticised the lack of sufficient
transport means for the corps and the need to directly
connect rural Carabinieri headquarters directly with local
telegraphic stations (pp. 326 - 8).
Finally, as a solution to the dualism still	 inherent in
the police system, Sciacca suggested that urban policing
should be left to only one corps, the Guardie di CittA, which
should take on an increased military character, whilst the
municipal police should be abolished. 	 In turn a special
squad of agenti ausiliari 'in borghese' should be chosen from
the Guardie and Carabinieri 	 for delicate investigative
operations (pp. 320-26).
The	 seriousness	 of an	 inefficient	 incoherent	 and
undermanned police system in Italy throughout the period
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researched and in the face of an every-growing Socialist
revolutionary movement indeed forms a considerable part of
this thesis. Archival investigation illustrates in fact that
the situation described by Sciacca in 1905 in no way improved
substantially and that, as indeed Fiorentino points out in
her study of policing under Giolitti, lack of numbers had the
double effect of placing the emphasis of police work on
political affairs to the detriment of the repression of
common crime	 and	 increasing conflict between the
civilian	 (PS/Guardie)	 and	 military	 (army/Carabinieri)
authorities, given extensive and often excessive requests by
prefects for military force for the control 	 of mass
revolutionary development, a phenomenon lasting throughout
the years under examination (p. 67, p. 101, pp. 114-20). As
demonstrated in Chapter III, the failure to update the
Italian police system and improve the living and working
conditions of its dependents also meant failure to change its
nineteenth century outlook and almost encouraged neglect of
duties and indiscipline.
The disastrous state in which the police forces emerged
from the First World War necessitated radical updating.
Funzionari, Guardie di PS and Carabinieri were numerically
insufficient
	
and badly paid and	 generally suffered
miserable living conditions. As a result of this preventive
police services were almost non-existent.	 Ministerial funds
were lacking and neither of the corps could fill up the
I
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numerous vacant positions. 45	If during the war years many
saw enrolment in the Guardie di CittA as a comfortable
alternative to the trenches, so that disciplinary
regulations, long and tiring shifts and low pay seemed
insignificant, the coming of peace totally changed such an
outlook. Realizing their low wage levels (despite the
increase stipulated by Law 1732 of 14 October 1917) the
majority refused to renew their contracts which expired six
months after the coming of peace and remained inside their
offices, rather than fighting crime in the streets.
Similarly, many Carabinieri, discredited during the war for
their role as military police which involved the rounding up
of deserters, preferred not to renew their contracts.45
Post-war governments were unsure as to the manner in which
the police system should be reinvigorated. They had no doubts
as to the dangers of employing troops, because of their
proletarian composition and the risk, therefore, that they
might side with the masses in the case of insurrection.47
Francesco Nitti, who became prime minister in June 1919, was,
on the other hand sceptical of the idea of giving the
Carabinieri a policing monopoly which would probably mean
placing police power in the hands of military hierarchies (if
not the crown itself) . 48 The special commission set up by
the Orlando government in March 1919, led by Camillo
Corradini, concluded that police power should be liberated
from the control of the army and that the interior ministry
police system should obtain '18 massima autonomia e tecnicitA
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(....)
	
al	 di	 fuori	 di	 ogni	 corpo e comando militare'
in the founding of a 'corpo speciale di indole professionale,
reclutato ai fini della polizia' (as he told Il Giornale 
d'Italia on 21 March 1919.) (Donati, p. 449).
On the basis of this, Law 1790 of 2 October 1919
undoubtedly strengthened the appeal and morale of the Guardie 
di citta (and of course that of the interior ministry) by
turning the corps into an enlarged armed force of 25,000
agenti - of which 500 cavalry - and 337 officers under the
new name of Regie Guardie (D'Orsi, p. 25). Its increased
military character was demonstrated by its division into
seven legions (in turn divided into divisions, companies,
lieutenencies and local headquarters or Stazioni) - similar
to the Carabinieri - with a general command consisting of two
lieutenant generals and two major generals. Training schools
for cadets and officers were also founded. Article 1 of the
'disegno di legge per la costituzione di un corpo di Regie
Guardie' of 6 September 1919 stated that legislation
regarding Carabinieri officers - their participation in armed
conflict, for example - now equally applied to Regie Guardie 
officers. Its aspired equality if not superiority as a police
force over the Carabinieri is illustrated by the
reconfirmation of the latter's role as principally a rural
force and the equality of their salary scales.
The position of the interior ministry was equally boosted
by the founding of agenti investigativi by Decreto Legge 
1442, a corps of eight thousand ex-Guardie di CittA'in
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borghese',	 for	 criminal	 investigation	 work	 (leaving
administrative and judicial tasks to the Regie 
Guardie)(Flores, pp. 178-9, Donati, pp. 447-8). According to
Flores, the decree also improved the working conditions of
police funzionari. Questori were placed in all provincial
capitals. Officers were given easier promotion possibilities
and each grade increased in number, while salaries increased
so that they were much higher than those received by other
state funzionari.	 'AnzianitA' was also a factor governing
salary levels. Given the creation of agenti investigativi 
tasks were better divided among Pubblica Sicurezza personnel.
Bureaucratic tasks were no longer the responsability of
funzionari but of the police administrative secretaries
(Flores, pp. 178-9).
The Carabinieri Reali, however, also underwent improvements
to counter the state in which they emerged from the war. The
decree of 2 October 1919 brought the total number of
Carabinieri to 60,000 (75,000 in 1922), dividing the corps
into nineteen territorial legions with seven group commands,
a cadets' legion, a training school for officers and a
training	 school	 for	 non-commissioned	 officers
(Sottufficiali). The following decree law of 20 November
1919 stipulated that two thirds of new officers were to be
recruited from the army (the remaining third from the corps
itself). In May 1920 eighteen autonomous mobile battalions
of Carabinieri were founded with the aim of combatting the
threat of revolution, demonstrating that the corps was in no
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way seriously relegated to a second-rate position. Again two
thirds of their members were directly recruited from the army
(Enciclopedia del diritto, Vol. VI, p. 269).	 According to
Flores (p, 182), both officers and agenti received salary
increases.
Donati reveals, however, several key errors in interior
ministry moves to ensure that the Regie Guardie adapted to
new policing requirements. Firstly, he criticised efforts to
excessively militarise the corps. This was demonstrated by
article 14 of the founder law which allowed the passage of
army officers into the corps and article 10 which similarly
allowed the recruitment of non-commissioned Carabinieri 
officers.	 To this may be added its equipping with military
type vehicles and machine gunners.	 This naturally enhanced
the ill-feeling of the armed forces towards the corps, but
more importantly, according to Donati, 'prese il
sopravento, a discapito dell'autoritA civile della PS' so
that:
Gli ufficiali non appena trasferitisi nel nuovo organismo,
cercarono	 di	 recreare	 condizioni	 e	 modi	 di	 vita
nell'esercito, favoriti delle particolori protezioni
politiche di cui si sentirono, vollero creare una visione
quasi mistica della Regia Guardia quale continuatrice, in
tempo di pace, dei gloriosi episodi dell'esercito vittorioso
(Donati, p. 451).
i
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If, according to the author, there were no limits to spending
so that by 1922 the corps had increased to a total of forty
thousand men and there were three times as many officers as
there had been in the Guardie di Cittá in reality the corps
did not develop the role to which the interior ministry
aspired. 49 Indeed L'Illustrazione Italiana of 17 September
1922 stated that though there were now eight thousand Regie 
Guardie in Rome (as opposed to nine hundred Guardie di Citta,
previously)	 crimes	 were	 on	 the	 increase.	 The	 corps
erroneously considered itself a military organization and not
a professional police force.
	 It needed, after three years'
existence, to better identify itself with its intended
civilian attributes.	 Nitti had given the Guardie uniforms
but not 'spirito di corpo'.
The police legislation of 1919, if undoubtedly improving
and enlarging the forces, was still relatively inefficient
in dealing with the needs of the post-war years. The failure
of Socialist revolution was a reflection not so much of the
repressive capacity of Italy's government forces but more of
the unwillingness of party leaders to put their revolutionary
theories into practice. Indeed the continued weak state of
the police forces was such that in September 1920 Giolitti
preferred not to put them to the test in the face of factory
occupations which the metalworkers carried out. D'Orsi states
that on other occasions, however:
-53-
l'eccidio proletario ritornO all'ordine del giorno. Nel
numero del 1 maggio 1920 Avanti! pubblicO l'elenco dei morti
proletari per mano poliziesca nei dodici mesi che vanno
dall'aprile 1919 all'aprile 1920:	 145 morti e 44 feriti
gravi: nello stesso giorno a Torino venivano uccisi 4 operai,
mentre numerosi altri erano feriti dalla forza pubblica e
altre uccisioni Si verificarono in Istria e Calabria."
Research on the province of Bologna during the period
concerned suggests, however, that on many occasions police
violence
	 may	 have	 been	 the	 result	 of	 a	 sense	 of
defencelessness and the incompetence of their superiors - as
demonstrated by frequent transfers - rather than a reflection
of their anti-revolutionary spirit. The case-study shows
that in no way did the Regie Guardie come to dominate
policing, as had originally been intended, as is proven by
the frequent use of the army, despite the risks of
fraternization this entailed, and of the Carabinieri, which
continued urban services alongside their rival corps, despite
reiterations to the contrary in the 1919 legislation.	 The
thesis	 also	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 increased	 military
character of the Regie Guardie only heightened their autonomy
from the prefectoral authorities so that police officials
often experienced lack of cooperation from their commanders
over the use of Guardie for police operations.
The rise to power of Benito Mussolini at the end of October
1922 saw radical changes in the organization of the Italian
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police system, though again the extent to which these cured
its long-term deficiencies is uncertain.	 Firstly, Law 1680
of 31 December 1922 abolished both the Regie Guardie and
Agenti Investigativi which were absorbed into the Carabinieri 
Reali, an obvious blow to the interior ministry. 	 The
abolition of these corps may be attributed to the general
unpopularity they had created, especially within military
circles. Mussolini in fact entrusted General Giardino of the
army high command with the task of compiling a report on the
functioning of the Regie Guardie in November 1922, the
results of which revealed excessive ministerial spending and
general corruption.	 Of particular significance, its general
command was strongly involved in:
episodi di favoritismi e di lotte intestine che originavano e
si alimentavano nella corruzione propria di quel mondo
politico che della regie guardia aveva fatto riserva di
caccia personale, vantandone la sottomissione diretta al
potere	 'politico'	 del	 ministero	 dell'interno	 e	 della
Presidenza del Consiglio.51
The report concluded that:
Ii servizio di sicurezza e d'ordine pubblico deve essere
affidato ad un corpo organizzato a tipo militare, retto
unicamente da disciplina militare, 	 con	 le garanzie	 di
giustizia in uso nell'esercito.	 Meglio, deve far parte
I
li
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dell'esercito, averne il morale e le tradizioni.	 Sono i
nostri magnifici Carabinieri.	 A disposizione del Ministero
dell'Interno per l'impiego, dipendenti dalla Guerra per il
resto.
	
Avere due corpi per uno stesso servizio 6 inutile e
dannoso (Donati, p. 473),
Mussolini indeed had three motives for not maintaining the
existence of the Regie Guardie. Firstly, doing so would
have meant laborious and time-consuming purges by removing
those officers particularly tied to the politics of the pre-
March on Rome governments. Secondly, the dissolution of the
corps, principally condemned for its Nittian associations,
would be looked upon favourably by military leaders, the
monarchy and the most conservative of public opinion.
Thirdly, given the founding of the new Fascist police corps,
the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN), its
maintenance may have been seen as excessive power
concentration by the new prime minister (Donati, p. 485).
According to the new legislation, both the Regie Guardie and
Agenti Investigativi would, by the end of March 1923, be
absorbed into the Carabinieri, the numerical force of which
increased from 65 to 75 thousand - of which 12 thousand were
to form a special division, known as Ruolo Specializzato, and
under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry from May
1924. Donati in his essay states, however, that:
I
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provvedimenti presi da Mussolini significavano
sostanzialmente ii congedo-licenziamento di un ingentissimo
numero di guardie che non avrebbero trovato posto nei ruoli,
di	 poco
	 aumentati,	 dell'Arma	 del	 Carabinieri.	 Se	 si
considerano	 un	 poco	 pi0	 attentamente	 le norme	 sullo
scioglimento della r.guardia, si rileva che esse furono
dettate da uno spirito punitivo nei confronti degli
appartenenti al corpo e, per la loro rapiditA di esecuzione
crearono inconvenienti abbastanza gravi nell'organizzazione
dei servizi di polizia nei mesi immediatamente successivi
alla loro applicazione.
The author continues that:
Durissimo fu ii trattamento riservato agli ufficiali della r.
guardia che potevano sl rientrare nelle categorie di
provenienza senza che perb fosse riconosciuto (...) " neanche
un giorno di servizio prestato nella r. guardia n . Non meno
severe le disposizioni	 adottate per	 i sottufficiali
militari di truppa che sarebbero stati licenziati e collocati
a riposo d'autoritA qualora non avessero trovato posto
nell'istituendo ruolo specializzato dei carabinieri in
borghese (pp. 480-1).
In April 1925, however, the Guardie di PS came back into
existence so that the definition of the Carabinieri as
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'I'unica forza armata in servizio permanente di pubblica
sicurezza' by article 1 of Law 1680 was shortlived. This
signalled, according to Collin, Mussolini's realisation that
the Carabinieri remained ultimately loyal to the king, 52 and
in Donati's opinion (p. 487), the unreliability of the MVSN
(described below), rendering necessary the use of a new
'polizia politica'.
	 Article 19 of Regio Decreto 383 of 2
April 1925 stated that Carabinieri belonging to the Ruolo
Specializzato of the corps had the right to enter the newly
wAs
constituted Corpo degli Agenti di PS, which/dependent on the
interior ministry whilst the Carabinieri were newly relegated
to the countryside with only a token presence in the
cities.53
With Mussolini's rise to power the traditional police
system came to find itself merely a component of multiple and
conflicting police hierarchies which, according to D'Orsi,
the new leader set up in order to:
da	 una	 parte	 garantirsi	 le	 spalle	 contro	 eventuali
contraccolpi militari, poliziesche o amministrativi che
potevano tentare di rovesciare il piedistallo su cui egli si
era appena asceso, dall'altro togliere di mano ai 'ras' i
capetti dello squadrismo locale e specialmente agrario'.
Parallel to the Carabinieri, a new Fascist party corps, the
MVSN, was founded by Regio Decreto 31 of 14 January 1923.
This was a means of regimenting, and so legalizing and
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disciplining the Camicie Nere of the Milizia Fascista which
had, in unofficial form mobilized for the March on Rome in
October 1922.	 Article 3 of the law in fact stipulated that
voluntary recruitment could be carried out among
'appartenenti alla milizia fascista' between the ages of
seventeen and fifty. The corps had the task of preparing and
maintaining the regimentation of the Italian people for the
defence of the nation's world interests and and was to work
parallel to the army and the traditional Italian police
organs (article 2). All militi had to swear an oath of
allegiance to the nation (article 3 of Regio Decreto 831 of 8
March 1923). They were subject to strict military discipline
and military jurisdiction, therefore, for certain crimes, and
divided into military ranks and zones, legions, etc.54
Article 7 of the founding decree stipulated that in case of
war the MVSN automatically became a component of the army.
The rather ambiguous hierarchical dependencies of the corps
were outlined in Law 832 of 8 March 1923. Article 2 in fact
stated:
Egli 6. agli ordini del Capo del Governo, a cui e direttamente
subordinato ii Comando Generale e dipende in conseguenza
dalle proprie autoritA gerarchiche, che agiscono in accordo
col Ministero dell'Interno, e quindi con le autoritA da
questo dipendente. Eventualmente in quelle localitA ove non
esiste nessuna di dette autoritA, pub venir richiesta della
sua opera anche dai sindaci.
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Article 38 of the law stated that the MVSN could be required
for police duties by the interior minister, the Comando 
Generale, prefects and sub-prefects (following the norms in
use for requesting troops) and in exceptional circumstances
the mayors. The Comandante Generale (directly subordinated to
'Ii Duce') who was also Direttore Generale di Pubblica 
Sicurezza (later renamed Capo della Polizia with a higher
rank than director generals in other ministries) linked,
therefore, within the interior ministry two police
hierarchies, that of prefect and the traditional forces and
that	 of the	 MVSN,	 signalling,	 according to	 Fucci,	 a
divergence	 between	 'autoritA	 legale'	 and	 'autoritA
rivoluzionaria'.55
The violent and undisciplined nature of the MVSN, whose
members tended to remain loyal towards their past squad
leaders rather than towards the hierarchy of the corps was
looked upon suspiciously by the traditional police forces and
even more so the army. The latter, though glad of the
creation of a new force relieving it of its past laborious
function of emergency police force was not altogether happy
about the constitution of a military style corps over which
it had little control, according to Lyttelton, and was
embittered at the unjustly high ranks and salaries enjoyed by
officers (ex-army officers and NC0s). Lyttelton states:
Agli occhi dell'esercito la concessione di questi gradi a *
uomini che in guerra non erano stati che ufficiali subalterni
3
- 65 -
o magari a ufficiali di carriera in pensione che nella
milizia avevano ottenuto una posizione pi0 elevata dei loro
ex-pari grado rimasti in servizio attivo era uno scandalo.56
The question of possible increased control bj the army of
the MVSN was brought to a head by the crisis created by the
murder of the Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti, in June
1924, during which Mussolini actually ordered its
mobilization, so demonstrating his desire to keep a political
corps based on the Fascist movement which he could resort to
in the event of an attempted government overthrow by the
traditional police and armed forces (Lyttelton, pp. 398-401).
Decree 1292 of 4 August 1924 modified, in the words of Verne,
'criteri liberissimi di reclutamento del personale ufficiali
delle precedenti disposizioni legislative 1 . 57 Besides the
obligatory oath of allegiance to the king (article 1),
article 6 stated:
Gli ufficiali della MVSN sono tratti dagli ufficiali delle
categorie in congedo del Regio Esercito, della Regia Marina e
della Regia Aeronautica, in seguito a loro domanda; i Capi
Manipolo potranno essere reclutati anche dai cittadini e dai
capi-squadra della Milizia, previo accertamento della loro
idoneita al grado.
and most importantly, article 8:
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Gli ufficiali della MVSN all'atto della loro incorporazione
conserveranno il grado e l'anzianita assoluta loro attribuita
nelle categorie in congedo del Regio Esercito, Regio Marina e
Regio Aeronautica dalle quali provengono.	 Ii successivo
avanzamento degli ufficiali della MVSN sara regolato con
apposite norme legislative, analoghe a quelle stabilite per
la altre forze armate dello Stato. L'ufficiale della MVSN
potra essere incaricato delle funzioni di comando superiori a
quelle inerenti al grado rivestito.
This naturally forced officers who had enjoyed elevated
positions in the corps to step down to the equivalent of
their original army rank.	 Article 18 in fact stated that
only in exceptional circumstances could officers keep their
present ranks. Finally, article 11 placed the corps under the
war ministry for obligatory pre-military training. Lyttelton
states, however, that in reality the changes brought about by
the new legislation were minimal. 	 With regard to the
question of ranks, for example, militi were able to continue
to have functions in no way reflecting the inferiority of
their nominal ranks. 58 The case-study of Bologna again
demonstrates that such modifications in no way helped lower
the levels of indiscipline and violence characterising the
corps.
In policing terms the corps presented the traditional
problems of dualism similar to those encountered between the
Guardie di PS and the Carabinieri, etc., and the prefectures
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increasingly avoided resorting to a force which proved itself
inefficient from a technical point of view. The MVSN
remained in existence purely to guarantee Mussolini an extra
margin of personal power. D'Orsi correctly points out that:
La milizia fascista, lungi dall'essere come recitava l'art. 2
del decreto istitutivo 'al servizio di Dio, della Patria
Italiana', si inseriva nel sistema di organizzazioni
repressive in potenziale contrasto fra loro, a cui Mussolini
diede vita e ristrutturci a proprio uso e consumo al fine di
ottenere un pit) ampio margine di sicurezza personale
attraverso il reciproco spiarsi dei diversi organismi (pp.
32-3).
These words indeed illustrate the essence of Mussolinian
policing: the co-existence of conflicting police hierarchies
and their traditional dualism were exploited in order to
maintain the fascist leader's personal power. This would
account for Law 672 of 18 March 1923 which allowed the
interior minister	 police	 chief	 (Direttore Generale di 
Pubblica Sicurezza) to 'conferire temporaneamente per
straordinari esigenze di servizio le funzioni di questore a
persone estranee all'amministrazione' and the co-existence by
1927 of several secret political police organizations known
as 'uffici politici di investigazione' with powers at the
provincial level but not necessarily under the control of the
prefect.
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Under the direct orders of the Capo della Polizia, and
acting over and above prefects and Questori came the OVRA -
the exact meaning of the title is unknown - famous for its
anti-Communist activities and divided into territorial zones.
The prefects had similar provincial organizations under the
title of Servizio di Investigazione Politica, as well as the
MVSN (Ufficio Politico di Investigazione). 59 Though OVRA was
probably founded by the Capo della Polizia in 1927, Franco
Fucci traces its origins back to the founding of an Ufficio 
Politico within the Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza 
in 1880. Decreto Luogotenenziale 1732 of 14 october 1917 set
up a similar special investigation office under the direction
of a Questore or Ispettore di PS.
	
In 1920 an Ufficio 
Informazioni was founded. Led by a PS official, its purpose
was the collection of 'notizie inerenti all'ordine pubblico'.
Employing mostly secret informers, Fucci saw this as:
un metodo di lavoro che dunque non 6 . stato inventato dal
fascismo, ma pre-esisteva e di cui era sempre stato fatto
largo	 uso;
	 addirittura	 se	 ne	 trova	 traccia	 nella
documentazione del
	 ministero dell'interno relativo agli
ultimi anni dell'ottocento, dalla quale risulta non solo
l'esistenza degli informatori Co confidenti che dir si
voglia) ma che comprende addirittura le ricevute delle somme
a loro pagate (pp. 49-50).
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This indeed illustrates the relevance of the study of pre-
fascist police development to the Mussolinian era.
The co-existence of several police organs with conflicting
hierarchies was of course in open contradiction to
legislative norms of 1926 and 1927 re-defining the role of
the prefect and generally increasing the prestige of his
office. Law 660 of 3 April 1926 gave prefects extended powers
as ministerial administrative field agents. Article 1
endowed them with the responsability IV the unity of
political orientation of the activities of local authorities
and different ministerial services. This more or less
coincided with the abolition of municipal elections that year
so providing for the appointment, on the recommendations of
the prefect, of the Podestä who assumed the former powers and
functions of the mayors, municipal and provincial councils."
The prime minister's circular of 5 January 1927 declared the
prefect the highest state authority in the province and
direct representative of central executive power, towards
whom fascist party-militants in particular had to show
respect and obedience - defender of the regime against the
enemies of Fascism and coordinator of the political and
administrative life of the province."
The use of political (ie Fascist) prefects from 1923 onwards,
solved a contradictory situation in which Mussolini wanted to
rely on the traditional police forces as the main defender of
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his position. As Fried states (pp. 183-4), only political
prefects could check party encroachments without accusations
of anti-Fascism. Prefects were also obliged to become party
members. 62 Casula states, however that the trend of
favouring non-bureaucratic personnel during the first years
of the Fascist regime
Si esaurl in breve spazio di tempo, tant'e vero che proprio
dal regime fascista venne nel 1937 il riconoscimento
giuridico della particolare legittimazione del personale
della carriera direttiva (p. 176).
Nevertheless, according to Fried, the power of the prefect -
though officially elevated and accompanied by such prestige-
boosting feats as the building of new prefectures and the new
importance of his bishop-like tours of the province - could
be ultimately checked by the MVSN, the federal party
secretary, the police chief's private inspectors, OVRA, the
Questore, hierarchically dependent on the police chief) and
the provincial Carabinieri commander (ultimately responsible
to 'Il Duce') (pp. 192-3).
The increased power of the traditional police apparatus
under Fascism is reflected, however, in Regio Decreto 1848 of
6 November 1926, notably referred to as 'Leggi
Fascistissime'. It may be considered the basis of the Fascist
authoritarian regime. Significantly, however, many of its
articles are clearly modifications of already existing
3
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legislation dating back to the nineteenth century, defining
therefore, the extreme importance of unification police norms
of which Fascism may only be considered a perfecting agent.
Of innovative interest was article 2 which endowed the
prefect with extraordinary powers in an emergency situation:
Ii Prefetto, in caso di urgenza o per grave necessità
pubblica, ha facoltA di adottare i provvedimenti
indispensabili per la tutela dell'ordine e della sicurezza
pubblica.	 Contro	 i	 provvedimenti	 del	 Prefetto	 gli
interessati possono ricorrere al Ministro per l'Interno.
Notably,
	 article	 17,	 'delle riunioni	 pubbliche e degli
assembramenti in luoghi pubblici' was a literal duplicate of
article 1 of the 1889 PS law. Articles 166, 167 and 168 of
the legislation took decisions on ammonizione out of the
control of the courts and placed them in the hands of a
commission	 consisting	 of	 prefect,	 public	 prosecutor,
Questore, Carabinieri commander and a superior officer of the
MVSN. Articles 166 and 167 rendered not only habitual
criminals, vagabonds, etc., but also 'persone designate dalla
pubblica voce come pericolose all'ordine nazionale dello
stato' subject to ammonizione, which may be considered a
perfection of the 1889 and 1894 legislation in terms of the
incrimination of political enemies of the state. Article 184
prescribed confino (internal exile)
	 - substituting the
denomination,domicilio coatto - for 'ammoniti' and:
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coloro che abbiano commesso o manifestato il deliberato
proposito di commettere atti diretti a sovvertire
violentemente gli ordinamenti nazionali, sociali o economici
costituiti dello stato, a menomenare la sicurezza ovvero a
contrastare od ostacolare l'azione dei poteri dello stato,
per modo da recare comunque nocumento agli interessi
nazionali, in relazione alla situazione, interna od
internazionale, dello stato qualora siano pericolosi alla
sicurezza pubblica'
Article 168 again specified that: 'L'assegnazione al confino
di polizia e la durata di questo sono pronunciate dalla
Commissione provinciale di cui all'art. 168', which was a
confirmation, therefore, of article 125 of the 1889 law, on
internal exile. The articles concerning confino carried the
same weight as the 1894 aggi Eccezionali, which had been
dropped from the beginning of the twentieth century, in that
the mere intention of committing crimes against the state was
sufficient for sentencing. Article 215 of the law asserted
the prefectoral power of decree to dissolve associations 'of
an anti-national character' and notably concluded that:
'Contro i provvedimenti del Ministero non k ammesso ricorso
nemmeno per motivi di legittimita'.
The Fascist totalitarian police system undoubtedly had its
roots in post-unification Liberal Italy. However, if
according to D'Orsi (p. 27) 'l'uso di classe della polizia
non	 muta	 nel	 passaggio	 dall'Italia	 liberale all'Italia
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fascista', the author adds that what did change with the
coming of the Fascist regime and the accelerated
industrialisation of the 1920s and 1930s was the 'politica
dell'ordine pubblico'.	 Under Fascism the police organs
penetrated society very much more deeply, so that:
Proprio	 in	 funzione	 del	 controllo	 oppressivo
	 e
dell'irregimentazione corporativistica delle masse del nuovo
proletariato	 urbano	 si	 articola	 la	 politica	 fascista
dell'ordine pubblico. Non si tratta pia di fare sparare sui
contadini, dai quali del resto Mussolini riceve, soprattutto
inizialmente, fiducia e benevolenza, bens( di tenere a bada
gli operai, non limitandosi semplicemente a frenarne le
'intemperanze', ma consegnando l'intera organizzazione dello
stato totalitario	 in modo da impedire la stessa possibilitA
di muoversi, esprimersi, ed organizzarsi, alle masse
proletarie, cosi da ridurre ad un fatto marginale la pura
'repressione' (p. 27).
Carucci similarly points out that whereas in the Liberal
system the state was able to make life difficult for the
political	 opposition	 with	 the	 use	 of	 'provvedimenti
eccezionali estranei al sistema ordinario' whilst
contemporarily promoting electoral democracy, the Fascist
police system was founded on the total elimination, from
1926, of political opposition to the regime. The achievement
of new internal orderliness necessitated:
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ii controllo preventivo e segreto sull'attivitA pubblica e
privato delle persone, l'uso sistematico delle misure
preventive di polizia (confine, ammonizione, diffide), la
concessione di poteri amplissimi ai prefetti e al ministro
dell'interno, che vengono ad essere svincolati per motivi di
'necessitA e di urgenza' anche della forma del decreto legge
(p. 72).
Carucci maintains that the 1926 PS law was founded upon the
1889 legislation but adds that it enormously amplified police
powers 'allargando i margini della discrezionalitA fino a
negare ogni certezza al diritto ed ad annullare ogni rispetto
della "persona umana"' (p. 72).
If the above indeed illustrates the adaptation of the
traditional police organs to the requirements of the Fascist
regime, one is naturally led to question the extent to which
such organs became Fascist, given also, for example the
increasing use of Fascist prefects during the 1920s and their
obligatory party membership. According to D'Orsi, Mussolini
himself was reluctant to 'fascistize' the traditional police
organs because in this way they could be used, if necessary,
to counter the power of the MVSN, denoting once again his
exploitation of conflicting police hierarchies in order to
maintain his personal power. Similarly Bocchini, Capo della 
Polizia until 1940, a traditional career class prefect, was
abJe to control the police 	 system , 'sottraendola in tal
modo	 in	 buona	 parte	 ad	 un	 inevitabile	 processo	 di
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fascistizzazione' (p. 38). Collin adds that Bocchini, though
personally corrupt and never more than opportunistically
loyal to the regime, 'provided Mussolini with a valuable
counterweight to the PNF, successfully resisting party
efforts to dominate the field of law enforcement' (pp. 430-
31). The Fascist nature of the traditional police system
never went beyond its loyalty towards the figure of
Mussolini, as demonstrated by Bocchini's particular concern
to protect him from assassination attempts from 1925 onwards.
Indeed the author suggests that the more or less unaltered
state in which the police organization emerged from the
Second World War and lived through the immediate postwar
period	 is	 demonstrative	 of the	 relative
	 autonomy	 it
maintained throughout the Fascist period.63
In summarizing briefly the history of the Italian police
system from its Piedmontese origins to the late 1920s, a
number of significant factors emerge: firstly, the phenomenon
of the co-existence of more than one police corps which may
in turn be linked to historical conflict between military and
civilian, royalist and bourgeois ruling forces in Italy;
secondly, emphasis placed on preventive rather than
repressive policing, a reflection of late and restricted
development of mass politics and democracy in Italy and the
reluctance of whichever ruling class (be it aristocratic or
bourgeois, Liberal	 'left'	 or Liberal	 'right') to share
political power, epitomized also in the figure of the
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provincial prefect; thirdly, the close link between the
traditional, liberal (post-unification) police system and
that of the fascist authoritarian regime, as illustrated by
the limited institutional changes Fascism brought to the
traditional police organs, as well as the basis of nineteenth
century preventive legislation of the Leggi Fascistissime of
1926 which in many respects may be considered a development
and perfection of the former; finally, an undermanned and
badly organized police system, a factor almost certainly
playing an important role in the moulding of often unofficial
twentieth-century prevention tactics and in the ascendancy
of provincial Fascism.
4
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NOTES
1. For the founding of the Carabinieri Reali see Angelo
D'Orsi,	 La	 Polizia.	 Le	 forze	 dell'ordine	 pubblico 
italiano (Milan, 1972), p. 5; Romano Canosa, La polizia 
in Italia dal 1945 a oggi (Bologna, 1976), pp. 20-21;
Robert	 Fried,	 The	 Italian	 Prefects;	 a	 Study	 in 
Administrative Politics (New Haven and London, 1963), p.
23; 	 Enciclopedia del diritto,	 Vol. VI (Varese, 1960),
p. 268; Giuseppe Renato, 'Gli ordinamenti della Pubblica
Sicurezza'	 in	 Divisione	 Affari	 Legislativi	 e
Documentazione della Pubblica Sicurezza (ed.), Cento anni
di amministrazione italiana (Rome, 1962), pp. 331-70
pp. 335-6).
2. According to Volume VI of Enciclopedia del diritto,	 (p.
273): I I carabinieri fin dalla loro istituzione hanno
avuto una doppia dipendenza; dal competente ministero
militare (difesa, esercito) per tutto cid che riguarda il
reclutamento, l'ordinamento, la disciplina, l'armamento,
l'equipaggiamento, l'addestramento, nonchê il servizio di
polizia militare considerato nel senso piu lato; dal
Ministero	 dell'Interno	 per	 quanto	 si	 riferisce	 al
servizio d'istituto, d'ordine e di sicurezza pubblica,
nonchê all'accasermamento ed al casermaggio'. According
to Ii Digesto Italiano: Enciclopedia di legislazione, 
dottrina e giurisprudenza, Vol. VI (Turin, 1906-12), p.
584, this naturally rendered the Carabinieri subject to
the jurisdiction of both the military penal code and the
civilian penal code 'per i reati commessi nell'esercizio
delle	 loro	 funzioni,	 come	 ufficiali	 della	 polizia
giudiziaria, ed agenti della pubblica sicurezza'.
3. Article 8 of the 'Regolamento per l'esecuzione della
legge di Pubblica Sicurezza' of 21 June 1865, stated:
L'azione delle AutoritA e degli Ufficiali di Pubblica
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luogo e l'ora in cui la forza abbia ad intervenire'.
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fosse stato necessario per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico
e della sicurezza pubblica'. Fried notes (p. 65) that the
Provincial and Communal Act of 23 october 1859 provided
for the territorial subdivision of Italy into provinces
(previously divisions), districts (Circondari)
(previously provinces), sub-districts (Mandamenti) amd
communes (Comuni).
6. Salvatore	 Correa,	 La	 sicurezza	 pubblica nel	 regno 
d'Italia, esposto nelle sue leggi l nella sua 
organizzazione e nei suoi rapporti col diritto pubblico 
dello stato ed internazionale privato, Vol II (Florence,
1867), pp. 498-505.
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una dura e lunga carcerazione preventiva dall'altra erano
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subdivided into 'arrondissementsr(th'e equivalent of the
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19. Gaetano	 Salvemini	 in	 Gaetano	 Salvemini/Ernesto
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the consequences of the explosion be particularly grave
(causing death, injury, etc.). According to article 5 the
sentence was increased by between and third and a half if
the crime was committed by three or more persons.
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27. Domenico Tarantini,  La maniera forte. Elogio della 
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Also worth noting are
articles 165 and 166 of the 1889 penal code. Article 165
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for the administration of Justice, War, Navy, Air,
Railroads and the Southern Public Works', an improvement
therefore on his previously postion. In the liberal
state, Fried maintains (p. 146), the prefect could not
very easily keep track of what the various services were
doing, since their directors tended to act on their own,
often failing to inform him of decisions affecting
provincial interests. Each ministry tended to distribute
its patronage through its own field offices. The prefect
could	 only	 counter-act	 this	 through	 the	 various
hierarchical channels.
61. Mussolini's circular defined the prefect as 'ii
rappresentante diretto del potere centrale' and warned
that: 'l'autoritA non puO essere condotta a nmezzadrie,
nê sono tollerabili slittamenti di autoritA o di
responsabilitA. L'autoritA 6 una ed autoritaria. Se ciO
non sia si ricade in piena disorganizzazione e
disintegrazione dello stato: si distrugge cio6, uno dei
maggiori motivi di trionfo dell'azione fascista, che
lottti (...) per dare consistenza, autoritA, prestigio,
forza allo stato, per fare lo stato uno e intangibile,
come 6 e deve essere lo stato fascista l . Regarding the
repression of state enemiesthe circular continued: 'Ii
prefetto deve porre la massima diligenza nella difesa del
regime contro tutti coloro che tendono ad insidiarlo o ad
indebolirlo (....)' and with regard to moral discipline:
'II prefetto fascista si occupa della tutela dell'ordine
morale (...) l'ordine morale fra i cittadini diventa il
presupposto e la migliore garanzia dell'ordine pubblico',
and finally, with regard to his new powers over the
political and administrative life of the province: 'Ii
prefetto fascista	 non 6	 il	 prefetto dei	 tempi
demoliberali. Allora il prefetto era soprattutto un
agente elettorale. Ora che di elezioni non si parla piO,
il prefetto cambia figura e stile: il prefetto deve
prendere tutte le iniziative che formino il decoro al
regime (...) e al prefetto che deve fare capo tutta la
vita della provincia, ed e dal prefetto che la vita della
provincia deve ricevere impulso, coordinazione, direttive
(...)' (D'Orsi,	 pp. 29-30).
62. According to Casula, p. 145, the move towards
'politicization' of the prefect was facilitated by cregio 
Decreto 2395 of 11 November 1923 which eliminate the
state of 'aspettativa' and 'disponibilitA' founded in
1901, so that once the maximum period of 'disposizione'
(three years) had expired prefects were automatically
retired from service. Casula sees this as 'innovazioni
(...) che rientrano puntualmente nella linea di favore
economico	 collegato	 al	 meccanismo	 punitivo	 della
3
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rimozione temporanea% The law increased the maximum
number of Prefects 'a disposizione'to 15 and eliminated
the maximum period of 'disposizione"quando al prefetto
in tale stato fossero affidati speciali incarichi del
ministro', denoting the use of prefects for special non-
provincial missions. In the words of the author (p.
145), 'Il prefetto con il carico diverso dalla prefettura
diventa cosi un ipotesi ordinaria e stabile e vice versa,
fra i compiti connessi alla qualifica di prefetto,
vengono ad essere ricompresi anche gli speciali incarichi
affidati dal Ministro'.
63. Richard Collin 	 (pp.	 431-2)	 states:	 'Just as	 Public
Security guards and Carabinieri had maintained a
substantial degree of independence under Fascism, albeit
while enforcing Fascist laws, neither force changed
enormously in the immediate postwar period, although the
greater discipline and organizational unity of the
Carabinieri, plus their contributions to the Resistance,
helped them to emerge from the war with somewhat greater
prestige. Those senior officials in both organizations
who had been too closely identified with Fascism were
quietly retired, but at the working level, policemen who
had been anti-Marxists under Giolitti and Mussolini
survived to be anti-Marxists under Alcide De Gaspari'.
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROVINCE OF BOLOGNA, 1897-1925
This second introductory chapter follows social, political
and economic developments in Bologna from the last decades
of the nineteenth century until the establishment of a
Fascist dictatorship in Italy in 1925, with the intention of
providing the reader with a background to the case-study.
It aims, wherever possible, to indicate those aspects of the
history and development of the province in which the police
authorities played a significant role, as a prelude to the
following analytical chapters.
It should be emphasised that until Italy's entry into the
First World War in 1915 the Bolognese province owed its
economic livelihood to agriculture (rice, wheat and hemp
particularly), as is reflected in the many agricultural
conflicts spanning the years 1890 to 1914. 1 Before the
European conflict Bolognese urban industry consisted mostly
of small-scale, artisan-structured machine, food, steel and
chemical manufacturers of limited importance. 2	The only
existing larger-scale industries were directly linked to
agriculture,	 stimulated	 by	 projects	 of	 agricultural
modernization and mechanization and land reclamation
undertaken at the end of the nineteenth century. They
produced farm machinery/vehicles and steam-powered pumps for
land reclamation (Dalla Casa, pp. 180-1).
From an agricultural viewpoint Antony Cardoza divides the
i
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province of Bologna into three areas, each with varying
forms of cultivation and social structure: the plains,
foothills and mountains. The first, forming part of the Po
Valley which stretches across the northern half of the
province was characterized by large farming estates of at
least fifty hectares each for the cultivation of wheat,
sugar, trefoil, hemp, rice and other crops.
	
They were
usually owned by large landowners (grandi proprietari) but
were often rented out to large leaseholders (grandi 
affittuari) (Cardoza, p. 12). The foothills lying directly
south of the city of Bologna tended to be farmed by
sharecroppers	 (mezzadri)
	 (wheat,	 corn,
	 grapes,	 fruit,
livestock rearing), though only between 60% and 90% of the
land was exploited (Cardoza, p. 18).
	 The mountainous area
to the very south of the province was predominently farmed
by	 small	 peasant	 proprietors	 (piccoli	 proprietari 
lavoratori) (corn, potatoes, chickpeas and beans for direct
consumption). It was only 40% arable, however, and was
geographically and culturally isolated from the social,
political and economic life of the province (Cardoza, pp.
16-17).3
The majority of large landowners were members of the local
aristocracy.
	
According to D'Attorre, they were usually
involved in Italian political and economic life at the
local, provincial and national level. The Marquis Tanari,
for example, besides owning farmland, held the office of
mayor of Bologna, was a parliamentary deputy and undertook
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many new agricultural projects. Several of them held the
office of village mayor. 4 Scagliarini, in her account of the
commune of San Giovanni in Persiceto, states that many
absentee landowners left the responsibility of running their
farms to fattori (managers). She also mentions, alongside
the aristocratic landowners, urban middle-class proprietors
from either the city of Bologna or San Giovanni itself
(usually successful merchants, contractors or members of
the professional classes) who, unlike the absentee nobility,
exercised greater control over the running of their farms.
The small/medium proprietors (piccoli/medi proprietari) were
divided into two categories: peasant farmers	 who worked
their land (proprietari lavoratori) and those usually
belonging to the urban lower middle-classes who had become
wealthy as a result of their activities and who employed
peasant workers (proprietari non-lavoratori).5
Alongside the landowners were the leaseholders. By the
end of the twentieth century many of the biggest farms on
the plains catered not only for the harvesting but also for
the cleaning, refining, storage and selection of crops.
Management of these farms was increasingly taken over from
their proprietors by large leaseholders (grandi affittuari)
whose full time staff included technical experts, skilled
peasant workers and engineers. The leaseholder class was
chiefly responsible for the above-mentioned undertakings of
land reclamation and agricultural modernization (Cardoza,
pp. 23-4).	 The landowners often rented out small sections
i
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of their property to small/medium leaseholders (affittuari 
piccoli/medi, lavoratori or non-lavoratori) who paid rent by
ceding 18% of their produce to them (Scagliarini, p. 140).
To the peasant classes may be added sharecroppers
(mezzadri),	 permanently	 employed	 labourers	 (salariati 
fissi),	 and	 seasonal	 workers	 (braccianti).	 The
sharecroppers were employed by landowners or leaseholders to
work small plots of their land by annual contract. At the
turn of the century such contracts stipulated that the
sharecropper had to cede 50% of his produce or livestock to
his employer.	 He was also responsible for the costs of
hiring peasant workers and feeding harvesting vehicle
drivers and for the provision of tools. His employer
provided him with housing and paid 50% of the costs of seeds
and farm machinery hire (Scagliarini, p. 142).
The permanently employed labourers chiefly worked on the
large farms on the plain and were paid monthly in cash and
natural products. Scagliarini states that:
nonostante gli stipendi fossero bassi, venivano considerati
come una categoria privilegiata rispetto ai braccianti
(salariati avventizi), poiche avevano un guadagno garantito
e sicuro. I salariati avventizi, o braccianti, costituivano
la classe pi0 povera del lavoratori agricoli, quella pit)
soggetta alla disoccupazione; essi venivano pagati
giornalmente a cottimo, ma durante un anno lavoravano in
media 50 e 60 giornate (...) 15 lire per giornata (p. 143).
- 94 -
Cardoza states that,'ordinarily labourers and braccianti
resided in make-shift "agro-towns" along the roadways of the
plains', by way of illustrating their deplorable living
conditions (p. 25).
It was indeed braccianti unrest, attributed by Cardoza to
the nation wide if not continental economic crisis in
agriculture during the 1880s, which saw the beginnings of a
rural Socialist movement in Bologna as elsewhere, especially
in the Po valley. Competition from North America, Argentina
and Russia forced landowners to withdraw land from
cultivation or shift to less extensive crops, cutting labour
costs down to a minimum by transforming many sharecroppers
into braccianti. The state responded by promoting land
reclamation projects ( p. 45). Cardoza adds, however, that
the leaseholders involved in this:
shared few of the gentlemanly pretensions and paternal
sentiments of the agrarian old guard; they were essentially
"agricultural industrialists" in the business of maximizing
profits by increasing production, lowering costs, and
selling their crops in the most lucrative markets. Running
business enterprises rather than peasant households, they
began to apply systematic economic calculation to farming
and to introduce new crop rotations, machines and chemical
fertilizers on an unprecedented scale (p. 49).
I
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Bolognese braccianti Socialism was strongly influenced by
the anarchist tendencies - dating back to the 1870s - 	 of
Bakhunin and the regional socialist leader Andrea Costa.
If during the 1880s spontaneous Anarchy was dominated by
'legal' Socialism, the radical nature of social tensions in
the province allowed the movement - now called the Partito
Socialista Rivoluzionario Romagnolo, founded in 1881 - to
retain	 a	 firm	 revolutionary	 character	 alongside	 its
legalitarianism.6
The first braccianti syndical organizations opposed to
the power of the agricultural employers appeared around
1884. They aimed, as the Associazione Operai Braccianti del
Mandamento di Budrio, to increase salaries, improve peasant
working conditions and reduce local unemployment. From 1885
similar organizations for permanently employed labourers
began to exist. 7 In 1892 the founding of the Camera del
Lavoro in Bologna coincided with that of the Partito dei
Lavoratori Italiani (the future Partito Socialista Italiano)
by Costa in Genoa. With a heterogeneous composition of
Democrats, Kadicals and Socialists, it united both urban and
rural syndicates which were divided, according to trade,
into	 leagues, 8
	though	 according
	 to	 Arbizzani	 (La
Federazione', cit., pp.114-5):
gli interventi della Camera del Lavoro di Bologna verso le
campagne e i contadini erano stati molto limitati C...).
Nonostante la riaffermazione dell'impegno di l profondire una
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"cura continua" verso i lavoratori delle campagne, l'opera
dell'organismo cittadino resta sempre saltuaria ed
"estranea" alle reali esigenze organizzative e sindacali dei
lavoratori della terra.
In 1901 the Federazione Nazionale dei Lavoratori della Terra
(Federterra) was founded. Divided into provincial
affiliates and closely linked to the Camera del Lavoro, at
its first congress, held in Bologna in November that year,
it voted in favour of a policy of socialization of the land
and of production and exchange, to the disgust of many
sharecroppers and small/medium leaseholders who splintered
off from the organization.
	 Indeed, according to Arbizzani,
('La Federazione%	 cit.,	 p. 119):
L'identificazione di programmi e obbiettivi fra
l'organizzazione sindacale e il Partito Socialista, pose un
limite fortissimo alla penetrazione e all'influenza del
sindacato fra le categorie contadine e in special modo fra i
mezzadri, i fittavoli e i piccoli proprietari coltivatori
diretti.
Its founding of workers' cooperatives, apart from protecting
wage	 levels,	 enabled	 experimentation	 in	 both	 land
socialization and production control.	 Cooperatives were
able to buy or rent land on which their members worked,
I	 paying them a fixed salary.	 Later-founded farm machinery
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cooperatives which rented out harvesting vehicles to
sharecroppers at cheap cost also played a significant part
in the agrarian conflicts.9
Such achievements were the result, however, of years of
laborious and often violent struggles. The peasant strike
weapon itself carried serious risks because in order to
become effective it needed to be put into action during the
harvest months so threatening both the employers with the
loss of a whole year's produce and the braccianti with the
loss of the major part of their annual wages. (Cardoza, pp.
58-9). League victories during strikes were imperative,
therefore, so that their action was directed not only
against the employers but also against non-league workers,
known as 'krumiri', often with violent results.	 According
to Preti:
Si comincia con l'opera di convinzione: e se questa non ha
esito, si passa alla minaccia. Dalla minaccia si scende
molto sovente, quando gli animi sono riscaldati e il posto
in gioco 6 grande, anche alla violenza."
Indeed,	 various forms of anti-'krumiri' boycotting were
adopted by the socialist syndical organizations during the
period under	 examination,	 as	 is demonstrated	 in the
following chapters.
The reaction of Bologna's property-owning classes to the
development of Socialism in the province was naturally total
i
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condemnation. Both the landowner and leaseholder classes
declared the braccianti strikes of 1897 'acts of economic
repression and violence, violating the fundamental norms of
reason, custom and law' (Cardoza, p. 58). The author
continues that even the traditional, aristocratic class of
landowners, though partly blaming the strikes on the profit-
making	 policies
	 of the	 leaseholders,	 were relatively
unsympathetic. Indeed many, realizing that they could
benefit from higher rents, if not also threatened from the
competition of industrial agriculture, moved over to the
leaseholder class (p. 52). Government repression was
advocated as a means of 'bringing the workers back to their
senses' and the agrarian local press organ La Gazzetta 
Emilia of 9 July 1897 accused syndicalist profiteers of
spending their time in coffee houses 'mentre i poveri
disgraziati, che ricevono la loro parola d'ordine, durano
fatica a trovare in qualche fosso dell'acqua putrida'.
According to Onofri the frequent use of the army to
suffocate strike initiatives was the motive for which
braccianti work-stoppages were usually fruitless."
Indeed, according to Tarozzi the 1890s were hard years for
the Camera del Lavoro organizations, hit by Crispi's 'Leggi
Eccezionali' in 1894 and the declaration of martial law in
1898 which saw the disbandment of many syndicates and
cooperatives (as outlined in Chapter III). Likewise its
funding from the city council was frequently abolished, as
during the period spanning December 1896 and April 1898
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(Tarozzi, pp. 27-32).
The reaction of these classes to Socialist electoral gains
was equally hostile. When in the administrative elections of
1889 the Democratic League (Socialists, Radicals and
Republicans) won control of the council of Imola, the new
administrators were referred to as 'straccioni, mascalzoni,
affamati' (Onofri,'1113- 22 3cit.m. 64-C) Imola's council,
distinguished for its initiatives in the public sector,
including the founding of orphanages and mental hospitals,
increased welfare policies and the making of school
education more effectively compulsory, was abolished in May
1893 on government orders (Arbizzani, Su compagni, cit., p.
127). In 1895 and 1898 the Socialist party was forced to go
into hiding to avoid government persecution (Arbizzani, Su
compagni3O1.4.,157).
The 1897 braccianti strike in Molinella in the north-east
corner of the province of Bologna was one of the few
successful union initiatives. The agreement reached between
the leagues and the employers' association stipulated the
reduction of daily working hours from twelve to seven and
wage increases from 1.50 to 3.00 lira per day for male and
from 1.20 to 1.75 lira for female labourers. 12	Employers
were also forced to accept foremen ('caporali') to keep
watch over their actions and decisions, a first step,
therefore, towards worker control, which employers were
hardly prepared to tolerate for long (Onofri,g1513-2.21Sp).
Indeed, if the 1897 strike may have taken the agrarians by
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surprise, they fought back ruthlessly the following year
with the aid of the prefect who reduced rice-workers' wages
on his own authority, using troops and policemen to arrest
and imprison league leaders and close Molinella's consumer
cooperative, braccianti leagues and the local Camera del
(1513-21'.
Lavoro (Onofri,/p. 62).	 This more or less coincided with
government repression of acts of solidarity on the part of
the local 'subversive' parties in the aftermath of the
violent suffocation of the Milan bread riots (see Chapter I,
pp. 38-9) so that a number of local newspapers (the
Socialist L'Amico del Povero, the Kepublican La Minoranza 
and the Anarchist La LibertA), many affiliates of the Camera
del Lavoro and the Circolo Educativo Socialista were
forcibly closed (Tarozzi, p. 32). In 1900, with the threat
of renewed strike action, the prefect supplied the farmers
with 600 military farmworkers (Cavazza, p. 74).	 The
agrarians justified this on the grounds that:
Noi rappresentiamo una parte non piccola dello stato e
dal momento che i soldati sono al suo servizio di difenderlo
dai nemici esterni, perchê noi non dovremmo servirci di loro
per combattere ii nemico che lo aggredisce dall ' interno?
(Onofr i I l913-22 1, c rt-- ) r CO.
The appointment of Giovanni Giolitti to the post of
interior minister in February 1901 partly affected the
outlook of the prefectoral authorities.	 This reflected the
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statesman's theory that social, economic and political
concessions would reduce discontent among the masses,
isolate PSI extremists and, in Cardoza's words, 'strengthen
the position of reformist elements within the PSI who could
then be induced to participate in an enlarged governing
coalition under his leadership' (p. 70). It was certainly
true	 that
	 in ' Bologna	 itself	 strikes	 and	 electoral
advancement	 had since 1898 continued, despite repressive
measures.	 Indeed, the PSI had won three out of eight
,	 „
constituencies at the 1900 general election 	 (Onofri, 11g-L;
cit i r72.), Giolitti ordered the prefect to demand greater
fairness from agricultural employers. In 1901 police and
military action was in fact minimal compared to previous
years, league offices and Socialist-controlled councils
remaining open (Cardoza, p. 72).	 This policy naturally
weakened the agrarian class which was divided over the
question of how to deal with league power. The leaseholder
class, particularly concerned at the fact that their rent
contracts stipulated payment irregardless of financial loss
through strikes, generally refused cooperation with union
leaders or government mediation through the prefect and
looked	 towards	 the	 formation	 of	 'associazioni	 di
resistenza'.	 The old guard landowner class advocated
compromise in the hope that this would neutralize the appeal
of the leagues (Cardoza, pp. 78-85). According to
D'Attorre, several of them felt that the solution to the
challenge of braccianti leagues lay in the expansion of
,
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sharecropping, others in Catholic-organized 'cooperativismo
confessionale dei lavoratori, alternativo all'organizzazione
di resistenza, di cui siano economicamente partecipi gli
stessi proprietari' (D'Attorre, p. 119).
The return of tension in the Bolognese countryside from
1902 onwards was a reflection of Giolitti's national-level
strategy, as demonstrated by the break between the PSI and
the government in March 1903 over the issue of continued
'eccidi proletari' in
	
urban centres and the now prime
minister's
	 inclusion	 of	 right-wing	 elements	 in	 his
government in November. A number of his policies aimed at
minimizing the dependence of rural employers on braccianti.
These included the use of contracts binding braccianti to
work even during strikes and the increased employment of
sharecroppers (Cardoza, p. 88). A partial return to strike
repression is demonstrated, according to Arbizzani ('La
Federazionej pp. 122-3), by the outcome of the Molinellese
strikes of the summer of 1903 which after 72 days concluded
with the arrest of 39 strikers and the imprisonment of 12.
If again at the national level the change in PSI strategy
manifested itself in the increasing influence of
Revolutionary Syndicalist factions and the first general
strike in 1904, the involvement of the sharecroppers in
rural conflicts in Bologna from that year onwards was,
according to Cardoza, crucial, because the threat of a
united Socialist peasant front forced the agrarians to put
aside their differences in order to form a stronger opposing
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force	 (Cardoza,
	 p.	 100).	 D'Attorre
	
states	 that many
aristocratic landowners defected to the leaseholder-
capitalist front, as in other Emilian provinces, in the
defence of the general interests of agriculture, with the
aim of favouring the development of contract labourers (as
opposed to braccianti) and turning the sharecroppers against
the braccianti by organizing	 and developing their class in
order to 'esasperare la disgregazione del proletariato
rurale	 attraverso	 una	 gestione	 discriminatoria	 del
collocamento, riaffermando cosi il pieno controllo del
mercato del lavoro' (D'Attorre, p. 120). Sturani, the
front leader of such developments, which became known as
1 compartecipazione', advocated not only opposition to league
power in defence of property and liberty but also the
support and protection of other agricultural classes and
non-league braccianti within a united farming hierarchy
(Cardoza, pp. 102-4).	 In this sense the agrarian class was
partly supportive of Catholic syndicalism which promoted the
formation of separate sharecropper leagues. Indeed the
commercial farmers of Molinella had a monopoly over the
local Catholic organizations by 1904 (Cardoza, p. 93).
There is indeed no doubt as to the ambiguous social
position of the sharecropper class.
	
Though not always in
agreement with his employer the sharecropper was
traditionally dependent on the success of harvests for a
living and opposed, therefore, to strike action (Cardoza, p.
21).	 Paul Corner in his account of the neighbouring
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province of Ferrara states that this peasant class had a
tendency to oscillate 	 between the landowners and leagues.
They supported the syndical organizations when this proved
to be advantageous but they were also prepared to	 abandon
them as soon as the agrarian employers responded positively
to their demands. The historian adds, however, that
they were not prepared to accept becoming members of a rural
proletariat which to them signified unemployment and general
hardship. 13 According to Preti, many sharecroppers sided
with the leagues for economic reward in the hope that the
so-often-preached abolition of private property would not
turn into a reality, since their ultimate desire was to be
able to afford to buy their own plot of land (Preti, pp.
250-51).
The attitude of the Socialist unions to this class was no
less ambiguous, however. Franco Cavazza states that
economic gains - Federterra initially aimed to achieve the
division of farming expenses and products between the
sharecropper and employer by exactly 50% 14
 - were offered in
the sly hope that sharecroppers could eventually be
converted to the Socialist visions of land socialization
(Cavazza, p. 76). At the same time, however, boycotting was
extended to the class as a means of coercing them into
joining the leagues (Cardoza, p. 95, Preti, p. 301). This
is significant if one is to consider that the sharecroppers
were among the first rural classes to defect to the Fascist
syndicates from 1921 onwards.
4
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Though the policies of 'compartecipazione' were initially
effective by 1907 it was clear that the agrarians had failed
to win over the sharecroppers in significant numbers, given
the strength of both the Socialist and Catholic syndicates
(D'Attorre, p. 120). The period 1907 to 1911 was generally
marked by peaceful relations in Bologna as many employers
negotiated with Federterra. This more or less coindded with
a general return to Reformist Socialist dominance both in
Bologna and nationally, 15	and less willingness on the part
of the government to support the employers outright, as
demonstrated by the new prefect Dallari's refusal to grant
police/army support over the importation of non-league
workers during strikes (Fiorentino, p. 19). The most
intransigent of the agrarians joined forces against the
unions by forming, for the first time, provincial, regional
and even national-level organizations. The founding of the
'Interprovinciale' - a regional farmers' association - in
1907 and the Confederazione Nazionale degli Agricoltori
(CNA) in 1910 marked the growing need for class solidarity
in the face of the hegemony of industry and the threat of
Socialism. The intransigent line, representing the
leaseholder class of farmers, called for legal restrictions
on the leagues, strike-insurance funds and the formation of
an interprovincial corps of armed volunteers to protect non-
league workers from league violence, as used by the agrarian
leader of Parma, Carrara, during the agricultural strikes of
1908 (D'Attorre, p. 123).
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The modernization of farming, as illustrated by the use of
new machinery and planting techniques, electrification and
the development of sugar refinaries, textile manufacturers
and food processors indicates the growing relationship
between	 agriculture	 and	 industry	 from	 1908.
	
The
intransigents, led by Carrara, urged the founding of new
forms of political representation, however, to protect
agriculture from the power of industry, as experienced by
the tensions which this new rapport had created over price-
stability, over-production and financial speculation. The
agrarian parliamentary pressure groups he proposed would
also serve to oppose Giolittian policies of mediation and
compromise with Socialism. The more moderate line led by
Count Filippo Cavazza, who continued to advocate government
mediation in strikes and the use of the traditional liberal
party system for lobbying for the needs of agriculture, had
been isolated from the forefront of 'Interprovinciale' by
1911 (Cardoza, pp. 138-46, D'Attorre, pp. 121-25). The
Associazione Agraria Bolognese (AAB), founded that year, was
modelled on Carrara's organization in Parma (Cardoza, p.
165). One of its main exponents, Alfredo Benni, had indeed
led the Bolognese intransigents in previous years and like
Carrara used squads of strikebreakers to protect his
workers, as is demonstrated in the following chapter. As
shown in this study (see pp. 178-79), the hard line of the
AAB radicalized social, political and economic tensions in
the province to the extent that the organization broke off
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relations with the	 prefect	 in 1912.16
The increase in agrarian militancy in Bologna during the
years leading up to the First World War coincided with a
general loss of faith in the capabilities of the liberal
parliamentary system. The extension of the franchise,
enlarging the electorate from three and a half to over eight
and a half million, enabled a PSI victory in Bologna in both
the general election of 1913 and the administrative election
of 1914 - Bologna's city council gained a Socialist majority
(19R-1,Vcri.)
for the first time (Onofriy p. 67). According to Cardoza (p.
207) the failure of the liberal parties was partly caused by
the hard line of the AAB which isolated many farmers,
fragmenting agrarian electoral forces, therefore. The
government's failure to intervene in the class war pushed
the agrarian organizations, together with the
industrialists, towards the anti-parliamentary politics of
Nationalism. Attracted by its cries for an anti-democratic,
authoritarian form of government and the expansion of
markets abroad, the CNA, according to Cardoza, supported the
1912 invasion of Libya, lobbying for government spending on
an Italian empire, rather than on the masses. Socialism,
which obstructed the progress of production, became strongly
identified as the enemy of patriotism (Cardoza, p. 187, pp.
190-2, D'Attorre, p. 127).
The combined industrialist-agrarian front, bolstered by
the economic recession in 1913, in turn pushed the PSI into
the arms of the Revolutionaries	 who won a
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majority at the 1912 PSI congress at Reggio Emilia. Though
in Bologna itself the majority of peasant workers remained
Keformist (as was demonstrated by Federterra's joining the
Camera Confederale del Lavoro which split off in 1912 from
the Syndicalist Camera del Lavoro with mostly urban
membership) (Arbizzani, 'La Federazione', cit., p. 140), the
agricultural syndicates showed firm determination against
agrarian intransigence as was illustrated by Federterra's
new sharecroppers' programme of 1913. 	 This aimed to
increase to over 50% the expenses sustained by the employer
and the products retained by the sharecropper. 	 It also
intended	 to	 remove	 where	 possible	 tension	 between
sharecroppers
	
and	 braccianti	 (Arbizzani,	 'Lotta
mezzadrile', cit., pp. 169-70).	 This eventually led to the
particularly violent combined braccianti-sharecroppers'
strike in Molinella in the summer of 1914 - provoked by the
handing out of eviction notices to sharecroppers who, with
the support of Federterra, had demanded a fairer deal from
their employers.
(Arbizzani, 'La Federazione', cit., pp. 151-3).
Under the new government of Salandra who succeeded
Giolitti in April 1914 and the new prefect Vincenzo
Quaranta, appointed in August, the Molinellese farmers
obtained police support over the importation of 'krumiri'
from the province of Padova to replace the strikers. On 5
October Socialist league workers attacked the convoy of non-
league workers in an effort to prevent its arrival in
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Molinella, killing four peasants and injuring many others.
In the wave of police repression following the incident
league power was eliminated as local syndical leaders were
either arrested or, as in the case of the local PSI leader
Massarenti, fled to exile, and farmers threatened with
eviction those sharecroppers who did not sign contracts on
their terms. 17 As is indeed revealed in the following
chapter, the Guarda massacre became, in the eyes of the
public (which only a few months previously had experienced
the truly revolutionary implications of 'Red Week') a symbol
of what they considered to be Socialist tyranny in the
province of Bologna. Documentation reveals, however, that
Molinella's movement was prosecuted less on factual evidence
and more on the immoral implications of Socialism as a
whole.
Though the entry of Italy into the European conflict in
1915 and the necessities of war naturally placed
restrictions on syndical power, the decrease, at least
officially, in labour disputes during the war years cannot
be attributed to state repression - as evident in the strict
disciplinary procedures governing the running of many
militarized war production plants during the conflict -
alone.	 If Cavazza asserts (p. 116) that the PSI 'aveva
trasferito ii suo campo di manovra in un altro terreno:
quello	 della	 battagli	 contro	 l'interventismo	 per	 la
neutralitS ad ogni costo.', so weakening syndical defence
systems,	 Cardoza	 argues	 that	 Federterra rather than
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supporting the party line responded positively to the
government's call for increased and more efficient
production since it saw this as a means of legitimizing its
policies. Bologna's Socialist municipalities, unions and
cooperatives were in fact so efficiently organized that they
were considered indispensable to the war effort. Federterra
itself came to an agreement with the AAB, through the
mediation of the prefect, that the latter would only hire
socialist workers if it promised not to strike (Cardoza, pp.
221-2). Archival documentation again reveals, however, that
though there were no serious disputes during the war,
Federterra particularly felt that the AAB violated its side
of the agreement and that the prefectoral authorities
tolerated this for the most part.
The war additionally brought vital changes to the
industrial sector of the province. The necessity of
increased production expanded the chemical, machine, wood,
textile and state industries. 18 Those factories most
needed for the war effort - many were converted into gun-
cartridge factories - underwent radical structural changes
with the introduction of machinery allowing for mass
production and the employment of unskilled workers (Dalla
Casa, pp. 181-2). They employed between twenty and twenty
five thousand workers, many of whom came from the
countryside, attracted by the prospect of a safe wage.	 De
Benedictis states that the war brought full employment to
the province and that 	 'per far fronte alla continua
necessitA di mano d'opera vennero impiegate anche le donne
(circa 6,000 lavoravano negli stabilimenti di stato e
ausiliari) e i minorenni (da 1,148 minorenni impiegati negli
stabilimenti e opifici di Bologna nel 1914, si era passati a
1,803 nel 1915' (pp. 71-2).
As in the rest of the nation Bologna suffered the serious
economic consequences of demobilization. According to Dalla
Casa, though the smaller, unmodernized industries were able
to adapt back to a pre-war economy, those directly linked to
war production left thousands unemployed. By November 1918
post-war redundancies amounted to between twenty five and
thirty thousand.	 The province was particularly affected
because during the war it had suffered a population
increase, caused by immigration from the Veneto, which had
been a war zone (Dalla Casa, pp. 182-3). De Benedictis adds
that those of rural origins who had worked in industry
during the war and were now redundant were unable to return
to the countryside because an agrarian crisis had reduced
the demand for labour (De Benedictis, P. 72). In rural
areas of the province the leaseholders had benefited during
the war from both the increase in output demand and war-time
rent freezes (to the detriment of the landowners) and many
of them had been able to buy property. Additionally, some
sharecroppers had made enough money to buy their own plots
of land, pointing, accordin g to D'Attorre, to the post-war
emergence of a new class of small peasant proprietors. This
was strongly contrasted with the poverty of the majority of
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sharecroppers and the braccianti who had most suffered the
effects of inflation, military conscription and the
violation of agrarian pacts (Cardoza, p. 230, D'Attorre, p.
129).
The intensification of PSI militancy and the particularly
tense political atmosphere in post-war Bologna are highly
comprehensible in the light of the economic crisis and the
sheer size of the workers' movement which, now with a
significantly large urban proletariat, had doubled in size.
The Camera Confederale del Lavoro alone increased its
membership from 41,583 in 1914 to approximately 86,000 in
1919, of which 16,000 came from the urban sector (De
Benedictis, p. 80). The deaths of six workers in a clash
with police in Imola in July 1919 (see Chapter IV, p. 248)
epitomized the tense situation of the nation as a whole.
According to De Benedictis, all worker categories went on
strike during the first months of 1919 for wage increases
and an eight-hour working day, which they obtained without
difficulty. In April 1919 an agreement between the Camera
Confederale del Lavoro and the employers recognized the
eight-hour day (p. 107). 	 If the general weakness of the
industrialists may partly have been the motive for the
ease. with which they complied with the unions' demands,
Dalla Casa notes that the government had strongly encouraged
the employers to start post-war production 'in una clima di
collaborazione fra le parti' so stimulating the above
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agreements (p. 191).
De Benedictis continues, however, that:
motivi sociali e politici si intrecciavano pert, giA a quelli
economici. Si richiedeva ii riconoscimento delle
organizzazioni operaie e degli uffici di collocamento presso
le Camere del lavoro, si voleva l'istituzione di commissioni
interne nella fabbrica, i lavoratori addetti ai servizi
pubblici chiedevano l'abrogazione dell'art. 56 del codice
penale, fortemente limitativo del diritto di sciopero, e
riconoscimento del carattere industriale delle aziende in
cui prestavano servizio (p. 79).
Such demands were obviously spurred on by
Syndicalist/Maximalist elements which, by the summer of
1919, dominated the PSI and Camera Confederale del Lavoro.
Believing that the bourgeoisie was on the point of
disintegration and almost certainly encouraged by the
capture by the PSI of seven out of eight constituencies in
the November 1919 general election, 19 they aimed to prepare
the proletariat for revolution. As is demonstrated in
Chapter IV, though their rhetoric may have been alarming to
the public, the frequent general and public employees
strikes of 1919 and 1920 were of no particular consequence,
despite their presumed revolutionary implications.	 This
reflected the failure of party and union members to put into
practice	 their	 theories	 of	 revolution	 and	 general
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disagreement between and within the Camera Confederale del
Lavoro and the Kevolutionary Vecchia Camera del Lavoro.
According to De Benedictis (pp. 85-6), the reformists,
'incapaci di rinunciare ad una visione settaria della lotta
politica del proletariato', were principally responsible for
the failed formation of an effective Reformist-Syndicalist-
Anarchist front. She equally blames the Maximalist
leadership of both the PSI and Camera Confederale del
Lavoro, incapable of turning their revolutionary rhetoric
into reality, for their failure to give sufficient lead to
the metalworkers' factory occupations in September 1920,
which lost, therefore, their revolutionary character (p.
106). According to Dalla Casa, this is demonstrated by the
fact that in only one of the fifty-six factories where
'Consigli di Fabbrica' had been elected did production
actually take place during the occupations (p. 193).
The state of the Bolognese countryside in the initial
post-war years, was marked by a weakened, more moderate and
collaborationist	 AAB,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the
aristocratic landowner	 Filippo Cavazza, and a re-vitalized
and extremely militant Federterra. The new agricultural
programme of the AAB stressed the collaboration and moral
uplifting of the peasant classes by transforming braccianti 
into sharecroppers, sharecroppers into small landowners,
etc. It also advocated the legalization of the leagues as a
means of modifying Socialist political goals (D'Attorre, p.
128, Cardoza, pp. 252-5). 	 Federterra, though remaining
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without Maximalist leadership, was largely influenced by the
revolutionary post-war atmosphere. As a result of this it
committed, in Preti's opinion, the serious error of adhering
to the principle that 'i lavoratori hanno il diritto di
imporre ai proprietari le condizioni del loro lavoro' when
it came to union demands (Preti, pp. 428-9). There was
consequently an increase in the use of fines and boycotting
by the leagues against uncooperative employers,
sharecroppers and small leaseholders and landowners, often
resulting in such intimidatory acts as the burning of
crops, killing of livestock and physical assault (Corner, p.
108).
The extent to which such violence and intimidation took
place is open to varying opinions. Corner differentiates
such acts as the imposition of fines and boycotts - often
stipulated in league statutes and pacts -	 which he
considers	 non-violent though obviously intimidatory and
which were often sufficient for achieving the desired ends,
and	 acts of violence accompanying this on occasions. 	 He
explains - and this is most significant - that:
i resoconti della violenza socialista vanno trattati con una
certa cautela. Il desiderio dei fascisti di amplificare le
dimensioni della "tirannia" di cui pretendevano di aver
salvato l'Italia produsse una buona dose di esagerazione e
di distorsione degli eventi dell'immediato dopoguerra (p.
108).	 I
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Preti on the other hand states that in 1920 such acts of
violence were frequent, adding that a lack of police
presence combined with braccianti anger over past
maltreatment and illusions about revolution had 'gone to the
heads' of several league leaders (Preti, p. 422).
According to Corner, many of them tried to dictate the
everyday life of their fellow villagers on such issues as
church-going and the political colour of the newspapers they
read (Corner, p. 111). Preti again states that many
agrarian employers found themselves paying fines of up to
ten thousand lire, impositions which they found it hard to
oppose, given the lack of effective police presence (Preti,
p. 424).
Lack of rural police presence, which will be
demonstrated in Chapter IV, may have forced the agrarians to
accept Federterra's demands for an eight-hour working day
and wage	 increases
	 of between	 18 and	 20%	 in	 1919
(Scagliarini, p. 147). In January 1920 the increase in the
cost of hiring braccianti, which the sharecroppers could no
longer afford, given their failure to force the employers to
contribute	 towards	 this,	 motivated,	 once	 again,	 the
formation of a braccianti-sharecroppers' front. Federterra
proposed the division of the sharecroppers' produce so that
they would be entitled to fifty, sixty or even seventy
percent of it, depending on the number of braccianti they
needed to hire (Scagliarini, p. 148, Preti, pp. 430-1).
	
From February 1920 the leagues went on strike for the 	 1
i
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recognition of Socialist labour exchanges and guarantees of
a fixed number of workers per hectare (Preti, pp. 140-41).
This was accompanied by the invasion and working of
uncultivated farmland. According to Cavazza, the leagues
unjustly took advantage of the September 1919 government
decree which legalized the occupation of abandoned land,
Such legislation, he claims, aimed to solve the
agrarian crisis in southern Italian regions where, unlike
Lombardy and Emilia, uncultivated or badly cultivated land
was a serious issue. He also claims that Federterra ordered
braccianti to leave plots of land unattended, giving them a
pretext for occupying them. Similarly, the nine thousand
sharecroppers facing eviction for having taken part in the
strikes were ordered to leave the employers' share of the
crops unattended in readiness for occupation (Cavazza, pp.
165-6, Cardoza, p. 282).
Cavazza further complained of the weakness of post-war
governments in the above disputes. Nitti had informed a
provincial farmers' commission that there was nothing he
could do to prevent the lawlessness in Bologna. The
indignation of the agrarians was further roused when
Giolitti ordered state crop requisitions at reduced rates,
given the sharp fall in production which the strikes had
caused (p. 166, pp. 169-70). 	 The strikes ended on 25
October 1920 when the Provincial Association of
Agriculturalists (APA), which had replaced the AAB in
December 1919, was forced to negotiate with Federterra. The
-118-
ensuing agreement - the Paglia-Calda Pact, named after the
leaders of the APA and Federterra, respectively - gave
Federterra full control over labour recruitment, the
guaranteed employment of braccianti in land reclamation
projects and an increase in the share sharecroppers were
allowed to retain of their produce (60% of cereals, 65% of
sugar and hemp), as well as a higher standard of
accommodation and income guarantees in the event of bad
harvests (Cardoza, pp. 286-7).
Working-class
	 gains	 in	 both	 the	 industrial	 and
agricultural sectors of the provincial economy were to be
short-lived, however. The sense of insult felt by farmers
and industrialists at the government's lack of support in
the disputes and its apparent indifference turned them not
only to intransigence but also to extra-legal methods of
dealing with Socialist power, of which they had some past
experience (see Chapter III). The Socialists for
their part would live to regret their failure both to unite
the rural and urban movements and to take advantage of the
political climate in which revolution might well have
succeeded if sufficiently organized and coordinated.
It would be erroneous to consider that Bolognese Fascism
rose from the ruins of the First World War, however. Its
origins may be traced back to 1914, the year in which the
Socialist victory in the administrative elections coincided
with 'Red Week' and an outburst of interventionist feelings
as the European conflict began.	 AccOrding to Onofri, the
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first 'Fascist' movement was formed by a group of left-wing
interventionists (Radicals, Republicans, Anarcho-
Syndicalists and Socialists) in 1914 under the name of
Fascio di Azione Rivoluzionaria (later Fascio Democratico di
Resistenza).
	
The	 'Fascists'	 directed their patriotic
violence against the city's Socialist administration during
the days of 'Radiant May'. 	 The upper and middle classes,
insulted by the mayor, Francesco Zanardi's policies of rent
controls	 and	 the	 compulsory modernization of rented
property, looked on without too much displeasure and became
increasingly	 influenced	 by	 their	 anti-
liberal/parliamentarian rhetoric	 (Onofri, '1913-22', cit.,
pp. 68-70).	 The military defeat of Caporetto in 1917 was
the cause of several defections from the Socialist
(Neutralist) to the Interventionist camp, strengthening the
resolve of the latter that the PSI could be defeated."
Though there were attempts at posing legal opposition to the
PSI violence remained the favourite interventionist weapon.
At the end of the war the 'Fascists' had the support of
demobilized soldiers and military forces occupying the city
and who, in June 1918, had tried to prevent the PSI from
holding a demonstration commemorating fallen workers. The
following November interventionists and ex-soldiers
physically attacked Zanardi (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp.
70-71).
The first Bolognese Fascio di Combattimento was founded on
9 April 1919, less than a month after Mussolini had launched
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his political movement in Milan. It was mostly represented
by ex-soldiers and officers of various political
backgrounds, predominantly Republican but also Nationalist,
Monarchist,	 Catholic,	 Radical	 and	 Syndicalist.	 Though
strongly anti-Bolshevik they were not insensitive to the
needs of the working classes. 	 They advocated strong forms
of government capable of finding solutions to the internal
and international crises. 21	The Fascio broke up almost as
soon as it had been founded because of conflicting political
origins.
	
The main issue concerned anti-Bolshevik policies.
While	 the	 Nationalists	 demanded	 total	 authoritarian
opposition to revolutionary movements, 	 the Republicans
argued that the working classes could only be tamed through
democratic, Socialist policies. 	 The Nationalists split off
in order to form the Lega Anti-Bolscevica, under the
leadership of the ex-serviceman Dino Zanetti. 	 Among its
members were	 Senator Tanari	 and Giorgio Ghigi,	 both
prominent agrarian figures.	 During the same period the
Arditi	 (assault soldiers) formed their own association
(Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., pp. 95-6).
The rebirth of a right-wing Fascist movement in Bologna in
September 1920 was totally dependent on the initiatives of
the urban and later rural upper and middle classes. During
the course of 1920 those afflicted by Socialist unrest and
angry at government passivity joined forces. Many agrarians
and industrialists, despite their traditionally belonging to
two opposed groups which had tended to force their economic
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problems upon the other with protectionist policies, etc.,
realised, in the face of land and factory occupations and
incessant strikes, that they should fight the common enemy
united (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 73-4). Many
Nationalist farmers, under the leadership of Ghigi, left the
APAI	challenging Paglia's line of collaboration and
compromise and identifying their interests with those of
industrial groups in the city, as was demonstrated by the
formation of a Fascist-agrarian-industrialist front during
the October 1920 administrative elections (Cardoza, p. 301).
Tarozzi, however, places great emphasis on the importance
of the urban middle classes - particularly the economic
forces of shopkeepers, artisans, small-scale industrialists
and employers - in the launching of the Bolognese Fascist
movement. This, she claims, is evident in their formation of
several economic associations which included the L'Unione
Esercenti	 and	 the	 Lega	 Industriali,	 Commercianti	 ed
Esercenti, both aiming to represent the needs of the middle
and lower-middle classes, which were worse hit than the
large-scale industrial and agricultural employers in the
economic crisis of the post-war years. The government, they
claimed, tended to favour the big capitalists and the
working classes while they themselves were hit by price-
reductions imposed by the Socialist council with the assent
of the prefect. They felt the need for political
representation so as to allow the recovery of a free-market
economy which until then had continually faced obstacles
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from the government (Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio',
cit., pp. 96-99).
The Associazione Bolognese di Difesa Sociale (ABDS),
founded in April 1920, united the anti-Socialist forces of
politicians, agrarians, industrialists and the commercial
classes.
	
It claimed the right to oppose strike action,
maintain public services and use its own volunteers to
enforce law and order if the prefectoral authorities failed
(Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., pp. 103-4).
According to Onofri, when in September 1920 the ABDS turned
to Leandro Arpinati's re-organized Fascio di Combattimento
in order to recruit three hundred armed men for the
administrative election campaign, the Questore found this
'del tutto normale' (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., p. 74). The
second Fascio was very much more right-wing and para-
military than the first. Republicans and Syndicalists had
been replaced by Nationalist and Liberal students, anti-
Socialist ex-soldiers and members of past Interventionist
para-military groups, the Arditi and D'Annunzio's 'Legionari
fiumani'.	 Its political programme stressed anti-Socialism
and anti-Bolshevism and the use, if provoked by its enemies,
of violence.	 It joined the agrarian, industrialist and
commercial classes in a united anti-Socialist electoral
campaign under the name of 'Pace, Liberta.	 e Lavoro'
(Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., p. 105).
The	 Socialist	 majority	 of	 58.2%	 at	 the	 October
administrative elections, however, 22 coupled with several
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very effective Fascist assaults 	 on the PSI	 the following
November demonstrated that violence was an effective means
of ridding the province of its Socialist hegemony. Indeed,
the provocation by fascists of an armed conflict in
Bologna's main square during the inauguration of the
Socialist city council on 21 November 1920, resulting in the
death of nine workers and the conservative councillor
Giordani, marked the debut of Fascist anti-Socialist
violence dominating the province until well into 1926. What
became known as the 'Battle of Palazzo d'Accursio' (the city
council headquarters) was almost certainly responsible for
the development of Fascism in many urban areas of Italy and
rural areas of Emilia and Romagna, as seems proven by the
launching of a movement in the neighbouring province of
Ferrara the following month. 23 The Fascist movement was
well supported and justified by the upper and middle classes
(many of whom helped to finance it) 24 and many members of
the police and judiciary - as is well documented in later
chapters - as a moral force capable of ridding the province
of the Socialists, who were unjustly accused of planning the
tragedy of 21 November, particularly the murder of Giordani,
who became a patriotic martyr. Indeed, according to Tasca:
Ii cadavere dell'ex-combattente 6 sfruttato fino al delirio;
si dimenticano la provocazione fascista, l'illegalita armata
contro un amministrazione regolarmente eletta, i nove morti
socialisti.	 Non	 si	 vede	 pi0	 che	 l'ex-combattente,
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condottosi eroicamente in guerra, ucciso "in un agguato"
dagli anti-nazionali.25
The attack, which had almost certainly been organized and
coordinated by the city fascio with the collaboration of the
Questore	 had its desired effect. 	 The new Socialist
council	 was	 dissolved	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	 government
commission. Many party and trade union leaders were
arrested in connection with the tragedy and further credence
was given to the theory of a Socialist attack when a number
of Keformist socialists resigned from the council in order
to dissociate themselves from Giordani's murder (Onofri,
'1913-22', cit.,	 pp. 78-80,	 Cardoza, p. 312, Arbizzani
'L'Avvento' cit., pp. 98-100).
The Bolognese Fascist movement had its origins in the city.
Following the Battle of Palazzo D'Accursio its attacks on
distinguished Socialist figures, including Zanardi and Ercole
Bucco, secretary of the Camera Confederale del Lavoro,
increased.	 Workers were frequently assaulted and union
headquarters were ransacked. 26 In the city it owed its
increasing support not only to the industrialists but also to
the middle classes, especially public employees who moved
over from the Camera Confederale del Lavoro to the support of
the Fascists in order to dissociate themselves from the
revolutionary implications of 21 November.27
The force of Fascist counter-revolution was 	 demonstrated
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by the movement's penetration into the countryside from
December 1920 onwards with the strategic objective of crushing
socialist resistance and 	 preventing	 the maintenance of a
braccianti	 and	 sharecroppers'	 front,	 through the	 forced
disbandment of their unions (Arbizzani, 'Lotta mezzadrile',
p. 175). According to Cardoza, fasci began to appear in
the communes from the spring of 1921. A rural fascio was
usually founded after local anti-Socialist avengers called on
the town fascio, eight thousand strong by June 1921, for help.
It was divided into two sections: the young squadristi formed
the action group or squads which carried out violent punitive
expeditions while the older members were responsible for such
administrative jobs as the organization of transport and
information. The author also suggests that rural	 fascio 
membership was in no way homogeneous. 	 That of San Giorgio di
Piano consisted of ten agrarians, four merchants and
manufacturers, seven white-collar workers, five public-service
employees, fifteen factory workers, eighty-two braccianti and
sharecroppers and eighteen from the professional classes. He
adds that most rural support came from the sharecroppers and
small-scale landowners who sought protection from the socialist
leagues (Cardoza, pp. 316-21).
Many historians and local accounts have testified to the
extremely high level of violence characterizing punitive
expeditions. Tasca, for example, detribes lorry loads of armed
fascists assaulting those suspected of being Socialist, the
ransacking of cooperatives and union headquarters, the torture
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and even murder of league leaders (Tasca, pp. 165-6). An
Avanti! report on Fascist crimes in Bologna between November
1920 and May 1921 bears witness to the general indifference if
not complicity of the local police forces which usually failed
to intervene to prevent violence, blocked off access to
communes under attack to conceal Fascist activities and even
arrested the victims of punitive expeditions. 28 According to
Dalla Casa, the local judiciary also became particularly
intransigent towards socialists and anarchists after the Battle
of Palazzo D'Accursio, collaborating with the prefectoral
authorities over Socialist arrests and in the confiscation of
documents used by the reactionaries to condemn the Socialist
city council for atAaximalist revolutionary attack (Dalla Casa,
movimento operaio', cit., p. 19, p. 27).
According to D'Attorre (p. 141), Bolognese Fascism owed its
success in rural areas to the support received from an
increasing	 number	 of	 agrarian	 employers,	 especially the
leaseholder class. In the spring of 1921 many of them fixed
contracts with the Fascists over financing and some - such as
Regazzi and Pedrelli, two young Molinellese leaseholders -
actually became fascio leaders (Cardoza, pp. 323-4).
Exploiting the peasants' fear of Fascist violence the agrarians
violated the terms of the Paglia-Calda pact, punishing league
leaders for past acts of violence and intimidation, as well as
the imposition of fines on agrarians and the middle class
peasantry (sharecroppers, small leaseholders and landowners,
etc.). The squads had, in Arbizzani's words, the support of
3
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'van gruppi di contadini medi, di appartenenti ai ceti
commerciali e impiegatizi, colpiti nel corso delle lotte dei
braccianti e degli operai a causa di impostazioni settarie e
H violente" (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 258). These
words reveal the significance of the ambiguous relationship
between the sharecropper class and the socialist unions and the
repercussions of Federterra's intimidatory and coercive
attitude towards the peasant middle classes. Dalla Casa
correctly points out, however, that 'Ii risarcimento dei danni
conseguenti alla violazione degli obblighi contrattuali era
avvenuta alla luce del sole e con la mediazione delle massime
autonita pubbliche'. In this sense the imposition of fines by
the leagues had been perfectly legal (Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo
e reazione', cit., p. 212).
The APA became increasingly isolated as the majority of
agricultural employers were attracted by Agrarian Fascist
slogans of 'La terra ac-IA lavora e a chi la fa produrre' and
the emergence of Grandi and Baroncini - both in favour of
closer ties between agriculture and Fascism - as provincial
fascist leaders (D'Attorre, pp. 146-7). Their programme, a
'virtual carbon copy of the proposals advocated by Count
Filippo Cavazza and the AAB in 1919', according to Cardoza,
advocated the 'industrialisation of agriculture (...) in the
general interest of the nation' and 'profit-sharing contracts
that transformed the rural labourers into partners and
associates of the growers in the processes of farm production'.
This would allow for the growth of a class of 'stable and
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socially conservative peasant proprietors' and the elimination
of the class of braccianti and Federterra with it (Cardoza, p.
335). Cardoza adds, however, that many urban fascists resented
the development of what they considered 'profit-making'
Agrarian Fascism which, though paying lip-service to the above
slogans, in real terms amounted to no more than an alliance
between the employers and Fascists to the detriment of the
poor. Indeed, as early as January 1921 Arpinati urged that the
movement break off from the conservative, bourgeois factions,
remaining an independent force, representing the 'interests of
all the people' (Cardoza, pp. 326-9).
If Agrarian Fascism aimed to take the rural proletariat out
of the control of the Socialists, the void left behind by
coercive methods had in some manner to be filled up. Fascist
syndicalist experiments seriously accentuated, however, the
dangers inherent in the founding of a 'peoples' movement on the
support of the property-owning classes. Though the first
Fascist syndical organization in Bologna, the Camera Sindacale
del Lavoro, founded at the end of 1920, had the representation
of not only Fascists,	 but also Liberals, Democrats and
Syndicalists, who claimed class collaboration, it became
increasingly obvious that in reality Fascist Syndicalism did
not seriously defend the rights of workers (Dalla Casa, 'Tra
fascismo', cit., pp. 208-10). Indeed, according to Arbizzani,
the only means of guaranteeing the success of the syndicates
was continued coercion so that the peasantry could be forced
1
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into the hands of the new Fascist leagues, thereby allowing the
agrarians,	 who	 no	 longer	 depended	 on	 Socialist	 labour
exchanges, to break contracts with the leagues. Those
sharecroppers refusing to desert Federterra, for example,
received eviction notices and little sympathy from local
magistrates (Arbizzani, 	 'L'Avvento', ci-b., p. 270).	 Fascist
violence also prevented them 	 from using low-cost cooperative
farm machinery (Cardoza, pp. 360-2). Raffa, however, does
attribute the success of the Fascists in organizing the
sharecroppers to the appeal of their slogans promising land and
protection from league persecution. 29 Braccianti desertions on
the other hand were increased through relentless violence and
fear of unemployment, especially during the harvest period when
the agrarians tried to rely totally on fascist workers
(Cardoza, p. 269).
The heaviest violence was concentrated in the commune of
Molinella.	 It involved the Bonifica Renana land reclamation
works, the territory of which comprised	 parts of the
provinces of Bologna,	 Ferrara and Ravenna.	 Through an
agreement of 1919 labour recruitment was controlled by an
interprovincial branch of Federterra. In June 1921 the
directors, strongly influenced by Ferrarese fascists, sacked 62
Molinellese Socialist workers who had refused to give up their
league membership, on the grounds that they had not turned up
for work. Fascists had in fact used force in order to prevent
them from doing so. They were replaced with Ferrarese Fascist
workers	 (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 218-9). 	 The
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incident was also complicated by the fact that the particular
place of work concerned was just inside the province of
Ferrara, and out of the jurisdiction, therefore, of the
Bolognese prefect, Cesare Mori, who had limited cooperation
from his Ferrarese colleague - who was obviously sympathetic
towards the Fascist cause (see Chapter IV, pp. 278, 288)
over the repression of these acts of intimidation.
The promotion of a Pact of Pacification by Bonomi, who
replaced Giolitti in July 1921, in the summer of 1921 was an
obvious threat to the Fascist syndicalists and came to
represent the first open conflict between Mussolini's
parliamentary line - following the election of 35 Fascist
deputies in May - and provincial squadrismo. Advocated by the
former as a means of enhancing Fascist parliamentary
manoeuvring powers and unifying the political force of Fascism,
Grandi, Arpinati and Baroncini vehemently opposed it (Cardoza,
p. 331). As Raffa states:
i fascisti bolognesi - e non solo - dovettero avere ben chiaro
il rischio che correvano a mantenere nella forma precedente le
relazioni con i nuovi organismi sindacali. Un iniziativa come
quello del patto poteva svuotare i risultati ottenuti (Raffa,
p. 45).
Fearing an exodus of workers back to the Socialist unions,
demonstrating once again the coercive basis of Fascist syndical
recruitment, provincial Fascism, as a token of its dissent and
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as a show of strength, organized a March on Ravenna in
September 1921, forcing the national leadership to 'tacitly
disavow'	the treaty (Cardoza, p. 332).
Mori's unsuccessful attempts at conciliation in the Bonifica
Renana dispute formed part of such pacification initiatives.
After failing to persuade the Fascists to accept politically
mixed labour exchanges he placed an apolitical government
commission in charge of labour allocations, which however, the
Fascists	 ignored	 from	 December	 1921	 (Dalla	 Casa,	 'Tra
fascismo', cit., p. 220). The dismissal of Racheli and
Baroncini from the Camera Sindacale del Lavoro, which accused
them of turning the syndicates into an employers' organization,
and the founding of the Federazione Provinciale dei Sindacati
Nazionali in January 1922 marked increasing alignment between
the fascists and the employers	 (Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo',
cit., p. 223, Raffa, p. 95). The following May the Bonifica
Renana management and the Fascist syndicates signed an
agreement whereby the former would hire its workers exclusively
from the latter in return for salary reductions (Arbizzani,
'L'Avvento', cit., p. 272).
Given both the violence and the extremely high level of
unemployment in Molinella, as Socialist workers were forcibly
replaced by Ferrarese Fascist workers Mori imposed an emergency
decree on 27 May 1922 suspending the importation of labourers
until all local workers had found employment (Arbizzani,
'L'Avvento', cit., p. 272). In reaction to this Bologna was
occupied for several days by fascists 	 from throughout Emilia
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who, with the support of the 	 provincial property-owning
classes,	 demanded the removal of the prefect, accused of
siding with the Socialists in the conflict	 (Dalla Casa, 'Ira
fascismo', cit., p. 230-1). His departure in August 1922
indeed marked the failure of the state to repress a movement,
the subversive implications of which were by now all too clear,
as is in fact demonstrated in Chapter IV.
In the urban sector the Fascists obtained exclusive
recognition of their unions from the industrialists in return
for wage reductions of up to 45% and increased working hours.
During the 'sciopero legalitario' of August 1922, which the
left-wing syndicates had declared in protest at the
government's failure to prevent the ferocious Fascist invasion
of Ravenna and other Adriatic towns at the end of July, 	 the
Fascists	 formed	 anti-strike	 squads	 and	 ordered	 the
industrialists to supply the fasci with the names and addresses
of the strikers, with the obvious tragic results. 	 Following
termination	 of	 the	 strike	 the	 Bolognese	 industrialists
automatically sacked those who had abstained from work,
replacing	 them	 with	 fascist	 workers.	 (Dalla	 Casa,	 'Ira
fascismo', cit., pp. 199-202, pp. 235-43).
Though the connivance of the state institutions (police,
army, judiciary), if not the government itself, was partly
responsible for the success of the Fascist onslaught, Arbizzani
also blames the defencelessness of the working classes on the
incapacity of Socialist leaders to understand the true
implications of Fascism and their hesitation in organizing a
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resistance strategy.	 Although the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) which split off from the PSI in TooliAarj 1921
declared war on the Fascists, it was weakened by its refusal to
ally with other left-wing parties. Both the PCI and PSI refused
to support the 'Arditi del Popolo', a Socialist paramilitary
organization created to counter Fascist violence and disbanded
by the government in the latter half of 1921 (Arbizzani,
'L'Avvento', cit., p. 261, P. 265). In May 1921 the Socialists
went to the general election erroneously believing that they
could suffocate Fascist violence through the ballot box.30
Similarly they committed themselves to the Pact of Pacification
without realizing that (in the words of Pietro Nenni):
Trattare la pace coi fascisti, voleva dire non rendersi conto
della natura del fascismo e specialmente di quello rurale, che
era il pi0 terribile. Voleva dire soprattutto, smarrire dietro
una chimera la coscienza dell'antitesi assoluta fra socialismo
e fascismo. Ora questo finiva per essere grottesco se Si pensa
che il Partito nello stesso momento, rifiutava qualsiasi intesa
con i gruppi antifascisti.
As on 6 August 1921 the Socialist daily La Squilla ordered its
forces to adhere strictly to the pact, putting down their
defensive weapons, the Fascists accelerated their offensives,
so that in reality the agreement amounted to no more than the
legalization of Fascist violence and the condemnation of any
worker resistance to this (Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo', cit., p.
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218, Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 267).
The period spanning the March on Rome in October 1922 and the
establishment of full Fascist dictatorship in Italy from the
end of 1925 was marked by a general state of crisis in
provincial Fascism. The process of normalization and
legalization which the fascist ascendancy to power required -
as was indeed epitomized by the attempted containment of
squadristi within the MVSN - fragmented provincial Fascist
movements, previously unified by the common desire to
eliminate the force of Socialism, so that the various factions
forming the movement, aware of their conflicting political
aspirations, often became totally opposed to each other. In the
province of Bologna the most apparent conflict within the
Fascist movement was between	 Syndicalist	 elements and the
property-owning
	 classes	 who	 had	 supported	 the	 Fascist
revolution. In rural areas particularly, antagonisms had
developed from the end of 1921 onwards. Many of the former
faction, under the leadership of Baroncini, realized that
Fascist Syndicalism as it stood amounted to no more than the
destruction of Socialist unions to the benefit of the
agrarians.
D'Attorre points out that 'La ricerca di una "legittimazione"
di massa pi0 duratura di quella offerta dalla violenza
terroristica, portava Baroncini e i suoi uomini ad avallere
financo rivendicazioni eversive rispetto ai successi conseguiti
dagli agricoltori nel 1921' (D'Attorre, p. 150). Both the
agrarians and the Fascists saw in the founding of the
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Provincial Federation of Farmers' Syndicates (FPSA), an arm of
the Federazione Provinciale del
	 Sindacati	 Nazionali,	 the
strengthening of their aims. Led and run by Cacciari and
Fornaciari, who represented the commercial leaseholder class,
but subject to the control of Fascist syndicates, its programme
favoured the rise of the small proprietors and sharecroppers
but also the dominance of commercial farmers with closer ties
to banks and marketing consortia. Yet, the FPSA only formally
guaranteed the application of labour agreements, sharecropping
contracts and wage rises (Cardoza, pp. 395-7, D'Attorre, p.
150). Baroncini, who had the support of the prefect Aphel,
wanted to use the FPSA to assert his power over the agrarians
and often turned his squads on farmers refusing to join the
organization. This was matched, however, by similar anti-
Syndicalist action, so that, according to Cardoza, a Fascist
class war almost developed. In 1923, for example, Regazzi's
agrarian squads physically assaulted the syndical secretary of
Mezzolara (D'Attorre, p. 150, Cardoza, pp. 422-3, Raffa, p.
219).
Baroncini came to realise that the paradox of agrarian
Fascism lay in its being built upon the destruction of workers'
rights and that for FPSA members the interests of production
inevitably meant the sacrificing of workers' needs, as was
demonstrated by their imposition of salary cuts well beyond the
10% stipulated in the pacts. The Fascist government which was
dependent, especially financially, on the support of the
property-owning Classes, was at best lukewarm in its support of
i
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the Syndicalists (Cardoza, pp. 410 and 413). The removal of
Baroncini and the re-emergence of Arpinati as provincial
Fascist leader signalled the start of the isolation of the
Fascist
	 Syndicalists.	 Revolutionary,	 anti-conservative
intransigence was strongly opposed by Arpinati who, with the
support of the new prefect and the commercial farmers, began to
purge dissidence from the movement (Raffa, p. 330). Criticising
Baroncini's movement as a 'closed party of thugs', Arpinati
stated that squad action should be limited to keeping down the
development of Socialist leagues and not the coercion of non-
Fascists into joining the syndicates. He stressed that union
members should be truly convinced by the ideals of Fascist
Syndicalism, which advocated welfare only through production
(Raffa, pp. 325 and 433).
The political crisis following the Matteotti murder
temporarily restored power to the Syndicalists, though this was
in reality a means of preventing a resurgence of the local PSI
and	 Camera	 Confederale	 del	 Lavoro	 whilst	 legislative
instruments that in future would put an end to any such
possibility were being prepared in Rome (Raffa, p. 383). This
enabled the Bolognese syndicates to dissociate themselves from
the PNF in December 1924, claiming that it had failed to defend
the workers against the landowners and industrialists (Raffa,
p. 380). Conflict between the urban Fascist unions and
employers was particularly evident in this period, as was
demonstrated by a series of cost-of-living strikes by many
worker categories in the autumn of 1924 and February and March
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the following year. The quick signing of agreements between the
employers and syndicates signalled less the achievement of real
benefits for the workers and more the necessity of preventing
the socialist organizations from exploiting such crises,
however. In August 1925 all militant union leaders were
dismissed and replaced by party hacks as all local level
syndicates	 became	 centralized	 as	 part	 of	 the	 National
Corporations. Similarly, Arpinati was instructed by Mussolini
to restore discipline to the party in the autumn of 1925,
placing dissidents in politically harmless positions. Notably,
Baroncini became executive of the agrarians' insurance company,
whilst Cuccoli, former syndical leader ousted by Arpinati in
August 1925, became podesta of Castelfranco Emilia. (Cardoza,
pp. 419 and 431).
If Fascist Syndicalism no longer posed a threat to the
employers it would be incorrect to assume that in Bologna power
was restored to them on traditional terms. Many did take back
positions of leadership in local and provincial
administrations, podestA, for example, which had been lost to
the Socialists. However, in agriculture, for example,
positions of leadership were awarded to the leaseholder class
rather than to the old-guard landowners. Agrarian individualism
was not restored in that decisions concerning agriculture were
taken in Rome and the ritual of contracts with workers'
syndicates had to be gone through, even if it was only a
formality (Cardoza, p. 433). According to D'Attorre, through
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the transfer of many Bolognese agrarians to leading positions
in Rome:
I	 contenuti	 programmatici	 dell'agrarismo	 emiliano	 -	 dal
produttivismo tecnicista, all'antindustrialismo, dalla
valorizzazione della compartecipazione all'accentuazione delle
istanze consortiti e corporative - avrebbero permeato la
presenza degli agrari nel dibattito politico e sindacale del
regime (D'Attorre, p. 153).
Cardoza concludes that the theory that Bologna's farmers were
simply Fascist flankers is destroyed if one is to consider that
the commercial leaseholders, despite their aversion towards
true Syndicalist worker power, were actively involved in the
Fascist institutional framework at all levels, their policies
bringing agriculture and industry closer together (Cardoza, pp.
I
450-1).
The March on Rome heightened already existing divisions
within the left in Italy.	 A few weeks before the Fascist
conquest of power the PSI had	 expelled its Keformists and the
Confederazione Generale del Lavoro had declared its
independence from the party with the aim of uniting all workers
in an apolitical organization in collaboration with the
fascists. This had been shortlived for the Communists,
Maximalists and Revolutionary Socialists had formed their own
syndical committee (Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo', cit., pp. 243-
4). From 1923 union power was further weakened by several
i
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central government decrees. These included law 692 of 15
January 1923 which officially abolished the eight-hour working
day, law 143 of 28 January which allowed the dismissal of
workers accused of 'subversion'. Indeed in Bologna many civil
servants were sacked for 'plotting against the state'. The
Camera Confederale del Lavoro was increasingly excluded from
labour agreements and on several occasions was attacked and
devastated by Fascist squads (Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo', cit.,
pp. 252-4).
The only serious initial resistance to the Fascist onslaught
was centred in Molinella where, despite excessive violence,
even murder, and the boycotting of socialists by the Fascists
and employers, workers remained loyal towards the Socialist
organizations, even at the cost of starvation. On 3 March 1923
local Fascism faced severe embarrassment when Mussolini was
presented with a petition signed by 3,624 Molinellese workers
asking for the re-opening of cooperatives and the right of free
organization. In July that year it was necessary to abolish by
prefectoral decree the Paglia-Calda pact which in other areas
the agrarians had been able to violate without difficulty.
Similarly in the summer of 1923 the Bonifica Renana works had
to be temporarily closed, so causing the redundancy of 750
socialists, in the hope that this would encourage them to join
the Fascist organizations.31
Peasant workers elsewhere showed kt6 cesistaAce than	 their
Molinellese companions, however. 	 What is more, Raffa states
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that even if Fascism in reality meant lower wages and longer
workin g hours:
sembra assai probabile che la vera arma psicologica del
fascismo sia stato l'annuncio della sua politica agraria che
prevedeva	 la	 sistemazione	 sulla	 terrazza	 dei	 lavoratori
agricoli	 (• ,...) in effetti 7.000 famiglie coloniche e 30.000
braccianti ci indicano a ritenere cospicua la penetrazione di
quella propaganda (Raffa, p. 260).
Raffa's point well suggests that one of the fundamental
failings of the Socialist policies of land socialization was
that it may have undervalued the ultimate desire of many
braccianti to be able to rent or own land. Indeed the 'Patto
di Compartecipazione' of 1923 placed many of them on small
plots of land under more or less the same conditions as
sharecroppers, though their employers gained between 60 and 65%
of their products,	 according to Scagliarini 	 (pp.	 170-1).
According to Raffa, however, from 1924 onwards
'compartecipazione' was abandoned, due to the financial burden
it imposed on the braccianti and Fascism turned to the idea of
transforming them into small peasant proprietors (Raffa, pp.
278-9). Onofri, points out, however, that in the long run
fascist anti-braccianti policies produced more braccianti than
existed in 1920, since the high costs incurred by sharecroppers
and small-scale landowners forced them into poverty (Onofri,
'1913-22', cit., pp. 83-4).
-141-
The Matteotti crisis of the summer of 1924 perhaps revealed
that despite the crushing of Socialist syndical power many
workers remained loyal to their previous unions. 	 On 27 June a
ten-minute silence was successfully carried out by the Camera
Confederale del Lavoro in memory of the Socialist deputy
Giacomo Matteotti who was kidnapped and presumed murdered by
the Fascist government.	 Dalla Casa notes that this was the
first general strike after the March on Rome. It encouraged
workers to take advantage of the crisis by infiltrating the
ranks of the Fascist unions in the hope of winning over support
(Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p. 255). Similarly, special
police powers allowing the closure of subversive associations
and persecution of anti-nationals, with which prefects were
endowed following Mussolini's infamous 3 January 1925 speech,
failed to	 eliminate all resistance immediately. 	 As is
demonstrated in Chapter V, the more or less outlawed Camera
Confederale del
	 Lavoro	 exploited	 the	 crisis	 in	 Fascist
Syndicalism.	 Dalla Casa states that well into 1925 Fascist
penetration	 into the	 Bolognese working classes 	 remained
incomplete as a number of socialist-organized strikes caught
the Sindacati Nazionali off their guard (Dalla Casa, 'Tra
fascismo', cit., pp. 254-60).
The aim of this second introductory chapter is to familiarize
the reader with the historical context in which the study of
policing in the province of Bologna takes place. 	 In tracing
social, political and economic developments from the end of the
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nineteenth century to Mussolini's establishment of a
dictatorship from 1925 emphasis has been placed on those events
most significantly involving the provincial police authorities.
These are: the growth of Socialist-led peasant syndical power
and the ensuing conflicts with local agrarian elites before and
during the First World War; industrial development in Bologna
during the First World War and the urban proletariat which
emerged at the end of the conflict; the post-war social,
political and economic crises, epitomized in Socialist land
and factory occupations and the growth of Fascism; post-March
on Rome struggles between provincial and state Fascism and
finally, the destruction of Socialist syndical achievements
after Mussolini's rise to power.
I
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Molinellese workers, taking advantage of one of its
articles - created to satisfy the requirements of the
International Labour Organization for propaganda purposes -
formed an ad hoc league, as permitted by the article. At
this point the government forcibly removed over three
hundred famililies from the commune and settledlelsewhere.
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CHAPTER THREE: A CASE-STUDY OF BOLOGNA'S
POLICE FORCES, 1897-1918
While the first chapter deals with a general history of the
Italian	 police	 system	 and	 the	 second	 examines	 social,
political	 and economic developments	 in the province of
Bologna, this chapter considers the role of the police forces
in Bologna. Though mainly concerned with Giolittian police
strategies and policing in the province during the First World
War, the principal starting point for the chapter is the year
1898 - dominated by violent strikes throughout the peninsula -
and this provides sufficient insight into late nineteenth-
century policing and the application of the 'Zanardelli' 1889
penal code and Crispi's 'Leggi Eccezionali' in controlling the
Socialist political and syndical movement.
The case-study begins in the commune of Molinella - the
heart of the provincial	 peasant syndical movement - and is
therefore initially focused on the braccianti	 strikes of
1898, though other aspects, including the prefect's role as
electoral agent and his control of Socialist syndical and
municipal development,	 are considered. The chapter then
questions the success of Giovanni Giolitti (appointed interior
minister in the Zanardelli government on 15 February 1901 and
prime minister on 3 November 1903) in moving away from the
traditionally military-based police methods of the 1890s.
Though	 again	 principally	 focused	 on	 agrarian	 battles,
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reference is also made to the use of general strikes in urban
areas, as well as more general questions of the control of
Socialist associations and electoral strategies. As evident
in the first chapter, the question of Giolittian policing is
strongly linked to the extent to which the statesman managed
to solve such internal policing factors as numerical weakness,
complex hierarchical structures, etc., and this is questioned
with direct reference to the Bolognese situation. The final
part of the chapter considers the role of the police in the
interventionist crisis leading to Italy's entry into the First
World War and the effects of war-time emergency legislation on
the province.
(i)	 Nineteenth century trends	 in police repression and
Giolittian innovations.
The failed Molinellese braccianti strikes of 1898, 1899 and
1900 were almost certainly a consequence of the success of the
1897 strike and the determination, therefore, of both the
agrarians and the prefect not to be caught off guard as before
(See Chapter II, pp. 99-100). Strikes broke out in 1898 when
the employers violated the wage agreement , which had been
signed under the auspices of the prefect Giovanni Giura the
previous year. According to the Democratic daily newspaper Ii
Resto del Carlino	 the agrarian employers had refused to
recognize the validity of that agreement and had fixed lower
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wage rates without consulting the braccianti organizations
first (31 March 1898).
	 The agrarians retorted through their
press organ La Gazzetta dell'Emilia that the leagues had
little understanding of the true needs of the braccianti and
only blocked negotiations (3 April 1898).
According to Onofri the prefect of Bologna, Serrao - who was
evidently seen as a stronger prefect than Giura who was
promptly transferred after the 1897 strike l - authorized pact
violations because otherwise the employers had threatened not
to plant rice that year (in order to avoid having to meet the
demands of the leagues) ('1913-22', cit., p. 61). This is in
fact verified by a telegram Serrao sent to the interior
minister in which he considered the 1897 pact invalid because
it had been forced upon the landowners by the Socialists. 	 He
added that:
Quest'anno si A. impegnata sulla stessa questione ma con
diverso risultato, poichê l'azione energica dell'autoritA
poliziesca incoraggiO i proprietari a non subire le pretese
del socialisti e quindi a non trattare con intermediari noti
per la loro mala fede.
This document, besides revealing the prefect's refusal to
recognize the validity of the pact, demonstrates that the
prefect shared the opinion with the agrarians that a minority
of troublemakers had coerced the majority of braccianti into
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striking.
	 They exploited the peasants by charging a daily
commission of five lire for their services. 2 Similarly, he
showed little concern for the serious economic plight of the
braccianti workers. Though expressing concern about this to a
police inspector in Molinella, he added that previous strikes,
limiting the amount of grain harvested, had been the cause of
the failure of wages to rise proportionately with the cost of
bread. 3	Molinella's delegate complained that many of the
unemployed were not seriously in need of charity and that 50%
of those on the poor list spent their relief money in the
osterie. On many occasions police concern for peasant poverty
was more associated with the consequences of this in terms of
public order and the development of revolutionary movements.
Indeed the interior minister even suggested to Serrao that
only encouragin3 emigration of what he considered 'quella
classe la quale offre i maggiori pericoli per l'ordine
pubblico,	 perchê	 piD	 accessibile	 alle	 lusinghe	 della
propaganda	 socialista'	 (the	 braccianti)	 would	 solve the
problem.4
During the strike Carabinieri and regular troops had the
task of preventing acts of violence and intimidation (as
stipulated by articles 165 and 166 of the 1889 penal code)
which strikers may have resorted to in an effort to force non-
league workers or those simply ignoring the strike call to
stop work in support of their cause. 	 There are no doubts as
to the large numbers of arrests carried out for such crimes,
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as testified by both archival police documents and press
reports.
What is questionable, however, is the extent to which such
police action was legitimately executed. If La Gazzetta 
dell'Emilia insisted that large crowds of strikers intimidated
free workers (31 March 1898), the police documents rarely cite
specific cases of violence. 	 This suggests that articles 165
and 166 left ample space for interpretation. What does
transpire through them is the use of cavalry charges and/or
mass arrests of large groups of strikers for merely assembling
and demonstrating, despite the fact that this was perfectly
legal, if not accompanied by violence, as Avanti! claimed (31
March 1898). On 28 March, for example, the prefect informed
the interior minister that a crowd of ninety striking rice
planters had been arrested for refusing to disband, even there
is no evidence in the document to suggest that their
assembling was, in itself, illegal. They were freed after the
local police inspector had warned them not to carry out
further demonstrations. 5 An explanation to this is gained
from studying Serrao's telegram to the Molinellese delegate,
dated 3 August 1898, in which he ordered the banning of
'passeggiate colletive di donne o braccianti in cerca di
lavoro' on the grounds that 'Un tale fatto costituisi di per
se stesso una violenza e potrebbe essere il sintomo di una
ripresa d'attentati alla libertA di lavor0. 6 The banning of
assemblies was considered a form of prevention of 'attentato
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alla libertA del lavoro', therefore. Only under martial law
(between 15 May and 7 July) were assemblies of any kind
officially abolished, however.7
With regard to arrests for violation of articles 165 and
166, Il Resto del Carlino of 31 March 1898 accused police
witnesses	 of	 fabricating	 episodes	 of	 violence	 and
intimidation.	 Referring to eight women alleged to have been
victims of the leagues, it stated that 'neppure una appare
come testimone al dibattimento.	 Esse parlano per bocca del
delegato o dei carabinieri'. The fact that on several
occasions the prefect ordered his forces not to carry out
arrests without sufficient evidence, as demonstrated by his
telegram to the delegate in Molinella of 10 August 1898 8 -
given that court acquittals were counterproductive in both
political and policing terms - suggests that the police was
indeed overzealous in the manner in which it handled strikes.
The repression of Socialist institutions accompanying the
strikes is an example of the way in which 1889 and 1894
legislation was put into use in order to suffocate labour
disputes. If Avanti!'s article of 31 March 1898 openly
supported the Molinellese rice planters' strike and criticised
the repressive attitude of the police and army, the prefect
saw the article concerned as punishable under article 247 of
the penal code ('apologia del reato, incitamento all'odio fra
le classi sociall y , etc.) and article 246 ( Y istigazione a
commettere reati'), given also that the newspaper had promoted
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public	 subscriptions	 in	 support	 of	 the	 strikers.9
Similarly, Massarenti and his colleagues were arrested or
sought after by the police for their role in encouraging
strikes and charged under articles 247 and 248 ('associazione
a delinquere'), hence the dissolution of both the Lega di
resistenza fra gli operai and the local Camera del Lavoro."
The Societa cooperativa fra i braccianti di Budrio which had
supported the Molinellese strikes was dissolved under article
3 of the Provincial and Communal Act, since it had become 'un
centro di	 propaganda	 socialista pericolosa per 	 l'ordine
pubblico'.11
Propaganda criticising state institutions was sufficient to
justify the closure of political associations.	 On I May 1898
the Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnolo of Imola was
dissolved by the prefect under article 251 of the penal code
('associazione diretta a commettere
	
i	 delitti	 preveduti
nell'articolo 247') and article 3 of the Provincial and
Communal Act because of its publication of 'propaganda',
criticiLl among other things internal exile legislation and
article 248.12
During the particularly conflictual period of May 1898 the
government was	 concerned not to allow the transmission and
publication of information
	
which might	 be politically
damaging.	 On 9 May 1898, the prime minister Di Rudinl -
almost certainly as a result of the bloodshed of the previous
day during bread riots in Milan - ordered prefects not to
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allow the transmission of private telegrams if they contained
reports on the conflicts which, in his opinion, would be
'alarming	 to	 the	 public'.	 This	 naturally	 had	 its
repercussions on the Molinellese strikes. On 29 June the
prefect informed the military authorities (who with the
declaration of martial law had become the highest police
authority in the province) that he had intercepted and banned
the transmission of a telegram from Molinella addressed to the
Socialist newspaper Ii Messaggero containing information
which, as he saw it, was 'in parte incomplete, in parte
informat0.13
A number of acquittals for lack of evidence by local
tribunals suggest, however, that the police authorities were
over-repressive. In June 1898, for example, Socialist leaders
in Baricella were acquitted by Bologna's Tribunale Penale from
the charge of having organized public demonstrations against
the cost of bread and flour in May (as part of the nationwide
demonstrations) and of having formed an association with the
aim of provoking a rebellion. 14 Similarly, three workers
arrested for having sung the 'Inno dei Lavoratori' were
acquitted by the court in Imola since 'risulta provato
avessero accennato una sola strofa che Pretore non ha ritenuto
indizio sufficiente eccitamento odio1.15
While 1889 and 1894 legislation was used to contain, if not
suffocate, Socialist strike and syndical activities, the
traditional prefectoral role of electoral agent was used to
i
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limit the success of Socialist local government initiatives
and prevent the election of Socialist parliamentary deputies.
At the 1897 general election, for example, the prefect Giura
received messages from all over the peninsula asking
permission for non-residents in Bologna to be able to return
home to vote for the constitutional parties, especially in
those constituencies where the PSI had a chance of winning a
majority. 16	He also received a telegram from the prefect of
Ferrara, dated 19 March 1897, stating:
Nell'interesse candidato costituzionale contro al socialista
sarebbe desiderabile che a Fantoni Giovanni impiegato
ferroviario rete adriatica non fosse accordata licenza recarsi
a Cento domenica.17
In the light of such documentation, the prefect's request on
18 March 1897 for military support against imminent Socialist
electoral violence may well have concealed his desire to use
reinforcements	 to	 the	 advantage	 of the	 constitutional
candidates. 18	Out of election periods, however, the prefect
turned to official legislation in order to control the
activities of Socialist local administration.	 In this manner
the town council of Medicina was dissolved in the autumn of
1898	 for	 over-spending	 and	 'manifestazioni	 di	 partito
contrarie alle istituzioni'.19
The archival documentation suggests that from the summer of
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1900 change, if only minimal, was on its way, a consequence of
altered public opinion on the manner in which the political
expression of the masses should be treated (see Chapter I, p.
39). Though, as in 1898, troops continued to over-protect
free workers from braccianti strikers with mass arrests, etc.,
and even carried out harvest work for the employers, there is
scarce information suggesting that the Socialist organizations
were persecuted on the scale of 1898 repression.
Demonstrations and meetings of a political nature were usually
permitted and were only interrupted if they openly and
directly criticised the government. In October that year, for
example, a police inspector on duty at a PSI meeting in
Molinella ordered the speaker to moderate his language after
he criticised the government for sending for troops to stop
recent strikes. The sub-prefect of Imola indeed praised this
behaviour as tactful, since it had enabled the respect of the
law without the need to resort to repressive measures.2°
Again, if Il Resto del Carlino accused the police and
agrarians of having tried to repress strike action which in
the opinion of the journalist had not involved illegal acts
(21/22 August 1900), the new prefect Evandro Caravaggio showed
particular concern for the plight of many workers who were
refused employment in the autumn of 1900 for having taken part
in the summer strikes. He reminded the employers that strikes
were the cause of a minority and that the workers and their
families caught up in agrarian revenge were not responsible
i
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for their actions. 21 On another occasion he saw the employers
as incorrect in refusing to negotiate with the leagues 'perch6
non solo non k vietato a una classe commettere la propria
causa a delegati o rappresentanti, ma anche 6 utile e
necessario non potendosi conferire direttamente con migliaia
di persone'
Evidence of change is also provided by an article in La
Gazzetta dell'Emilia of 23 August which stated:
Quando la polizia, i carabinieri, i funzionari, i magistrati
credono che ii governo intervenga a favore degli scioperanti,
cominciano a temere di essere sacrificati se fanno atti di
energia, e non k certamente con tali disposizioni d'animo che
rappresentanti	 della	 legge	 possano	 avere	 l'autoritA
necessaria per agire.
Though the agrarian press almost certainly exaggerated here,
the sense of caution and tact adopted by the police forces in
certain situations is also evident in other areas of policing
activities. Documentation implies that in the electoral field
police officials were becoming aware of the force of public
opinion. This is expressed by the sub-prefect of Imola who in
the aftermath of the 1900 general election stated:
.22
Io ho la coscienza di aver fatto tutto quello che un
Funzionario del Govern() pub fare in una 	 citta di Romagna e
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specialmente in
	 Imola,	 sotto un controllo costante del
numeroso partito socialista. Ho visto ripetute volte i
Sindaci e molti elettori veramente influenti, e ml sono
astenuto dal compiere qualsiasi atto che g iustificando, anche
soltanto nell'apparenza, l'accusa di violenza avesse potuto
far giuoco agli avversari.23
In this sense policing in 1900 may in many ways be considered
an anticipation of Giolitti's police strategy the following
year.
One of the main problems in approaching the Giolittian
policing question lies in the lack of institutional norms
governing his policies, as described in Chapter 1 (p. 40).
According to Fiorentino, the explanation for this is to be
found in the wide socio-political differences between the
Italian regions and even the individual provinces, rendering a
single police strategy impossible. 	 Giolitti had to approach
the 69 Prefetture on an individual basis (p. 5). A close
study of the manner in which he initially dealt with the
braccianti strikes in Bologna suggests that without altering
legislative norms on strikes and political associations he
based his strategy on more relaxed interpretation of
legislation previously used to suffocate syndical activities.
Even where he dealt with advanced forms of the PSI strategy
(boycotting,	 general	 strikes,	 etc.)	 in	 later years by
i
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altering such norms, the documentation suggests that slow
legislative developments forced prefects and police commissars
to use their powers of discretion more Hlan norrricill.
Examination of the archival documentation reveals Giolitti
tried to alter the manner in which the police authorities
confronted the Socialist strike weapon. Indeed, he encouraged
prefects to distinguish between economically- and politically-
based strikes and to show more tolerance towards the former if
they were not accompanied by acts of violence - a more
accurate interpretation of articles 165 and 166, therefore.
He often in fact asked the prefect for details of wage figures
and working hours forming the basis of the protests. Where
he considered grievances genuine, as in Molinella in May 1901,
he ordered the prefect to encourage greater fairness from
employers, refusing to support them with troops, as in the
past. On 20 May that year he ordered Caravaggio to warn
Molinellese agrarians that they could not count on government
support during the present braccianti strike because their
wages were the lowest in the province and to encourage them to
negotiate with their workers to avoid losing a whole year's
produce. 24
 He ordered prudence on the part of the prefect to
ensure that agreements were achieved, thereby keeping spirits
calm, reflecting his desire to solve disputes before they
reached violent proportions and indicating the new role of the
prefect as mediator in labour disputes. He was to use acts of
persuasion to prevent league demands from becoming excessive,
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especially	 if failed	 negotiations were
	 likely to cause
unemployment the following winter.	 Giolitti clearly saw the
local Socialist deputy Bissolati as having a strong influence
on the masses, since on several occasions he ordered
Caravaggio to persuade him to keep the strikers calm, avoiding
embarrassment for the govern,ment which could only tolerate
non-violent economic strikes.25
The new role of the prefect is evident when considering his
toleration of frequent peaceful demonstrations by the
unemployed (usually in front of the local PS or council
headquarters) who demanded work and relief money and his
frequent requests to the government for the development of
public works schemes (and in particular the execution of long-
awaited land reclamation projects). According to Avanti! of 1
February 1902, for example, hundreds of workers demonstrated
in the village squares of Minerbio, Baricella, Budrio and Ca'
de Fabbri for a more prompt start to land reclamation works,
and concluded 'Il prefetto fa sperare subito provvedimenti'.
Caravaggio pointed out to Giolitti in September 1901, however,
unemployment relief also served to lessen the risks of
demonstrations becoming violent. This suggests that new
conciliatory measures may often have been less aimed at
solving long-existing social problems and more concerned with
public security .26
Alongside peaceful economic strikes and demonstrations the
initial Giolittian years reveal tolerance towards political
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demonstrations and conferences, though again the prefect was
given scope in deciding whether or not such acts constituted a
public security risk.
	
The documentation suggests that though
the police officials kept the prefect informed about the
contents of Socialist speeches, only direct or violent
criticism of the government was considered illegal.
	 In April
1902, for example, Caravaggio informed Giolitti that he had no
intention of prohibiting an anarchist conference on the
internal exile legislation since 'Ii comizio medesimo possa
ritenersi non un atto di vilipendio ad una legge dello stato,
ma solo un esame obbiettivo e sereno
	 di disposizioni
legislative da correggere'. 27
	As with strikes it seems that
under	 Giolitti	 already	 existing	 legislation
	 was	 more
accurately interpreted, therefore.
Where strikes became violent, political or spread throughout
the province Giolitti showed no reservations, however, in
calling for military repression to protect non-union workers
from league	 intimidation and arresting ring-leaders,
	 if
necessary, demonstrating therefore the limits of his new
policies.	 The prefect was authorized to resort of article 3
of the Provincial and Communal Law which allowed the banning
of public assembling in emergency situations.
	 On 23 April
1901	 he wrote to Giolitti justifying his decree which put
into practice such legal provision on the grounds that
strikers armed with farming tools were roaming around the
countryside in a threatening manner. 28	He emphasized,
I
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though, that troops were to act as a deterrent only and were
not to over-protect the employers. Indeed Caravaggio had to
remind the Molinellese delegate, who obviously interpreted the
use of military reinforcements as a return to nineteenth-
century forms of repression, that 'Non si devono soffocare
scioperi ma semplicemente impedire che degenerino in atti
delittuosi'. The funzionario concerned had in fact, in
accordance with the military authorities, encouraged employers
to provoke the strikers into acts of violence so justifying
their repression.29
Socialist press articles and several letters of complaint to
Giolitti from Bissolati suggest that the interior minister's
new strategy was unsuccessful in altering the attitude of the
policeman towards working-class manifestations. As Bissolati
pointed out, strikers continued to be arrested for peacefully
inciting non-union braccianti to stop work. He added that
'L'eccitamento pacifico allo sciopero non ê reato', but that
'cosi non intendono ne prefetto, ne delegati, ne carabinieri,
i quali si sono evidentemente assunti il compito di fare
l'interesse dei padroni'. Massarenti accused the police in
telegrams addressed to Avanti! of having injured strikers.
This was confirmed by Bissolati who stated that policemen,
having been reminded that they were no longer allowed to carry
out mass arrests, had resorted to the use of fire-arms,
killing a worker during demonstrations in Molinella.3°
There are several possible motives for the above-mentioned
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police conduct. Firstly, one should consider the sense of
disorientation these new and sometimes ambiguous policies
caused especially among the lower ranks of the police forces.
Indeed, as in the last example, the use of bullets almost
certainly reflected the policeman's sense of insecurity at not
being able to carry out mass arrests, as in the past, despite
orders to prevent Socialist violence. 	 They may have panicked
in the face of violent or apparently threatening behaviour on
the part of strikers.
	
Fiorentino	 states in fact that
episodes of small groups of Carabinieri or Guardie di citta 
firing on demonstrators whilst awaiting the arrival of
reinforcements were a common phenomenon during the Giolittian
period (p. 26). This may have been the cause here, given that
the interior minister had advised the use of troops in the
area only a day previously to Bissolati's letter. If the
prefect had considered the use of military reinforcements
unnecessary, judging perhaps that in that particular situation
mediation was more likely to calm the strikers, it does not
follow that local forces were able to cope with large crowds
of people, previously considered internal enemies of the
state, without resorting to the 	 repressive methods of the
past. Indeed, in the commune of Budrio the local police
delegate demonstrated much Jrustration at not receiving extra
forces despite his frequent requests for help, adding that
five Carabinieri were incapable of controlling the Socialist
movement there.31
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Obviously, where policemen had little experience in dealing
with the strikers and demonstrators on conciliatory terms the
possibilities of casualties were high, especially when
considering that the prefect in no way tolerated weakness and
inefficiency from his subordinates.
	 One should also bear in
mind the constant reality during those years of numerical
weaknesses - dealt with later on in the chapter -	 even in
terms of military reinforcements so that those areas
presenting a less conflictual situation usually remained
unprotected and exposed, in Budrio for example, while forces
were concentrated in zones of heavy conflict, as for example
Molinella.
Another significant factor lies in the dangers implicit in
the discretionary powers bestowed upon the prefect by Giolitti
who advised mediation though offering, if necessary,
sufficient repressive means, as demonstrated by the interior
minister's note to Caravaggio on 24 April 1901. 32	Prefects
obviously had to judge accurately how to deal with varying
situations.	 This could hardly be guaranteed and indeed the
autonomy left to them may have allowed abusive conduct. A
survey of Giolitti's communications with other prefectures
indeed suggests that the severity he showed to those prefects
failing to put down violence during strikes and demonstrations
may well have helped to maintain a pre-Giolittian level of
abuse and repression. As the prefect of Foggia was warned in
June 1902, a more liberal government did not mean a weaker
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government.	 Indeed Giolitti	 held prefects personally
responsible for episodes of uncontrolled violence.33
The interior minister's new policies were further limited by
the relative autonomy the Carabinieri maintained from the
prefecture. The hierarchical ambiguities governing the use of
this military corps for police duties have been outlined in
Chapter I. If one is then to consider that it constituted the
only effective rural police force, divided into small nuclei
stationed in most of the towns and villages	 in the province
and dependent for police operations on a small 	 number of PS
police delegations, 34 the limited control of the prefect over
Carabinieri operations is easily imaginable. As the Questore 
warned the prefect Dallari in 1908, he had to ask mayors to
inform him of all significant events in their villages 'non
essendo l'Arma dei RRCC tenuta, per proprio regolamento, a
riferire su tutti indistintamente gli avvenimenti che si
svolgono nel territorio delle stazioni sparse nel
Circondario 1 . 35 One may conclude from this that Giolitti was
limited, therefore, in the influence he had over Carabinieri 
conduct. Though he saw the increased use of the corps as an
alternative to the army (see Chapter I, p. 44), its
fundamentally military character almost certainly reduced the
possibilities of change.
Though the interior minister officially showed concern about
allegations of arbitrary arrests and police brutality during
strikes in Bologna, there is little evidence of serious
I
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measures preventing or punishing such conduct. Besides, the
prefect tended to assure Giolitti that he had ordered
moderation on the part of his subordinates, advising arrests
only where articles 165 and 166 were violated. 	 On May 20
1901, for example, Giolitti asked Caravaggio to investigate
allegations of brutality on the part of a Carabinieri 
brigadier towards women strikers. 	 Caravaggio replied that
such allegations were exaggerations on the part of Massarenti.
He defended his forces on the grounds that the strikers had
violated the law. 36 As Fiorentino states, Giolitti tended to
support publicly policemen accused of abuse of power or even
brutality, as he in fact defended Caravaggio in parliament
against accusations by Socialist deputies that the prefect
continued to side with the agrarians during strikes	 (p. 11).
The acquittal of the army commander, who ordered his forces to
fire on demonstrators in the neighbouring province of Ferrara
in June 1901 killing two workers, on the grounds of 'legittima
difesa',	 may be considered concrete proof of Giolitti's
failure to resist 'l'urto combinato delle forze reazionarie
politiche e degli interessi della casta militare', according
to the moderate PSI leader Filippo Turati.37
Reaction on the part of the agrarians suggests, however,
that	 despite	 certain	 serious	 limitations	 in	 Giolitti's
policies, change had indeed come to the province of Bologna.
According to La Gazzetta dell'Emilia of 13 May 1901, the new
government
	 policies
	
forced	 Caravaggio	 to	 'assistere
t
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impassibile allo svolgersi dello sciopero di Molinella, deve,
anzi chiamare a se i proprietari per invitarli a trovare una
via di accomodamento, mentre un anno fa mandava i soldati a
sostituire gli scioperanti'. As described below, however,
agrarian reports tended to contort the reality of the
situation and this was often aimed at coercing police leaders
into demanding greater intransigence from their subordinates
towards the working class movement, allowing if possible a
return to pre-Giolittian policing methodology.
In later years Giolitti's policies were inevitably influenced
and altered by such external factors as the increase in
revolutionary elements within the PSI, its break from the
government in 1903 and the development of more radical strike
forms, as described in Chapter II (p. 102). This is very
evident in the province of Bologna where from 1904, so
documentation suggests, the prefectoral authorities returned
to pre-Giolittian forms of repression.	 La Squilla in reports
on 13 and 20 August 1904, for example, blamed this on the
arrival of a new prefect, Antonio Dall'Oglio. Policemen in
Medicina were accused of preventing free workers from joining
strikes and encouraging them to commit acts of violence
against the leagues. 	 The police in general were criticised
for over-exaggerating about the level of Socialist violence to
justify the use of military repression.
	
At least initially
Dall'Oglio certainly disagreed with Giolitti over how to deal
with agrarian strikes.	 Giolitti saw the employers as the
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cause of disputes in August 1904 because of their refusal to
recognize the leagues as workers' representatives.	 The
prefect argued,
	
however,	 that the agrarians
	 could not
recognize them because in doing so they would be admitting
their obligation to employ league workers only, which they
considered an infringement on the rights of property.38
The prefect's abandonment of the 'Giolittian' role of
mediator may well reflect his uncertainly about how to handle
new PSI syndical strategies.	 In rural areas, so he reported
to Giolitti in September 1904, legislation was insufficient in
dealing with frequent boycotting which in his opinion had
violent implications, violating the rights of property.
	 He
added that non-league peasants	 'vivono quindi una vita
continuamente agitata nella tema di dover subire presto o
tardi qualche vendetta'.	 His apprehension may well have been
influenced by the lack of legislation to deal specifically
with this new strike form, as demonstrated by the acquittal in
Budrio of six braccianti accused of threatening to boycott
those peasants refusing to join the local league in May 1904.
His attitude was almost certainly influenced by the agrarian
press.	 Ii Giornale di Bologna (temporarily replacing La
Gazzetta dell'Emilia in 1904 and 1905) reported on 28 August
1904 that police delegates sent to rural areas of the province
became so influenced by the leagues that they were powerless
against everyday Socialist violence and intimidation.
In urban areas the revolutionary implications of the latest
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PSI strategy, the general strike, were obviously alarming to
Dall'Oglio. His apprehension may again have been heightened
by the initial caution of the prime minister who during the
first general strike, which followed the victory of the
Revolutionary Syndicalists over the Reformists at the PSI
national congress in September 1904, ordered his forces to
avoid contact with demonstrators on the grounds that
'trattandosi di movimento che non avendo ragione di essere non
pua durare'. 39
 The prefect in fact failed to follow these
directives and Avanti!	 (21 September 1904) reported conflict
as police officials, 'sorpresa dalla imponenza della
manifestazione' tried to disband demonstrators and the army
carried out cavalry charges, arresting forty workers.
From the end of 1904 however, Dall'Oglio had greater support
from Giolitti - and his shortlived successors Fortis and
Sonnino - who temporarily abandoned his policies of mediation.
This change in the prime minister's strategy was clearly
G oi ulSed by the failure of the 1904 general strike, which
demonstrated that repression could be used without the risk of
"665
provoking revolution.imore or less coincided with his more
determined support of agrarian policies of 'compartecipazione'
and a constitutional electoral revival in Bologna. Indeed
Giolitti called a general election in November, exploiting
public anti-Socialist feelings generated by the general strike
in September.	 In Bologna the prefectoral and military
authorities acted to assure a constitutional majority.
	 A
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telegram from Dall'Oglio to his rural delegates ordered 'in
nome ministero' the formation of monarchist 'defence groups'
in front of polling stations, allegedly to protect voters from
socialist intimidation. La Squilla, however, reported the use
of cavalry to put down public protests at acts of clerical and
moderate party intimidation inside polling stations during the
Budrio constituency re-election in January 1905. 40 Cardoza
states that the local administrative elections of the summer
of 1905 which saw the recapture of 11 out of 15 municipalities
by the constitutional parties coincided with the collapse of
the	 leagues	 and	 temporary	 success	 in	 agrarian
'compartecipazione' policies (p. 108).
1905 documentation clearly reveals an over-protective
attitude on the part of the prefect, who now had better
support from the government, towards the agrarians, with
little concern for the disastrous effects 'compartecipazione'
may have had on the economic plight of the local peasantry.
This was particularly evident in his support of the agrarian
anti-braccianti policies epitomized in the development of
agrarian associations, employment offices and sharecropping-
type pacts which prohibited strikes.
	 Indeed he recommended
the main promotor of such policies, Sturani, in a letter to
the agricultural minister in May 1905. 41
 While Socialist
politicians and union leaders complained that the local
proletariat starved because of inadequate public works schemes
and the refusal of employers to harvest land if this would
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enable them to avoid having to negotiate with the leagues,
Dall'Oglio replied that:
questo stato di cose non k che effetto di quella lotta di
classe che va sempre ph) accentuandosi in codesta zona e per
la quale all'organizzazione del proletariato viene opposto
quella del proprietari di fondi • (...) se nessuno loro
(Socialist leaders) contende il diritto di organizzare in
leghe gli operai essi non possono negare ai proprietari il
diritto di consociarsi fra loro.42
Similarly, he justified the eviction of sharecroppers in
Crespellano in October 1905 on the grounds that Socialist
leaders had encouraged them to rebel against their
employers.43
Dall'Oglio was also concerned about the activities of the
Revolutionary Syndicalist and leader of the Camera del Lavoro,
Lenzini, in 1905 and 1906. He was considered responsible for
violent demonstrations during general strikes and for the
promotion of Anarchist anti-militarist campaigns. Indeed the
prefect informed the interior minister of an Anarchist-
Syndicalist resurgence in the province in October 1905. Both
Lenzini and the provincial Anarchist leader Armando Borghi had
promoted public meetings with the aim of discussing the
possible use of propaganda to damage the integrity of the
army. Orders were consequently received from Rome to ban such
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meetings, which could henceforth only take place in private
form and with a limited number of participants. Three
thousand copies of a manifesto entitled 'Al Richiamati' were
confiscated from the homes of Borghi and other Anarchist
leaders who were prosecuted under article 2 of Law 315 of July
1894.44
Lenzini was also accused of leading the Camera del Lavoro
in a boycotting campaign against the city council in 1906, in
the hope that this would persuade the mayor Tanari to entrust
municipal	 public	 works	 exclusively	 to	 Socialist	 labour
exchanges. Both the Camera del Lavoro and the Lega del
Muratori (bricklayers' syndicate) were considered the main
promoters of a violent demonstration in February 1906 in which
a	 few thousand workers were encouraged to invade the city
council headquarters, Palazzo d'Accursio. Stones were thrown
at groups of soldiers, Carabinieri and Guardie di citta.45
Again, during May Day celebrations that year demonstrators
attacked tram-drivers and shopkeepers who continued working.
Several carriages were vandalised and shop windows smashed and
a tram-conductor and barber injured.	 The prefect held the
Anarchists principally responsible for this.46
The documentation also illustrates growing government
intransigence towards railway workers' strikes. During the
April 1905 general strike the prefect took firm measures to
guarantee as far as possible the normal functioning of the
rail network. Army reinforcements were used to guard railway
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stations and lines from possible sabotage attempts and to
protect trains, which were driven by 'krumiri' workers.
Signalmen who went on strike without being substituted were
preventively arrested.	 The government ordered Dall'Oglio to
abstain from negotiations. 47	This tough	 line may be
considered an anticipation of legislation, passed 	 after the
strike, which declared railway men public officals (see
Chapter I, p. 42) and on these grounds, as declared in a
circular from the interior minister to all prefects, a railway
strike was henceforth to be considered an open act of
rebellion.48
The general strike of May 1906, in reaction to the killing
of workers by the police during a demonstration in Turin,	 is
of particular significance to this study. 	 On this occasion
the citizens of Bologna took the law into their own hands to
repress
	
the	 action	 of	 what	 Dall'Oglio	 described	 as
'scioperanti	 teppistici',	 carrying	 out	 numerous	 arrests
'all'approvazione della forza pubblica'. That the prefect
approved of such action is demonstrated by a report to the
interior minister of 10 May in which he stated that the
vandals had no longer dared attempt further acts of violence
following
	 a	 citizens'	 counter-demonstration. 49	If the
prefectoral authorities interpreted such action in defensive
terms, Avanti! of 12 May 1906 accused young Monarchists,
'democristiani' and merchants of provoking the demonstrators
with the protection of the police.
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The participation of Bologna's bourgeois forces in the
repression of the general strike was almost certainly a
consequence of the weakness of the police forces or alarm on
the part of the prefect himself. Though there are no doubts
as to the resistance put up by large forces of Carabinieri and
soldiers, as well as numerous arrests of demonstrators
attempting to force public employees to stop work, it is
possible that police forces were exasperated by the insistence
of the strikers who reacted to the repression by throwing
stones, causing several casualties among the police ranks - as
testified by both Avanti! and the prefect." Though the use
of arms may have been a solution it is possible that the
authorities feared the consequences of this, given that the
strike itself had been caused by police killings in Turin.
It is feasible therefore, that the reaction of the civilian
forces may have posed a safer alternative to harsher forms of
repression. Whatever the explanation to this - archival
documentation is not clear - the real significance of this
episode lies in the use of civilians for policing activities.
Though the extent to which this was spontaneous or organized
by the Questura is unclear, the incident almost certainly had
some influence in	 the formation by the Questura , from 1909
onwards of 'Pattuglie Cittadini', making up for police
numerical weaknesses, to fight crime, as mentioned below. The
importance of this is also appreciable if one is to consider
the basis of the post-First World War Fascist movement in
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Bologna:	 the repression of violence by civilian forces where
the police authorities were or seemed powerless.
It would be erroneous to consider that during the above
period government policies, as reflected in the attitude of
the prefect, aimed to crush the working-class movement. They
intended„ if anything to counterbalance growing radicalism
within the PSI in an attempt to maintain a political
equilibrium. This is evident if one is to consider the
changes the new prefect Ernesto Dallari (appointed in October
1906)	 brought	 to	 policing,	 especially	 in	 rural	 areas,
suggesting more or less a return to original Giolittian
policies.	 Indeed he criticised many employers for their
exaggerated use of non-union	 workers and for relying too
heavily on the support of the authorities in this. The
delegate in Molinella, who supported him over this, admitted
that claims by employers that the leagues invaded their land
were simply part of their tradition of 'allarmare con
invenzione per ottenere antica protezione'. He criticised the
local agrarian association for failing to maintain its promise
to reduce daily working hours and suggested that the prefect
advise them not to provoke violence because of their obstinate
attitudes. He also took legal action against one particular
employer, Brunelli, for encouraging his non-union workers to
insult and assault league members.51
According to Cardoza, the explanation to this clear change
in policy lies in Giolitti's realization that in the long run
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'compartecipazione' had only increased conflict, since the
associations which it promoted were run by the strongest and
most intransigent employers who pulled smaller farmers into
battles which they could not afford to lose. As a result of
this many moderate and	 traditional employers began to
negotiate with the leagues once again 	 (pp. 112-5). Another
explanation lies in the return to Reformist dominance of the
PSI both nationally and in Bologna. Dallari reported the
strengthening of Reformist ranks in Bologna in April 1907 with
the unification of the majority of municipal sections of the
PSI under the Federazione Provinciale Socialista. 	 Similarly
the Questore noted a crisis in the Revolutionary dominated
Camera del Lavoro culminating in the removal of its leader
Lenzini.52
With regard to certain PSI strategies the government
remained intransigent as in the past, hence the sending of
troops to Baricella in July 1907 to cope with peasant land
invasions aimed at preventing 'krumiri' from harvesting.53
Similarly, troops and police reinforcements were mobilized
during general and railway workers' strikes. During the
October 1907 railway strike Giolitti banned the transmission
of telegrams encouraging work stoppages and ordered prefects
to arrest those committing acts of sabotage and railway
personnel abandoning convoys, reflecting increased zealousness
on the part of the government, in accordance with 1905
legislation. 54	The arrest of most of Crespellano's league
1
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leaders in November 1907 and their prosecution under article
154 of the penal code ('violenza privata') for intimidating
their own members into the observation of boycotts illustrates
moves by the judiciary to more severely repress certain forms
of league activities, as outlined in Chapter I (pp. 41-42).55
On the other hand the repression of the most radical forms
of Socialism was contrasted by new social legislation passed
during the period 1907 - 14 regarding such issues as accident
insurance and pension schemes. New health legislation placed
responsabilities on state periphery organs, including the
prefect, for such initiatives as the setting up of 'farmacie
comunali' (municipal chemists selling medicines at reduced
prices) from 1913, and the free administration of medicines to
the poor (Aquarone, Tre capitoli, cit., pp. 14-17, 177-85).
This was matched by more serious initiatives on the part of
the prefect to solve unemployment problems in the province.
In November 1912 Dallari criticised public works schemes
because they only had immediate relief effects and were really
no more than a 'semplice mezzo di polizia', ie they were aimed
more at keeping the masses at bay and less at solving long-
term economic problems.	 The solution he advocated was the
reclamation of 90,000 hectares of land which though reducing
the number of braccianti 	 required would allow greater
sharecropping settlements.55
The prefect's concern to prevent extremism on both sides is
well illustrated from 1911	 when in Bologna the intransigent
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AAB began to evict sharecroppers and violate pacts and the
Camera del Lavoro became strongly influenced by Anarchist and
Revolutionary elements once again - paralleled on national
terms by the Libyan invasion and a return to Revolutionary
dominance in the PSI. Though the Questore was fearful of the
consequences of a revolutionary dominated Camera del Lavoro
and a Federterra which though still reformist was not immune
from infiltrations from the extreme left, he claimed that the
reformists could win back 'se la maggioranza degli operai
sapra affermarsi e reagire contro la sopraffazione e le
violenze', illustrating his faith in the generally pacifist
nature of the majority of the workers. Such predictions were
in fact confirmed at the end of 1912 with the formation of the
reformist Camera Confederale del Lavoro (see Chapter II, p.
108).	 In the same report he criticised the attitude of the
employers which was:
tutt'ora circoscritta nel criterio classico del diritto di
proprieta e della sua prevalenza su quello del lavoro. Ii jus 
utendi et abutenti vige senza la minima evoluzione, assoluto
ed intangibile, nella concezione padronale ed ogni pretesa o
deroga	 ad esso appare	 una violazione ed un principio
rivoluzionario.
He expressed annoyance at their constant demands for police
protection in return for their full tax contributions. 57 The
1
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uneasy relationship between the prefectoral authorities and
the agrarians was confirmed the following year when the latter
abandoned negotiations with the leagues in protest at what
they considered Dallari's support of braccianti claims. The
prefect had in fact justified their protests at constant pact
violations by Medicina farmers.58
If the above documentation shows that Giolitti's policing
strategy was to a great extent dependant on the relationship
between the government and the PSI, the impact that this had
on provincial policing, especially at the local level was
limited, however. Indeed, though initially Dallari was
praised for opposing the unfairness of the agricultural
employers - as demonstrated by a telegram he received from
Massarenti in June 1907 59
 - allegations of police partisanship
with the agrarians turned out to be as frequent as they had
been under his predecessor Dall'Oglio,
	 so union leaders
complained.
	 In 1911, for example, Federterra sent Giolitti an
extensive report accusing Dallari of indifference towards
agrarian pact violations and police brutality. A Carabinieri 
sergeant major (Brigadiere) was alleged to have condoned the
murder of a bracciante by his employer in Sala Bolognese while
in San Pietro in Casale another sergeant major
	 shot and
killed a striker, injuring another.
	 Local magistrates were
accused of delaying court action against him."
Similarly, general strikes were no less violent affairs
under Dallari.
	 Though, according to Avanti! of 14 October
i
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1907, the new prefect avoided using conspicuously large forces
in the October 1907 general strike, 'cossiche la
manifestazione proletaria si svolse calma e tranquilla e la
citta aveva solo l'aspetto di un giorno festivo', the extent
to which his forces always managed to follow his directives is
dubious. During the April 1911 general strike Ii Giornale del 
Mattino, a local Democratic newspaper, reported Carabinieri 
and Guardie di citta blocking a procession and brutally
attacking its front-liners (18 April 1911). The Questore for
his part claimed that he had stopped the procession because it
was intent on throwing stones against Palazzo d'Accursio and
had acted repressively because anarchists and 'pregiudicati'
had reacted violently to this. 61	This	 therefore suggests
continued	 failure
	 among
	 many policemen to adapt to
Giolittian tactics of mediation.
Dallari's reaction to allegations of police brutality was
total support of the forces involved, despite his opposition
to agrarian intransigence. When, for example, in June 1911
the mayor of Sala Bolognese complained of police maltreatment
of peasant demonstrators, he replied that such repression had
been necessitated by the criminal behaviour or the leagues.62
Even if Dallari was conscious of police over-protection of the
agrarians he may well have followed the prime minister's
tradition of publicly playing down allegations of this sort
and defending his forces.	 This may account for his measures
to	 restrict	 the	 circulation	 of	 Massarenti's	 telegrams
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reporting police abuse."	 As the Questore pointed out,
however, the police found themselves in a situation where the
agrarians considered their action late and insufficient and
the	 leagues	 accused
	 them	 of	 arbitrary	 and	 partisan
behaviour."
	 Indeed, that both sides were probably not
totally objective in their interpretation of police policies
in the province should be borne in mind when considering their
reports on police behaviour.
Independently of their attitude towards labour disputes,
both	 Dall'Oglio	 and	 Dallari	 maintained	 their	 roles	 as
government electoral agents, and this naturally conflicted
with policies of strike mediation.	 Hence, like Dall'Oglio in
1904,	 Dallari	 was	 instructed	 by	 Giolitti	 to ensure
	 a
constitutional	 victory	 in	 the	 1913	 general	 election.
Similarly,	 he	 limited	 public	 spending	 by	 Molinella's
Socialist municipal council and kept Budrio's council under
the control of a 'commissario prefettizio' in 1907 and 1908
until he was sure of a constitutional electoral win."
	
The
ambiguous role of the Giolittian prefect is in fact only
conceivable if placed within a general governing context in
which minimum economic and political concessions were granted
to the working classes in the hope of keeping the ruling
classes in power.	 Hence the reality of continued electoral
corruption, despite the widening of the franchise in 1912.
The 'Giolittian' prefect epitomized the government's desire
for	 career	 personnel	 with	 professional	 administrative
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training and experience who could be 'politicized' to fit the
needs of an ever-changing social and political climate.
	
This
would account for Dallari's rather conflicting role which
reflected less his own political	 feelings and more the
ambiguous dictates of the government which he was serving.
Dall'Oglio's replacement in October 1906 - for over-supporting
the agrarian cause, so Cardoza claims (pp. 113-4) - may well
be an example of the failure of the prefect to run the
province less on his own political dictates and more according
to the varying political needs of Rome. 	 Documentation in
Rome	 suggests, however, that all prefects appointed in
Bologna under Giolitti (Dall'Oglio included) were from the
career class and there is no doubt as to their excellent
professional records. According to Aquarone, under Giolitti a
successful prefectoral career opened the way to such elevated
political positions as ambassador and senator, rather than
vice-versa (pp. 60-1). Caravaggio in fact became a senator on
retiring in November 1901, after a number of years in office
in Bologna. 66 The question of the Giolittian prefect deserves
far wider investigation, however.
If near-nineteenth century forms of police repression
continued to be used in certain situations	 - as was also
demonstrated by continued 'eccidi proletari' at the national
leve1 67 - episodes of individual, unofficial and usually
locally-based	 police	 partisanship	 with	 the	 agrarians
demonstrate that Giolitti's policies did have some impact, if
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only negative, on police conduct.	 In 1908, for example, the
delegate of Budrio informed Dallari that his predecessor had
become so friendly with local employer
	 Benni (mentioned in
Chapter II, p. 106), that when league land invasions were
imminent he sent the
	
Carabinieri away from the scene of
conflict in order to justify the leaseholder's use of fire-
arms	 in	 self-defence	 and	 legitimize the
	
use of	 army
reinforcements." There are several possible explanations to
this.	 Individual policemen may have moved over to partisan
support of the employers because they genuinely felt
disorientated by new policies which limited their previous
repressive powers. They may have been influenced by the force
of public opinion which frequently attacked the police forces,
as was illustrated in the agrarian press. Indeed personal
attacks such as the one received by Molinella's delegate
	 in
July 1907 obviously were effective in enforcing
	 police
connivance with the agrarians." 	 As in the case of the
delegate of Budrio, however,	 the provocation of conflict in
order to justify the use of troops may almost have been a
means of self-defence on the part of unprotected policemen,
reflecting a relatively weak police structure.
This analysis of policing under Giovanni Giolitti would not
be complete, however, without considering serious internal
problems in the administration and organization of Bologna's
police forces, since they almost certainly accounted to a fair
extent for police behavioural trends during the period. 	 Of
i
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greatest significance here is the question of numerical
weakness which has on several occasions emerged in this study.
Documentation indeed reveals that nearly always police numbers
were well below the limits set by law and that even
considerable increases in numerical strength were usually
ineffective. In January 1910, for example, the Questore 
informed Dallari that out of 32 police officials posted within
his territorial	 jurisdiction	 ,	 14 had permanent office
positions, leaving 18 for active service. 	 Of these 4 were
too old for street duties and 6 were on missions outside the
province. This left 8. 70 Similarly, he complained that
though the numerical force of the Guardie di CittA had been
increased from 214 to 310, this had been reduced to 272
because the city council was unable to pay for extra board and
accommodation.	 In 1911 he stated that missions often pushed
the numerical strength of the Guardie to below half. 71	Again
in 1909 he claimed that 'ii personale dei Carabinieri
assolutamente impari alle ordinarie e normali esigenze del
servizio, tanto in cittA che nel circondario'.72
Lack of sufficient forces during this period is evident if
one is to consider the large number of requests made for the
establishment of new police delegations	 and Carabinieri 
stations. Indeed the absence of police presence in certain
rural areas often necessitated the setting up of temporary
police units, using forces from other areas of the province.
The inefficiency of these measures is obvious, however, since
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the transfer of a police delegate, for example, to another
zone exposed his own delegation to the threat of the Socialist
leagues, etc.73
Documentation suggests, however, that the interior minister
did not usually respond positively to the prefect's requests
for extra forces or new headquarters, despite official
encouragement through financial compensation of increased
Carabinieri and Guardie di CittA enrolment, as shown in
Chapter I (pp. 43-4). When in May 1906 Dall'Oglio asked for a
new police delegation in Malalbergo, he received the reply
that there was not enough funding for such a venture. Again,
in reply to Dallari's requests for more Guardie in 1909, the
police chief stated that this was impossible given that over a
thousand were lacking nationally. 74 The seriousness of
numerical weakness in Bologna is evident if one is to consider
that during the general election of May 1909 reinforcements of
Guardie di Finanza (financial police) were employed. The
following November the Questura had to resort to the use of
555 members of the public to form 'Pattuglie Cittadine' -
under the authorization of an interior ministry decree of 1863
which granted arms permits to citizens for this purpose -
which under the guidance of police officers guarded the city
against crime. By February 1910 the numbers had diminished to
118 and, as the Questore himself admitted, these patrols were
of no real effect in crime prevention.75
If there were few casualties in Bologna itself, in Italy as
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a whole the inadequacy of police forces placed the onus on the
use of reinforcements or the army. According to Fiorentino,
Giolitti was forced to admit in parliament in March 1908 in
the face of continued 'eccidi proletari' that the use of the
army was the main cause of bloodshed and added that he hoped
that an increased number of Carabinieri as an alternative to
troops would limit this, though continuing to emphasize the
importance of the army in policing (p. 40). One may conclude,
however, that if no real changes took place - Giolitti's idea
of using Carabinieri battalions as an alternative to the army
was never pushed through (Fiorentino, p. 72) - this was
because, besides the financial difficulties this may have
involved, the prime minister was afraid to oppose military
leaders	 by	 altering traditional	 and military	 forms of
repression too much.
That the over use of reinforcements generated tensions
between the prefectoral and military authorities is evident in
Bologna.	 In September	 1908 the police chief Leonardi
criticized	 Dallari	 for	 over-concentrating	 Carabinieri 
reinforcements in certain areas of the province without
forewarning their commanders. 76 There was also obvious
rivalry between the Carabinieri and the civilian police
authorities. When in December 1914, for example, the mayor of
Castiglione dei Pepoli asked the prefect for a permanent
police delegation in the town, given the success of the
presence of a temporary delegation in controlling strike
I
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initiatives	 there	 the	 previous	 summer,	 the	 Carabinieri 
division commander angrily claimed that his forces were
adequate! 77 Such animosity may well have been generated
during the Giolittian period by the prime minister's obvious
desire to increase the prestige of the Guardie di cittA, as
described in Chapter I (pp. 43-4).
Reports show that in Bologna the quality of policemen was in
no way improved under Giolitti. This was almost certainly due
to the failure of the government to improve their working
conditions.	 The Questore was as critical of the bad quality
of his forces as he was of their numerical weakness. 	 He
mentioned apathy, frequent absence from work and general
indiscipline in reports of January and August 1910.
	
An
attempt to place Guardie di CittA in special divisions to cope
with increased crime that year had proved fruitless. Of the
forty percent of Guardie who stayed in the force after two
years service, at least a third were badly disciplined, taking
advantage of their plain clothes status for these special
duties to slope off work. Similarly, he complained that
their superiors in the force set them a bad example with their
'alcoholic' or 'psychologically affected' state.78
Motives for the state of decay into which the Questura had
fallen are numerous. The Questore's January report suggested,
for example, that the limited number of active officials were
especially envious towards their younger colleagues who
usually avoided night duties and other exhausting work because
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they were sent on missions out of the province.
	
Criticism
from the public about the high levels of unsolved crime had
also thrown personnel	 into a state of apathy.	 On a national
scale newspapers such as state officials La Tutela Pubblica 
expressed the bitter feelings of many policemen about unfair
pension and promotion schemes and humiliating salary levels
and what many considered lack of sympathy from the government
over this. 79 Fiorentino indeed mentions a Carabinieri 
national strike in 1910 and a high level of discontent among
funzionari that year, since financial bonuses granted in
August 1907 had still not been paid (p. 67). This last point
reveals the reality of slow bureaucratic proceedures rendering
any legislative moves aimed at improving the policeman's
working conditions insignificant.
Giolitti was generally unsuccessful in altering the state of
policing in Italy and changing the traditionally repressive
mentality of the policeman because he did not create the
conditions necessary for this. If anything his policies
simply disorientated police leaders, often with dramatic
consequences. After thirteen years of Giolittian rule the
police system remained in as much decay as it had been in
1901, presenting more or less identical problems of numerical
weakness, dualism and rivalry between corps, indiscipline,
etc. Giolitti's strategies were automatically limited because
his own support for the working-class grievances were only
half-hearted and	 often totally incompatible with his
i
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electoral requirements. He aimed to keep the Socialist
movement under firm control, his social policies a means of
limiting the attraction of Revolutionary Socialism, but when
the going became too rough a return to near traditional
methods of repression was inevitable.
Giolitti's replacement by Salandra in April 1914 left
Dallari a further four months in office in Bologna. The
following June a conflict between republicans and Carabinieri 
in Ancona, resulting in the deaths of three demonstrators,
provoked serious revolutionary disturbances in many parts of
the peninsula as Benito Mussolini, the Revolutionary
Syndicalist PSI leader proclaimed, in the words of Luigi
Albertini, 'Caccia agli agenti, carabinieri, soldati 1.80 What
became known as 'Red Week' had its effects to a minor but
significant	 extent on the Bolognese province.	 On 10 June
Dallari received reports of the felling of telegraph poles and
the cutting of	 telephone wires in rural areas, and during
the following days he informed the interior minister of acts
of arson and sabotage.	 'Teppisti' attempted to steal weapons
from a train, which they managed to stop and railway lines
were blocked.	 Several churches and public buildings were set
on fire. 81 Of greater importance to this study, however, as
during the general strike of May 1906, once again civilians
were involved in anti-revolutionary counter-demonstrations.
Though the archival evidence is thin here, Onofri states that
demonstrations proclaimed by Federterra 	 and the Camera
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Confederale del Lavoro on 9 and 11 June were attacked by armed
members of the Nationalist Party with the protection of the
police. 82	Dallari,	 in answering to allegations by the
socialist deputy Calda that the police had tolerated
Nationalist violence, claimed that in reality a group of
citizens, mostly merchants embittered by the effects that the
demonstrations were having on their trade, had exchanged
punches with workers on 11 June and that the police had
intervened to stop the conflict, arresting those resisting
their orders or inciting revolution. That he may have been
aware of the intentions of the Nationalists, however, is
demonstrated by the fact that he had warned the Socialists not
to pass in procession through the particular location where
the conflict later took place. Indeed, if one is to consider
that on 11 June the prefect had reported that he did not have
sufficient Carabinieri and army reinforcements, it is quite
understandable that the police forces may have benefited from
the help of the bourgeois forces of the city. 	 Following the
incident Salandra did in fact	 order the prefect to avoid
conflicts,
	
especially	 those	 'derivanti	 spontanea
collaborazione	 cittadini',	 suggesting	 that	 the	 original
circular issued in which the government expressed its
confidence that it would have the cooperation of its subjects
in the restoration of peace may have been overinterpreted by
both the police and the citizens.83
Dallari himself claimed in a letter to the interior minister
i
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on 12 June that, unlike his predecessor, he had never
permitted the formation of 'pattuglioni tutela ordine
pubblico' for the repression of revolutionary demonstrations,
since he considered this a reflection of the numerical
weakness of the police	 as well as	 giving such conflict
almost	 civil-war dimensions.	 He added that he intended to
ban arms permits to prevent this.	 Indeed, he received a
letter of protest from the president of a shooting range in
Castelfranco Emilia that
	
Carabinieri had removed the breach
blocks from rifles stored there, the following day .84	 The
events of June 1914 provide once again evidence of	 the
importance during the first years of the twentieth century of
the adoption by bourgeois society of anti-Socialist self-
defence tactics to counter60,1Ante a police system which, under
Giolitti, had adopted mediatory measures in handling the
aspirations of the masses, independently of how successful
these measures actually were. 	 The unofficial connivance of
individual	 policemen
	 in	 this	 and	 the	 often	 official
organization of 'Pattuglie Cittadine' by the Questura itself
(as in 1909) only further legitimized what may be considered
a dress rehearsal for the post-First World War years when
Fascism provided the solution to newly gained Socialist
powers.
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(ii) The Guarda massacre and the effects of the First World
War on policing in Bologna.
The replacement of Dallari by Vincenzo Quaranta in August
1914 was almost certainly a reflection less of the manner in
which the former handled 'Red Week' - there is no evidence of
this - but more of his association with the Giolittian era.
According to Brunello Vigezzi, Dallari was 'un tipico prefetto
giolittiano, accusato di tolleranza verso i socialisti e i
"loro episodi di barbarie 1t '. 85	The disbanding of Molinella's
syndical organizations and the dissolution of the Socialist
administration on the orders of the prefect following the
tragic massacre at Guarda on 5 October 1914
	 during the
braccianti-sharecroppers' strike (see Chapter II, pp. 108-9)
indeed illustrate the advantage 	 gained by the agrarians from
Quaranta's appointment.	 Onofri, in his detailed study of the
event, goes as far as to suggest that the massacre had been
provoked by the new prefect, who needed a sufficient pretext
for repressing the leagues. This author argues that Quaranta,
well aware that the peasants were prone to outbursts of
violence, deliberately delayed the arrival in Molinella of a
crucial telegram which would almost certainly have calmed the
mood of the leagues. The telegram in fact informed Massarenti
that the presence of 'krumiri' - the fundamental cause of the
tragedy - in Molinella was merely a precaution. They would be
sent home immediately, should an agreement be reached between
I
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the leagues and the employers. (La Strage, cit., pp. 110-8).
	
*
What indeed does emerge through study of the documentation
is the prefect's desire to incriminate the Molinellese
leagues, not so much in terms of legal evidence proving that
they had planned the incident in advance, as was made out, -
evidence of this kind was in fact hard to come by! - but more
on the immoral implications of years of 'red slavery' in
Bologna. The local PSI deputies Bentini and Modigliani, who
rallied to the support of the leagues after 5 October informed
Salandra that both the prefect and the agrarians had, before
the incident, demonstrated their unwillingness for a peaceful
solution to the strike. Though the Molinellese peasant
association declared its willingness to end the strike within
the deadline set by the agrarians for this, non-union workers
had still been sent for." Following immediate repressive
moves in the aftermath of the tragedy, Quaranta, rather than
promoting real moves towards pacification, supported the
employers over their refusal to negotiate with what remained
of the leagues on the grounds that they should in no way feel
obliged to have dealings with worker representatives accused
of murder. 87	Similarly, the Vice-Questore was unwilling to
help those sharecroppers
	 who, because of their refusal to
accept new pacts on the terms of the agrarians, were evicted
since 'concessione ricovero escomiati parte Autorita
municipale o per ordine governo porterebbe vittoria sovversivi
e perpetuerebbe agitazione escomiati'. Quaranta added that the
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ease	 with which the majority of sharecroppers had managed
to come to agreements with their employers without the
mediation of the leagues was proof of the 'artificiositA di
tutte le impostazioni 1.88 In response to accusations that the
authorities had forcibly prevented the leagues from taking
part in these so-called 'negotiations' he retorted that:
con una sorveglianza attiva Si cera di impedire che i
leghisti potessero coartare la volontA di proprietari, coloni
o braccianti, costringendoli a seguire direttive non suggerite
dalla persuasione, ma imposte con le minaccie e le violenze."
The documents cited demonstrate how Quaranta exploited the
violent implications of local syndicalism emerging from the
massacre to suffocate any league initiatives.
Proof of the farcical nature of the incrimination of
Molinella's Socialist organizations for the murder of the
'krumiri' emerges once again in the police files of 1916 at
the time of the first trial when the prefect, despite the
original arrest of 62 league members, informed Salandra that:
Ii Massarenti 6 infatti l'unica figura degna di rilievo.
Tutti	 gli	 altri
	
imputati sono personaggi secondari che
dileguano nelle incertezze morali di un delitto compiuto da
una folla. Il Massarenti 6 l'esponente di tutto un sistema e
il perno di tutta una propaganda di odio e di lotta (...)."
1
I
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The trial, postponed until 1919, terminated that year with an
amnesty for the 62 arrested and revocation of arrest warrants
for Massarenti and two other colleagues. Quaranta had notably
advised the prime minister not to proceed with the trial
since, in his opinion, an acquittal would appear a moral
triumph for Massarenti whilst if condemned they would become
political martyrs. Massarenti was also acquitted of the
charge of embezzlement of public funding as mayor of
Molinella. Indeed, the 'commissario prefettizio' Cacciari who
had immediately replaced him in 1914 had been forced to
withdraw the charges for lack of evidence.91
If Giolittian police tactics certainly had their limitations
the events of Guarda are suggestive of total abandonment of
policies of mediation and a return to nineteenth century forms
of repression. If Dallari in the face of what he considered
violence and intimidation by revolutionary elements within the
PSI organizations had tended to place his trust in the
pacifist/Reformist Socialist majority of the province's
working classes and the success of dialogue rather than
repression, Quaranta, a normal career prefect but in Cardoza's
opinion an instrument of Salandra (p. 192), saw repression as
the surest means of putting an end to Socialist bullying.
Indeed he complained in a report to the interior minister in
November 1914 that in the past the police and judiciary had
been too weak. 92
	Vigezzi, commenting on the repression in
Molinella, claims that he ignored possible differences between
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revolutionaries or reformists, desiring only to liberate the
proletariat from any form of 'red' enslavement' (pp. 954-9).
The above point needs to be taken into consideration when
examining policing in Bologna during the war years. This
final section is significant for this study for the following
reasons. Firstly, it questions the position of the prefect
and his forces with regard to 'interventionist' development in
Bologna and aims to parallel this with the post-war period in
the next chapter. Secondly, it considers the effects of
mobilization and emergency legislation on the life of the
province with particular reference to the restrictions this
placed on Socialist party and syndical power. It examines the
role of the prefect and the provincial military authorities in
encouraging, if not enforcing, social, economic and political
harmony and maintaining, where possible, a high level of
patriotic morale.
Though Italy did not join the First World War until May 1915
the period of its neutrality, declared in August 1914, is
essential since it is characterized by lively, if not violent,
internal political conflict centred around the question of
Italy's possible intervention. Though there is little
evidence to suggest that demonstrations for or against
intervention were officially banned by the government,
Salandra did initially enforce Italy's neutralist position by
ordering his prefects to prohibit 'qualsiasi manifestazione
delle rappresentanze locali a favore di uno o dell'altro degli
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stati belligeranti intesa ad influire sulla azione politica
del Governo' on 7 August 1914. Indeed, less than a week after
this, the interior minister ordered Quaranta to invalidate a
declaration by Molinella's Socialist council in favour of
neutrality and threatening to mobilize against 'tentativi di
quanti volessero trascinare Nazione nell'immane conflitt0.93
This was matched by general concern on the part of the
prefectoral authorities about the position of the political
parties with regard to the war. On 21 April 1915 the Questore 
informed Quaranta that not only the Socialists but also the
Catholics and bourgeoisie were opposed to it. 94
 Police forces
appeared particularly concerned about initiatives against the
war in the Poarchist camp.
	 On 11 April the Questore claimed
that Borghi, Emilia's Anarchist leader, was organizing a
general strike in the hope of setting off revolution and that
'per raggiungere l'effetto voluto sarebbero commessi attentati
alle opere d'arte ferroviarie a mezzo di esplosivi alio scopo
di rendere difficili i movimenti di truppa ed obbligare i
ferrovieri di essere con loro solidali.'
	 On 21 April the
prefect asked the interior minister for 'forze sufficienti a
sopprimere il minimo atto di ribellione, istituendo anche, se
del caso, un regime eccezionale che, di per sê, sarebbe il
migliore ammonimento'.
	 Less than a week later he received
orders from the ministry to compile a list of dangerous
elements to be arrested in the event of idisordini1.95
A certain amount of apprehension was expressed by the
i
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prefectoral authorities about the formation of revolutionary
Interventionist groups.
	 According to a report by the
Carabinieri authorities in January 1915, the Reformist
Socialists, now under the denomination Partito Ufficiale
Socialista and the largest Socialist organization in the
province, and the Revolutionary Syndicalists - both opposed to
the war - had suffered defections to the 'Fasci di Azione
Rivoluzionaria' which (dominated by republicans and dangerous
ex-revolutionaries and anarchists) aimed to act illegally and
violently in the hope of setting off the war in order to
'sovvertire le attuali istituzioni'.96
The period of neutrality was characterized by a series of
violent clashes between the Neutralists and Interventionists.
Officially the prefectoral authorities showed firmness towards
both camps in repressing violence. Where, for example,
Interventionists attempted to storm Palazzo d'Accursio in
protests at the Socialist city council's neglecting to fly the
national flag on the king's birthday (11 November 1914)
repression was naturally swift, and a patriotic demonstration
in front of the Austrian consulate in December 1914 was put
down with similar brutality, so the Nationalist Dino Zanetti
claimed in his memoirs. 97 Quite apart from the author's
tendency to exaggerate, the action of the prefecture was
almost certainly motivated by Italy's neutral state in the
European conflict in the latter case and the general necessity
for the maintenance of public order in the former. Especially
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among the lower ranks of the police forces, however, there
were obvious cases of connivance with the Interventionists
which the prefectoral authorities seemed to tolerate. 	 If
police spokesmen claimed that the police remained impartial
during clashes and simply aimed to keep confrontation at a
minimum, the Socialist press painted rather a different
picture. On 11 April 1915, for example, a police report
stated that following a private Interventionist conference the
authorities separated and disbanded opposing groups in Piazza
Vittorio Emanuele, Bologna's main square, and arrested several
interventionists for provocative behaviour. 98 La Squilla of
17 April 1915 claimed, however, that the police 'in dolce
connubio coi rivoluzionari "fascisti" ' prevented neutralists
- including those who had tickets - from attending the
conference. At its termination fifty Nationalist students
headed in the direction of the Ponzio bar - a Socialist
meeting place - provocatively singing patriotic songs with no
reaction from the police.	 Only when the Socialists retorted
with "La Bandiera Rossa" did the police intervene to arrest
several socialists.	 Avanti! claimed that both the police and
the Interventionists had invaded the bar which they vandalised
(12 April 1915)	 La Squilla similarly reported the police
attacking	 a	 group	 of	 neutralists	 to	 the	 delight	 of
Interventionist	 onlookers	 in	 May	 1915,	 by	 which	 time
manifestations of violence had become an everyday affair in
the city (22 May 1915).	 The censored spaces of an Avant!! 
I
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article of 16 May on a Neutralist demonstration imply that the
authorities may well have desired to conceal the conduct of
both the Interventionists and their own forces."
Only on 18 May 1915, with the realistic possibility of
intervention, did Salandra send telegrams to the prefects of
Bologna, Parma, Reggio Emilia and Modena ordering the
prohibition of meetings and demonstrations threatening public
order in the light of the international situation which
necessitated the maintenance of internal peace. The circular
stated that
Chi istiga disordini o vi partecipa si rende reo di tradimento
verso la patria. Ogni opinione potendo liberamente e
legittimamente manifestarsi in parlamento, non k ammisibile
che assembramenti tumultuosi tentino infrangere indirizzo
della politica del paese.
Quaranta himself issued an appeal to the citizens of Bologna
on 15 May urging them not to be divided at such a critical
moment for the nation. 1 "	 Italy's declaration of war on 20
May	 1915,
	 however,	 saw	 another
	
particularly	 violent
Interventionist demonstration on the evening of 23 of that
month.	 This time the Interventionists had no difficulty in
breaking through police cordons to invade Palazzo d'Accursio,
breaking several windows
	
('involuntarily'	 so the prefect
claimed).
	
They also invaded Palazzo Re Enzo to ring the
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bells. Similar attempts in two churches were halted by the
'amorevoli esortazioni' of police officials. Evident here is
Quaranta's desire to play down the episode.101
In analysing the behaviour of the Bolognese police forces
during the period of neutrality it is important to distinguish
where possible between acts of true political discrimination
and repression dictated by the necessities of public order.
Police numerical weaknesses may have been a serious motive for
the latter. In April 1915, for example, the prefect warned
the interior minister that his forces were insufficient and
that the few available Guardie di CittA and Carabinieri:
stanchi di turni lunghissimi (....) non hanno modo di
resistere coi mezzi ordinari e non si vuol o lasciare che la
teppa domini per le vie o che i consolati vengono offesi e che
le repressioni seguano con metodi violenti ai quali poca forza
6 sufficiente (...).102
This may indeed account for the manner in which the above-
mentioned Interventionist anti-Austrian demonstrations were
repressed, especially since in this case policemen guarding
consulates had particularly important responsibilities.
Serious incidents could have had international repercussions.
On other occasions, however, the natural avversion of many
policemen
	 towards	 the	 anti-patriotic	 rhetoric	 of	 the
Socialists coupled with psychological pressure from the
3
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Interventionist camp was probably the cause of obvious
political persecution. Zanetti clearly mentioned the euphoria
in which the forces of law and order may have been caught up.
He implied that during a demonstration in Piazza Vittorio
Emanuele on 21 February 1915 soldiers let interventionists
through cordons since 'ormai anche i soldati sapevano che la
dichiarazione di guerra era imminente'.
	
A soldier knocked
down in the ensuing rampage was carried in triumph by the
crowds because 'Era un soldato d'Italia' (pp. 115-6).	 The
significance of this lies once again in the obvious
collaboration of civilian and police forces against Socialism
and the parallels that may be made with the post-war years in
the suggestion that such behavioural trends had a long-
standing tradition in the province of Bologna.
With the declaration of war, social, political and economic
life in Bologna was transformed. Starting on 22 May 1915,
many emergency legislative measures were immediately put into
force. Law 671, 'Conferimento al governo del re dei poteri
straordinari in caso di guerra' of 22 May allowed the
government to pass any laws concerning defence and public
order and to finance military affairs outside the limits of
previous legislation. Regio Decreto 674 of 23 May
'Provvedimenti Straordinari in materia di pubblica sicurezza'
allowed policing to be placed in the hands of military
commanders or civil commissioners, prohibited public meetings,
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civil and religious processions, military style marches (with
or without arms), public assemblies and private meetings if
public in form.
	 The law also allowed the dissolution of
associations responsible for disturbing the peace.
	
In
consequence of this law Quaranta ordered his forces to keep an
eye on both Neutralist and Interventionist activities. 103	As
fore-warned by the decree, police responsibility for 	 the
province passed to the armed forces in September 1915. The
provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli were divided
into military zones, each led by a Comandante di Zona (zone
commander) who directed policing activities. Though the
police forces maintained their regular competences, the
prefects had to 'tenere al corrente i Comandanti di Zona circa
lo spirito delle popolazioni, l'atteggiamento dei partiti,
specialmente sovversivi, 	 nonchê su tutto cie, che possa
interessare un vigile di servizio di P.S.' .104
Regio Decreto 675 of 23 May 1915 prohibited references in
the press to the number of dead, injured or imprisoned in the
war, changes in military leadership and military operations.
Newspaper editions could be confiscated by the prefect, sub-
prefect , 'o chi ne fa le veci' if in their opinion
publication would lower public morale and faith in the
government authorities, encourage conflict between political
parties or jeopardize national interests in any way. Most
importantly, article 3 of the law stipulated that all
newspaper editions should be presented to the prefect, sub-
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prefect or their representatives
	 at least an hour before
publication for possible censorship. The effects of this were
keenly	 felt in Bologna, particularly by the left-wing
parties.
	 On 12 July 1915, for example, Quaranta ordered the
confiscation of the thirty-fifth edition of La Squilla 'dato
l'atteggiamento subdole del foglio che, con frasi e articoli
non apertamente contrari alla guerra tende ad attrizzare lo
scontento e l'odio fra le classi sociali', as he explained to
the interior minister. 105
	On 22 October, however,
	 he
complained that measures to control anti-war propaganda were
insufficient, suggesting that the matter should be placed in
the hands of military tribunals.105
Law 885 of 20 June 1915 punished the passing of information
different from
	 that issued by the government.
	 If such a
crime were committed with deliberate intent to disturb public
order or damage public interests the punishments were severer.
In view of this law in September 1915 the Questore reported
the arrest of an anarchist for talking against the war to
injured soldiers at the Rizzoli hospital.
	 Quaranta was also
apprehensive about	 charity missions on the part of the city
mayor Zanardi and the local Socialist deputy Bentini at the
war front. As he warned the prefect of Udine on 19 June 1915
'Trattasi	 di	 due	 socialisti	 ufficiali	 noti
	 per	 gli
atteggiamenti
	 anti-militaristi	 prima della guerra e pel
contegno
	 subdolo	 (...)	 essi	 sotto
	 l'apparenza	 di	 una
iniziativa
	
lodevole	 cercherebbero	 portare	 costa
[
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propaganda' .107
Several significant police measures in Bologna emer3e
frcm the documentation. At the end of May 1915 an
organization of 'Pattuglie Cittadini ,
 was set up, as in 1909,
to make up for a lack of policemen in the city, given the war
situation. Four squads consisting of between fifteen and
twenty-five civilians and each led by one or two Guardie di 
Cittá guarded the four city districts from crime late in the
evening.	 A fifth group would carry out afternoon duties
alongside the 'Squadra Mobile' (flying squad).
	 They had to
pay particular attention to foreigners and suspects living
near to the military arsenal.	 If an initial report concluded
that 'I singoli Pattuglianti sono animati da buone
disposizioni di animo e volenterosamente si sobbarcano al
disagio di una notte insana e cià pur di potere contribuire
anche in minima parte all'opera concorde di tutti gli
italiani' ,108 archival evidence suggests that they did not
seriously solve the problems of police numerical weaknesses.
Indeed the following month the Questore advised the prefect to
ask the military authorities for permission to arrest all
'pregiudicati' since 'la pubblica forza impegnata tutta in
servizi straordinari non pu g) efficacemente esercitare sui
medesimi la sorveglianza normale di tempo di pace' .109	In
August 1915 Quaranta complained of the mal-functioning of the
'Pattuglie'.	 Their members were indisciplined and their
excitability 'ii rende pericolosi ogni qualvolta vengono a
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contatto con i cittadini'.	 The policemen leading the squads
either had no authority over the civilians or behaved as
unprofessionally
	 as	 the	 'pattug1ianti'. 11 ° 	Though	 no
reference is made here to the anti-Socialist activities of the
Interventionists,
	
this	 is	 yet	 another	 example of the
importance of the civilian policing tradition in Bologna.
If on the one hand the war placed further restrictions on
political activities on the other it regulated industrial
relations in order to ensure maximum productive output. In
agriculture, for example, law 791 of June 1915, 'Provvedimenti
straordinari per il raccolto dei cereali nell'anno in corso'
allowed the prefect to order landowners, leaseholders,
sharecroppers and peasants to lend out their quadrupedi and
harvesting vehicles, along with their personnel, to other
farmers in their commune before and after their own harvests.
It also established the setting up of commissions presided
over by a legal expert (giudice consigliatore) and two
agricultural experts (one representing the employers, the
other the workers) in order to solve disputes.
In the province of Bologna the agrarian conflicts officially
ended on 9 June 1915 with the signing of an agreement between
Federterra and the AAB. It stipulated a wage increase of 15%.
In turn the Socialist syndicates renounced boycott action on
condition that the employers 	 gave preference to local
Socialist workers.	 Law 203 of 8 August 1915 postponed the
expiration of agrarian contracts for one year.
	 It also
I
-207-
allowed the employers to call workers to assist sharecroppers
unable to cultivate their land sufficiently as a result of
military call-ups. The sharecropper was required to pay 50%
of the costs. On 5 March 1916 an agreement in the province of
Bologna increased wages by a further 25% and agrarian
contracts were extended once again with the 	 Decreto 
Luogoteneziale of 24 February 1916. Finally the
'Provvedimenti straordinari' of 30 May 1916 (645) authorized
the formation of a provincial commission, led by the prefect,
with the task of considering work forces available in relation
to local labour requirements, organizing the movement of
labour,
	 revealing	 the	 availability
	 of	 farm	 vehicles,
encouraging	 female	 labour	 and	 solving
	 labour disputes.
'Commissioni arbitrali mandamentali' (sub-district arbitration
commissions) led by local magistrates were formed with the
task of judging claims on either side of contractual
violations.111
The above war legislation and the ensuing pacts are vitally
significant to the history of the Bolognese agrarian struggles
because they represent the first examples of legally binding
agreements. The prefect as president of the provincial
arbitrary commission was particularly confident that he had
achieved social peace in rural areas. In the aftermath of the
March 1916 agreement he claimed, perhaps over-optimistically
that:
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Si ê stabilito che ogni divergenza venga dissoluta ad un
arbitro con che si 6 tolta la possibilità di sorpruse e
l'essere l'unico arbitro scelto nella mia persona k naturale
atto di omaggio all'autoritA specialmente per parte dei
lavoratori	 tutti	 iscritti	 alle	 leghe	 socialiste,
	 mentre
documenta
	 il riconoscimento del	 Governo nelle questioni
socialmente importantissime.112
In reality, however, the documentation suggests that social
and economic peace was only superficially maintained, ass
evident in the large number of protests from both sides at
pact violations.	 Federterra claimed that the employers
refused to increase wages as stipulated in the agreements and
that they used non-league or Catholic workers - and prisoners
of war and soldiers towards the end of the war- to avoid
having to employ Socialist workers. On 28 September 1915, for
example, Federterra informed the prefect that Benni of
Molinella refused to grant the 15% wage increase to his
workers as stipulated by the pact of the previous June. This
caused a strike which served as a pretext for him to employ
non-league workers with the aim of damaging the interests of
the Socialist unions.
	 Federterra's letter concluded that,
'Per ottenere tale cosa, egli ricorre al solito sistema
dell'Agraria di rimangiarsi
	 i contratti per poi gridare
all'infrazione dei medesimi da parte del nostri leghisti 1.113.
In November 1916 Federterra claimed that Benni and other
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local employers	 employed Ferrarese workers despite the
presence of unemployed workers in Molinella, so violating
article 3 of the March 1916 agreement which banned the
importation of workers unless there was no local unemployment.
Ironically, however, the prefect went down on the side of the
employers who appealed to the arbitrary commision against
league work stoppages in protest at the above. He judged that
Federterra's attitude was contrary to the March agreement and
to the spirit of the commission, since violations of agrarian
pacts	 did not justify strikes and only the commission itself
had the competence to judge whether or not violations had been
committed. 114 He also issued a 'Lodo Arbitrale' which
confirmed that Benni had violated the pact but reiterated that
this did not justify similar violations by Federterra.115
The appeal of Francesco Manzoli,
	 leader of the Lega
Braccianti di Bologna, against the Societä Orticoltori on 27
July 1916 had a more straightforward outcome.
	 In April 1916 a
pact had been signed whereby the society would only employ
workers from Manzoli's organization. When the employers
violated this by employing workers from other communes at
cheaper rates, the prefect as president of the arbitrary
commission ordered the violators to respect the pact.116
Quaranta also ordered the sub-prefect of Imola to warn a
certain Diotalloni in August 1917 who abandoned his crops to
avoid having to pay workers at higher rates that 'un siffatto
contegno anti-patriottico non sortirebbe alcun effetto, perchê
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a parte ogni eventuale responsabilitA in cui incomba si
provvederebbe alla lavorazione coercitiva dei prodotti'.117
The huge number of pact violations during the war years
suggests that the arbitration 	 commissions were of no real
effect, however.	 There is little evidence of legal action
being taken against violators, implying that the so-called
'Lodi Arbitrali' as issued against Benni (see above) were no
more than a declaration by the higher authorities and did not
carry legal sanctions.	 Notably Federterra's work-stoppages
were usually in protest at pact violations by the employers,
suggesting that the Socialists felt the need to act outside
the commissions which were obviously of limited effect.
On many occasions Quaranta demonstrated that he did not take
Federterra's complaints seriously and that he saw the leagues
as the chief pact violators. 	 This was particularly evident
towards the end of the war when Federterra frequently
complained that the agrarians used military workers to avoid
having to employ league members.
	 According to a report
Quaranta received from Federterra in October 1918 Federico del
Rio of Medicina had provoked strikes by
	
deliberately giving
his workers a poor quality wine ration.
	 This gave him a
pretext for resorting to military workers.
	 Other employers
tended to allow Socialist labourers to do low paid work while
better paid jobs were given to the army at a cheaper rate.
Though the employers claimed that there was no available
labour Federterra retorted that farmers often ignored offers
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of workers from the Socialist labour exchanges, as happened in
Minerbio in March 1918, or did not even ask for workers, as
was reported
	 in Medicina. 118	If restrictions on the
employment of soldiers by the agrarians were imposed by the
military authorities themselves in March 1918, suggesting that
on occasions Federterra was taken seriously, the prefect
demonstrated his support for
	 the agrarian cause and his
contempt for the principles of the arbitration commission of
which he was president by advising a certain 'Marchese' in May
1918 that in case of syndical pact violations he could always
resort to the use of soldiers or prisoners of war.119
Quaranta's image is further distorted when considering his
appeal to the interior ministry for secret funds to finance
the Catholic unions.
	 In January 1915 he urged upon the
minister that the Fratellanze Coloniche were:
associazioni di contadini costituzionali che meritano ogni
benevolenza non solo per aver saputo resistere alla marea
socialista ma perche ciO fecero unicamente con gli scarsissimi
mezzi propri senza aiuto nê economico nO di altro genere.
Having obtained 3,000 lira for this from secret police funding
he once again asked for help in August 1917 since the
Fratellanze, he claimed, were the only non-Socialist workers'
organizations and could produce promising political results in
the province. 120
 Further evidence suggests partisan behaviour
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among
	 several	 other	 police	 officials	 and	 magistrates.
Federterra informed the prefect on 17 July 1915 that Cacciari,
Molinella's
	 'commissario	 prefettizio',	 had	 advised	 local
agrarians not to respect pacts since they could always count
on the army for any necessary work. 121 On 21 April 1917 the
provincial public prosecutor informed Quaranta that the
justice minister was concerned about the manner in which the
arbitration commission of Budrio functioned. The local judge
'lascierebbe troppa libera mano al Commissario Baroni e
talvolta favorirebbe illegittime pressioni di costui sui
contadini, per costringerli ad accontentarsi di rimborsi
minori di quelli che sarebbero dovuti 1.122
The above suggests that traditional episodes of connivance
between policemen and the agrarians remained in force during
the war years.	 Again, pressure from the agrarian camp may
have been responsible for this.
	 An anonymous note to the
prefect found in the 1917 police files stated, for example:
E vivamente commentata la proposta di aumento del 30%
	 sulla
tariffa ai Lavoratori Agricoli. 	 E un aumento esoso e grave
perche unito al 20% forma il 50% mercede ossia aumento
approvato in nessuna parte d'Italia.	 (...) Cosa dice la
popolazione lo vedrete sui giornali. Intanto rimediate se non
volete una crisi dolorosa.	 Intanto ii presidente dell'Agraria
si 6 dimesso.123
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Quaranta for his part maintained an ambiguous role throughout
the war period. If officially he dedicated himself to the
tasks the war required of him, promoting social peace and
harmony, behind this lurked the inevitable desire to curb the
power of Socialism which in many respects, as in the rural
areas of the province, benefited from war-time legislation. If
he seriously aimed to protect the masses from the lure of
Socialism he did not realise, however, that on many occasions
his support of the employers was economically detrimental
towards those he desired to protect.
In the	 industrial	 sector emergency legislation placed
restrictions on the freedom of employees of firms involved in
important military production. 	 Decreto Luogotenenziale 1455
of	 29	 September	 1915	 militarized	 all	 workers	 in	 the
'Stabilimenti Militari', (auxiliary factories). According to
the Ministry of War circular of 4 October 1915 militarized
workers became subject to the jurisdiction of the military
penal code.
	 Those who abandoned their posts were declared
desertors. 124	In Bologna the designation of many industries
as	 'auxiliary' pulled in between twenty and twenty-five
thousand workers from the countryside to work in war
production, (see Chapter II, pp. 110-11). Evidence suggests,
however, that factory directors on occasions preferred to
grant concessions rather than impose the harsh sanctions
dictated by the war-time legislation. 	 Indeed, according to a
report from Quaranta to the interior minister in February 1917
I
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the directors of three military plants were relatively lenient
towards striking women workers demonstrating for higher wages,
which	 were	 granted.	 The	 prefect	 warned	 the	 military
authorities, however, that	 'una arrendevolezza eccessiva'
could increase the likelihood of strikes.125
According to both the prefect and the local military
commander, the real threat to the smooth running of production
in both the urban and rural areas lay in the activities
promoted by the PSI and the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. In
December 1916 Quaranta warned that demonstrations by women -
free of the iron discipline to which their male counterparts
were subjected in the factories - for wage increases were
the effect of subversive propaganda which aimed to stimulate
general discontent among the masses and lower public morale.
The police authorities also claimed that Socialist mayors were
responsible for demonstrations. A report by a police
commissar to the Questore in 1917 stated that the mayor of
Granarolo, for example, had encouraged a demonstration by
women. The absence of employment in the commune rendered this
manifestation solely political. While the demonstrators were
prosecuted under article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act
and article 3 of the Decree 674 of 23 May 1915 the commissar
suggested that the mayor could easily be intimidated into
restraining his conduct.126
Quaranta himself complained that the civil courts were too
lenient towards 'subversives'. 	 Acquittals or light sentences
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were almost an encouragement of propaganda and demonstrations.
Quaranta suggested to Salandra that all public order crimes
should be referred to military tribunals since 'qualora gli
elementi	 sovversivi	 sapessero	 che	 giudici	 della	 loro
delittuosa impresa sarebbero non i giudici 	 (....) ma i
tribunali	 di	 guerra,	 ben	 diverso	 diverebbe	 il	 loro
contegno' .127 
	
He also complained of the lack of Carabinieri,
given their involvement in military operations, rendering
police activities difficult. Similarly a police commissar
advised the Questore in May 1917 to transfer troops to those
areas where socialist propaganda was particularly successful
and strengthen Carabinieri village nuclei there.128
Again, however, Quaranta clearly advocated, alongside this
repression, concessions to those hardest hit by the war. As
he told the sub-prefect of Imola in December 1916:
Ricordi che le autorita devono oggi piO che mai dimostrare
concretamente tutto ii loro interessamento per le classi pi0
colpite dalla guerra,	 ma debbono evitare di
	 cedere a
intimidazioni	 violente	 che	 costituirebbe	 esempio
pericoloso.129
On these grounds probably he criticised the 'uomini d'ordine'
not only for their incapacity to match Socialist propaganda,
choosing 'la politica del silenzio' instead of patriotic
manifestations but also for their economic selfishness.
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Agricultural employers abandoned the cultivation of non-
profit-rendering crops and shopkeepers profited from the war
with up to 100% price increases.	 He warned that economic
hardship for the masses would keep the subversive parties in
business 130
This was almost certainly the motive behind his support of
Zanardi and the city council over the maintenance of an 'Ente
Autonomo di Consumo' (Consumer Co-opertive) set up in August
1914 to sell food products at cheap prices and control local
inflation.	 The prefect demonstrated this support in a letter
to the interior minister, dated 21 September 1916, in which he
stated that the action of the mayor should be encouraged given
the absurd manner in which shopkeepers had pushed up prices to
the highest levels in the nation.	 Indeed he ordered Zanardi
to intensify checks not only on price levels in local shops
but also to see whether certain food stuffs 	 had been dosed
with	 foreign substances.131
This may be contrasted, however, by his defence of the
ruling classes against the PSI over other issues.
	 This was
particularly evident with public spending by Socialist
councils. Communal and provincial budgets with special regard
for employment and hospital schemes were usually cancelled by
the prefect who appealed to the Consiglio di Stato as
president of the Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa. 	 Indeed
Zanardi complained at a city council meeting in February 1916
that every time the Socialist majority proposed some kind of
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reform which did not appeal to the Conservative majority the
prefect intervened, a procedure which rediculed the so-called
autonomy of local government.132
If Socialist municipal council spending was curbed during
the war, those ex-Socialist communes controlled by 'commissari
prefettizi' suffered drastic reductions in public spending on
health, employment and charity as part of Quaranta's overall
desire to curb what he considered abusive spending by past
socialist local governments, so making up for the enormous
deficits which this had caused. This was particularly evident
in Molinella and was almost certainly part and parcel of the
purges originating back to the Guarda massacre.
	 As early as
November 1914 the prefect had written the following words to
the interior minister:
Giova
	 ricordare	 come	 molte	 delle	 amministrazioni	 della
provincia siano nelle mani di socialisti ciö che rende pi0
facile	 il	 pericolo	 (....)	 di	 attivitA	 che	 anima	 le
amministrazioni popolari poco preoccupate dei mezzi con cui
far fronte alle spese, mezzi che ricadendo in gran parte,
mediante la sovrimposta, sulle classi abbienti, sono invece
assai calcolati da questi quando trovansi al potere. Di pi0 i
socialisti mal Si adattano spontaneamente alle barriere della
legge a cui tendono a sfuggire solo che rallenti la vigilanza
continua delle autoritA.
1
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Referring to Molinella the report continued that council funds
had been placed in a cooperative run by Socialist councillors
so that it was more difficult for the authorities to control
their spending. Over-spending on health assistance and the
registration of too many names on the poor list had caused a
deficit which the council had overcome by going further into
debt.133
These measures reflected once again Quaranta's desire to
remove Socialist hegemony from the province
	 and his failure
to realise the economic effects this would have on the
provincial population.
	 Several articles in Avanti! and La
Squilla in 1916 claimed that the 'commissario prefettizio' of
Molinella, Cacciari, removed many from the poor list, causing
starvation and disease (see Avanti!, 9 March 1916, La Squilla,
18 and 25 March 1916).
	 The enquiry ordered by the local
Carabinieri into these allegations concluded that these new
measures	 certainly	 offended
	 those
	 who	 were	 used	 to
'spadroneggiare in detto comune' but that the discontent was
not the	 result of	 starvation	 but	 the cause of the
propaganda. 134
	Quaranta for his part praised Cacciari's
success in removing corruption from the commune and:
procurando principalmente elevare materialmente e moralmente
condizioni	 quei	 lavoratori,	 togliendo
	 sistemi
	 degradante
elemosina e fornendo invece abbondante proficuo lavoro di cui
tutti sono grati.135
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La Squilla, however,	 in an article dated 25 March 1916
challenged the authenticity of data on the economic state of
families in Molinella. If, as the authorities claimed, many
families had benefited from the previous harvest which gave
them 24 quintals of grain each, given the large composition of
families and the seasonal nature of braccianti work this would
be nearly sufficient to last them until the next harvest, but
was hardly an indication of wealth.
Relevant here is evidence of the interference of the
military authorities who, according to Quaranta in a report to
the interior minister in October 1916, had ordered the
cancellation of government payments to families in Molinella
with males at the war front, 'essendo risultato che esse
invece godono di un reddito pit) che sufficiente ai propri
bisogni 1.136 Similarly the mayor of Loiano complained in
August 1916 that his position on a special commission to
decide on charity concessions was superfluous because of the
condescending attitude of the military authorities and
Carabinieri who also had representatives on the commission,
who refused to take the opinions of local members into
consideration and were unaware
of the reality of poverty in his commune.137
Archival evidence suggests that Quaranta's strategy towards
the provincial PSI changed towards the end of the First World
War. This may well reflect a softened opinion about the true
will or capability of the PSI leadership to carry through a
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revolution, gained from his experience of a general strike in
April 1917 which, he claimed, had revolutionary implications.
He stated that his warning to Zanardi and local Socialist
deputies Bentini and Brunelli
	
'circa i provvedimenti che
l'autoritA avrebbe potuto adottare nei riguardi degli operai
militari maschi, anche se non scioperanti' induced them to
stop the strike from going ahead though the last-minute call-
off had not been effective. Though expressing genuine fear of
revolution which was almost certainly encouraged by events in
Russia	 and	 other	 belligerent	 nations	 and	 the	 over-
concentration of troops with local origins in Bologna which
increased the risks of army fraternization in the case of
insurrection 138 he admitted the following July that the local
PSI was unlikely to become involved	 in	 revolutionary
activity.	 Only the youngest elements were involved in
preparing the masses for possible revolution.139
In the aftermath of the military defeat at Caporetto in
October 1917 Quaranta continued to warn that though Socialist
leaders made positive official statements about the tragedy in
order to create the impression that the PSI believed in
national solidarity they would certainly not have the courage
to force a healthy attitude upon the masses, whose support
they did not want to risk losing.
	
On these grounds he
suggested that as much tact as possible be used to obtain
support from the masses.	 In particular PSI leaders were not
to be constrained to 'silenzio ufficiale' since this would
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only increase anti-national propaganda. 140
Such policies of tact rather than repression became
increasingly apparent towards the end of the war and indeed
brought him into conflict with the m i litary authorities who
advocated	 a	 hard	 line.	 An examp l e	 of this	 concerned
censorship, which from Caporetto until the end of the war was
particularly harsh. News concerning a nti-war demonstrations,
accidents in the military factories, army suicides, the
punishment of deserters and references to the Bolshevik
revolution were strictly prohibited in the press, as is
evidenced by numerous government circulars on the subject.
In November 1917 the prefects of Bologna, Ferrara, Forll,
Ravenna and Rovigo received orders from the area military
commander that private postal corrispondence in the war zone
was	 to	 be	 opened	 'per	 seguire	 le	 attivitA	 delle
organizzazioni sovversive e delle persone sospette di attivitA
antinazionale'. 141
 When on 4 June 1918 the army supreme
command ordered the banning of an Avanti! edition in Emilia
and Veneto Quaranta wrote to the interior minister, protesting
that the measure was 'inutile e antipatico', adding that the
censor's office in Bologna had correctly vetted the paper and
other papers with the same contents had been published. 142
As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, conflict
between the prefect and the military authorities heightened in
the immediate post-war period over the involvement of the army
in the newly found 'Fascio di Combattimento'.
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The dilemmas and ambiguities in the prefect's attitude
towards the left during the war period stem from the unique
manner in which the European conflict regulated social,
political and economic relations in the province. These were
dictated by the overriding necessity of guaranteeing the
highest possible war effort in terms of both patriotic and
moral support and industrial and agricultural output. This of
course rendered a truce between conflicting political and
economic forces inevitable.
	 Behind the facade of internal
peace lay the reality of continued conflict, however.
	 This
was almost certainly dictated to a large extent by Quaranta's
failure on	 many occasions	 to	 free	 himself from
	 past
allegiances with the employers and from his natural distrust
of 'Red' power.
	 Indeed from a political point of view he was
strongly suspicious of the revolutionary potential of the PSI,
especially in war time. His capacity for tact rather than
repression matured, however, during the latter war years so
that by the end of the conflict he saw dialogue and the
increased economic welfare of the masses as the surest means
of curtailing the advance of revolution, as we shall see in
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICING IN BOLOGNA DURING
THE RISE OF FASCISM, 1918-22
(i)	 The threat of Bolshevism and the roots of Bolognese
Fascism.
Examination of the period spanning the end of the First World
War and the Fascist counter-revolutionary debut in the autumn
of 1920 in Bologna is essential to the study of the main period
of Fascist ascendancy in the province. Comprehension of the
motives behind the outbreak of systematic counter-revolution
(epitomized by the Palazzo d'Accursio massacre of November
1920) and prevailing attitudes within the ranks of the police
forces is only possible if events in the preceding period are
considered. The two main aspects to be taken into account are
the weakened and demoralized state in which Italy's police and
armed forces emerged from the European conflict (which even
Nitti's legislation was unable to retrieve) and the threat of
revolution from the left. State hesitancy in dealing with
subversion - given the weaknesses inherent in its police
apparatus - was almost certainly a contributory factor in the
radicalization of postwar anti-Socialist and anti-democratic
forces and the development of connivance with those forces
within state institutions.
The reduced state of Italy's police forces immediately after
the First World War and in the following two years is very
evident in Bologna. Archival documents show, for example, that
-238-
following the Armistice in November 1918 the Guardie di 
citta were numerically insufficient, undisciplined and so
underpaid that their ministerial rent allowances were unable
to keep up with the intense rate of postwar inflation. 	 Many
of them were so eager to leave the corps that they were
prepared to
	
commit acts	 of indiscipline	 (ranging from
desertion
	 to	 feigning	 illness)	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 being
discharged. In February 1919 Guardie di citta tried to
organize a national strike - as is evident in a pamphlet
confiscated by the Questore of Bologna - in protest at what
they considered a derisory level of pay.	 There is also
evidence of a national Carabinieri strike during the same
period. It was centred in Rome, Milan, Ancona and Turin and
was motivated by low wages and - as in the case of the Guardie 
- the obligation to continue services until six months after
the war for those who enrolled during the conflict. Though
there is no concrete evidence of work-stoppages in Bologna the
Questore reported general low morale and bitterness. In March
1919 the prime minister, Orlando, ordered prefects not to
allow strikes or the formation of police unions or
associations •1
In Bologna the shortage of Guardie was accentuated by the
fact that many Carabinieri were still employed by the ministry
of war to guard munitions depots and factories and as late as
April 1919 the prefect, Quaranta, urged the interior minister
to persuade the war ministry to release Carabinieri from
military duties since 57 of	 the 310  Guardie di citta 
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allocated to the province had never been provided. Of the
remaining 253, 109 were unfit for service, sick or on duty
outside Bologna. 15 were allocated to Imola and 83 were
employed in special squads or for office duties. This left a
total of 36 Guardie for policing in the streets, public
buildings, etc. Quaranta also reported 6 Carabinieri guarding
the powder-magazine and another 36 on duty at the ordnance
factories, leaving a total of 80 for normal policing. The
minister, though replying that he had asked the war minister
to provide extra Carabinieri warned that no more Guardie could
be sent because nationally the corps lacked three thousand men
and because Bologna was numerically better off than other
provinces .2
Another problem facing Bologna's prefects during this period
was the limited availability of soldiers for police duties.
There are two possible reasons for this: Firstly, numbers in
the army were obviously reduced as part of general postwar
demobilization. In April 1919, for example, the local
military commander complained to the war minister that he was
unable to keep up with the prefect's requests for troops
because of the discharge of up to a thousand soldiers at a
time.3
Secondly, the overwhelmingly proletarian composition of the
lower ranks of the army acquired through war mobilization left
their commanders in great fear of acts of subversion, easily
encouraged by Anarchist and Revolutionary Socialist anti-
militarist p ropaganda.
	 Indeed, in October 1919 the prime
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minister, Nitti, ordered prefects to censor frequent articles
in the Socialist press on soldiers'	 living and working
conditions, cases of indiscipline and mutiny, which were
considered to be nothing less than incitement to subversion.4
In Bologna there were several cases of suspected involvement
of soldiers in subversive activities, though for the most part
these suspicions were not confirmed.	 In June 1919 the
Carabinieri external division commander warned the prefect of
rumours that subversive ex-soldiers or soldiers on leave
entered barracks in uniform in order to fraternize with
soldiers, encouraging them to aid them in the formation of
battalions of Arditi Rossi.
	
In May 1919 Quaranta warned the
local military commander about the participation of soldiers
at Camera del Lavoro meetings, though he was unable to tell
whether they had been discharged or were still on active
service.	 The authorities' fears may have been justified if
one considers that in July 1920 the prefect, Pericoli, asked
Nitti to transfer the 24th infantry division away from Bologna
following a mutiny which the military authorities had quelled
with the arrest of 17 soldiers.5
The unwillingness of the military authorities to provide
prefects with excessive numbers of troops was supported by
both the Nittian and Giolittian postwar governments as
illustrated by their circulars restricting their use to
emergencies.
	 Indeed, in April 1920 a decree limited army
police duties to the guarding of buildings.
	 Only in
exceptional cases of disorder were they to be used for
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controlling crowds. In June 1920 the war minister complained
to Bologna's military commander that too many troops were
being employed for preventive policing, a task which should
have been limited to Carabinieri and Guardie Regie.6
In Bologna prefects were for the most part forced to rely on
insufficient	 reinforcements	 of	 soldiers,	 Guardie
	 and
Carabinieri which	 in	 itself was problematic, given the
impossibility of permanently maintaining forces in the various
locations requiring them.	 In some cases reinforcements were
simply JaNwn from permanent police nuclei elsewhere. In July
1919, for example, the sub-prefect of Vergato asked Quaranta
for the return of 69 Carabinieri sent to another part of the
province as reinforcements since the remaining 26 were
incapable of handling anti-inflation demonstrations on their
own. By October 1920 the Questore had warned the prefect,
Visconti, that in some areas of the province forces were
literally non-existant. In Praduro and Sasso (now Sasso
Marconi), for, example, the Carabinieri commander who was on
leave had not been replaced, as a result of which:
Pertanto l'arma non solo non 6. in grado di intervenire, dove
sarebbe necessario, per impedire violenze in atto, ma spesso
non pub neanche, per mancanza di mezzi, procedere poi agli
atti di polizia giudiziaria occorrenti per la denunzia alla
magistratura ed i riferimenti a questo ufficio, Ii quale
perciO,	 quasi generalmente,	 apprende reati, talvolta di
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notevole gravita, per caso dalla stampa cittadina o da voci
vaghe, con inevitabili inesattezze e lacune.7
Such words are demonstrative of the seriousness of police
absenteeism in many areas of the province in the postwar
years. They also outline the general ineffectiveness of
Nittian police legislation at the end of 1919.
	
The
significance of this lies in the use of another 'police force'
from 1921, namely Fascism, in place of state forces, as
illustrated below.
	
This thesis indeed places considerable
emphasis on the many inadequacies inherent 	 in the Italian
police system as a key factor in not only the rise of
Bolognese Fascism but also the connivance of many members of
the police forces with the movement.
Even if on occasions army and police reinforcements were
available to police commanders, bureaucratic hitches often
impeded their brisk arrival.	 In June 1920, for example, the
prefect asked for better cooperation from the Carabinieri 
third division commander in the provision of men.
	 This was
because the military commander had recently obstructed his
request for troops in an emergency on the grounds that he had
applied to the wrong command.	 Similarly the prefect
complained of lack of cooperation from the Carabinieri legion
commander over his desire to reorganize Bologna's Carabinieri 
more efficiently. 8	These incidents clearly indicate the
autonomy which the Carabinieri continued to maintain from the
prefectoral authorities and the obvious negative effects this
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had on policing.
In dealing with the threat of revolution Bologna's prefects
apparently aimed first and foremost to reduce if not remove
its potential causes.	 This was evident in the maintenance of
cordial relations between the prefecture and the PSI city
administration and economic concessions, wherever possible, to
the working classes.	 This was obviously encouraged by the
experience of the war years in which working class demands
were at least formally fulfilled if this would guarantee
social,	 economic	 and	 political	 peace	 in	 the	 province.
Quaranta and his successors - all career prefects, as outlined
in Missori's book - clearly lobbied for solutions to economic
disputes.	 They were particularly concerned about the
disastrous	 effects	 of	 industrial	 demobilization	 on	 the
provincial working class population. 	 As early as December
1918 Quaranta warned the government that public works and
redundancy money provided only temporary relief. He suggested
that in their place wartime military industries be transformed
into peacetime industries. 9	He also asked for the quickening
of bureaucratic formalities necessary for setting up public
works in the province, in the fear that otherwise 'extremist'
Socialists would benefit from the economic crisis. 	 Similarly
he supported city council initiatives at artificial price-
lowering .10	 Prefects were also prepared to oppose the
employers in labour disputes if they were clearly in the
wrong. In March 1920 D'Adamo had no hesitation in telling
the constructions director of the Italian State Railways that
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workers building the new Florence-Bologna railway were
justified in striking since their wages were lower than those
quoted on the official local labour market.11
Peaceful relations were maintained with Zanardi in the hope
of persuading moderate Socialists to oppose Revolutionary
elements within the PSI. In December 1918 Quaranta even
suggested that a confidant of the Questura infiltrate
Socialist circles in order to 'acquistare l'animo di alcuno
dei dirigenti, che pur non essendo fra i massimalisti godono
influenza decisiva, almeno locale' .12 Indeed, in the face of
a "Pro-Russia" general strike in July 1919, the prefect
Bladier - who had recently replaced Quaranta who had been
promoted to interior ministry police chief - informed the
interior	 minister	 that	 a	 disagreement	 between	 the
Anarchists/Vecchia	 Camera	 del	 Lavoro	 and	 Zanardi/Camera
Confederale del Lavoro was likely to prevent demonstrations
from becoming violent.	 The majority of workers had voted to
take part in the strike but rejected its revolutionary ends
which were	 advocated by the Anarchist leader Borghi.13
Similarly Quaranta, though initially fearful of the ability of
the Moderates to successfully oppose extremist elements,
authorized a PSI May Day procession on the grounds that in the
past the Socialist city council had kept its promise of order
and discipline.14
Government instructions on how to deal with strikes and
demonstrations tended to be unclear and ambiguous, so
enhancing the dangers of conflict, especially under Nitti. As
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the prime minister told prefects in preparation for the
general strike of March 1920: 'Intervento authoritA dovrA
essere pronto ed energico per impedire che possa crearsi stato
di fatto che reclami repressione e susciti conflitti'. In
other words the mere presence of the police forces was
considered sufficient to intimidate would-be trouble-makers.
In the face of a similar strike in December 1919 Nitti ordered
the prefect of Bologna to maintain constant contact with the
PSI in order to avoid 'sorprese'. Processions were only to be
authorized if PSI leaders took responsibility for their
conduct. 15 Such measures may certainly have been attributed
to the reality of inadequate police and armed forces.
Notably the regional military commander told the sub-prefect
of Imola on the occasion of the July 1919 general strike that
he was unable to provide him with the two battalions requested
for but that if the correct precautions were taken 'nulla
avverrA di pericoloso' .16 Naturally precautions included the
preventive arrests of potential revolutionary ring-leaders, as
for example Borghi for his violent propaganda in July 1919 (II
Resto del Carlino, 20 July 1919).
If, however, the above precautions were unsuccessful and
violence did occur Nitti, in total contrast to his tactful,
non-provocative prevention policies, not only ordered swift
repression but also counted on the cooperation of the public
in this. During the May 1920 railway strike, for example,
he ordered the formation of citizens committees to replace
strikers. 17	La Squilla of 24 and 31 January 1920 also
1
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reported the substitution of railway, post-office and
telegraphic employees by student volunteers during the general
strike of January 1920.
Nitti's use of the public went far beyond the substitution
of strikers, however.	 During the July 1919 general strike he
ordered citizens organizations - including ex-combattents'
associations and the various political 'fasci' to cooperate
with the police authorities in the repression of violence and
maintenance of public order, stressing however that these
groups were to act under the guidance of police officers and
never autonomously. Inevitably this was almost an incitement
to conflict since it placed power in the hands of elements
unable to draw the line between toleration and repression with
any degree of accuracy, too easily carried away by patriotic
or anti-Socialist euphoria. The prime minister in fact
complained to prefects that these civilian groups disobeyed
the orders of police officers, resorting to autonomous and
overzealous, if not illegal activities. 18 Avanti! of 24 July
1919 claimed that in Bologna Arditi (assault troops) had
attacked a peaceful PSI demonstration. The article concluded
that this had either been encouraged by the prefect under the
orders of Nitti or organized by the military authorities, very
much involved in anti-Socialist political initiatives, as will
be discussed below.
In April 1920 the local socialist deputy Grossi questioned
the interior minister about this issue in parliament,
suggesting that he had authorized civilian volunteers to form
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organizations with police functions. Though the interior
minister denied this he added that he could not oppose the
activities of these associations as long as they remained
within the limits of the law (II Resto del Carlino, 18 April
1920 and 20 May 1920).	 Archival documentation does not
unfortunately provide sufficient insight into the true
intentions of Nitti and his prefects here, though in the case
of Bologna supplementary evidence suggests that the prefect
Bladier would not have tolerated violence on the part of
counter-revolutionary forces as demonstrated by his general
opposition to disorderliness on both sides. There is the
possibility that prefects either misinterpreted or even took
advantage of ambiguous instructions, especially since police
inadequacies were a reality. De Felice mentions, for example,
that on the occasion of the general strike of July 1919 the
prefect of Milan came to an agreement with the local 'Fascio
di Combattimento' whereby he could rely on its help in the
event of serious disorder.19
Whatever the case the
	 use of civilians for police duties
was proven yet again to be counter-productive, encouraging
rather than avoiding conflict.	 It certainly dispelled any
impression of tolerance or firmness which the government
desired to give.	 Nitti himself was accused of legitimizing
'follie omicidiarie,	 abusi, violenze'	 as expressed in La
Squilla's	 article	 of	 19	 July	 1919	 entitled	 'Ii
Carabinierissimo'.	 It enabled the organizations involved to
take advantage of their new powers to combat political
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opponents	 in the streets.	 This	 risked conditioning
individual policemen who may have interpreted such
uncontrolled action as being on the orders of the government
even if this was not actually the case.
If the evidence suggests that general strikes were not
usually violent affairs in Bologna, those few cases of
conflict involving the police were almost certainly a
consequence of ambiguous ministerial policing norms. Analysis
of two incidents shows that Nittian policies of firmness and
tact in the face of demonstrators could not always be
reconciled with the reality of insufficient numbers of
policemen.	 In the case of the Anarchist demonstration of 3
July 1919 in Imola which ended in looting and ransacking the
prefect criticised the police officials 	 who instead of
remaining firm in the face of danger abandoned the scene to
fetch reinforcements. Their absence only increased the
looting so that when the Carabinieri reinforcements arrived
they had to use their fire-arms killing six people, an act
which	 the	 prefect	 described	 as	 'fatalmente	 legittimo',
however. He also saw their state of physical exhaustion and
unpopularity in Imola as contributory factors in the tragic
outcome of the conflict.20
The killing of eight braccianti, again by Carabinieri during
a Socialist conference in Decima (San Giovanni in Persiceto)
on 5 April 1920 may again be attributed to a general sense of
defencelessness on the part of the policemen involved. The
incident was provoked when a police official tried to prevent
1
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a speaker from criticising the government (and in particular
the police system). 	 This only rendered the crowd hostile.
The Carabinieri brigadier ordered his forces to	 fire in the
air	 when the official was hit by an object thrown from the
crowd which he mistook for gun-fire, so he claimed. 	 Since
this had no effect he fired shots into the crowd, his
subordinates following suit.	 A police inspector's report
criticised the official for his intolerant attitude despite
the limited number of Carabinieri at his disposal. He was
blamed for trying to control a crowd with only thirteen men
who were so badly positioned as to be defenceless without
resorting to their arms. Nitti himself ordered the transfer
of the officialand also criticised his superior for the
limited precautions taken.21
If the archival documentation suggests that the incidents
were caused by inadequate police numbers, the Socialist press
claimed that they were pre-meditated. According to Avanti! of
4 July 1919, the illegitimacy of the action of the Carabinieri 
in Imola was proven by the fact that the victims were innocent
citizens murdered in different locations of the town. La
Squilla of 10 April 1920 accused the Carabinieri brigadier in
Decima of venting his anger on the crowd, murdering the
speaker Campagnoli at point-blank range with a bayonet and
ordering his men not to fire randomly into the crowd but to
single out their targets. 22
 Indeed the police inspector's
report dispelled claims by Carabinieri that their action was
motivated by their hearing shots fired from the crowd. 23 What
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is significant here is that on occasions such as these the
distinction between pre-meditated and defensive action on the
part of possibly exhausted policemen may have been only
slight, suggesting a correlation between the inadequacy of the
police system and cases of brutality. Such reactions may
indeed have been caused by both political aversion and the
threat of a menacing crowd.
Giolittian strike tactics certainly lessened the risk of
conflict, as illustrated by his handling of the September 1920
factory occupations. Contact with would-be revolutionaries
was to be avoided at all costs 'per non dare pretesti', as he
ordered the Bolognese prefect, Visconti, on 31 August. Though
originally troops, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie guarded
Bologna's metal factories (internally and externally) against
possible occupations, police officials allowed workers to take
over the factories when it became obvious that otherwise
conflict was inevitable. Troops left the interiors of the
buildings which they continued to guard from the outside.
Only following the end of the occupations did the police move
into the factories to check whether arms of explosives had
been manufactured during the occupation.24
There was nevertheless certain confusion as to the exact
orders given and the consequences of this could have been
tragic. The military authorities complained to Visconti that
police officials ordered troops not to fire on workers as they
commenced the occupations, claiming that this was contrary to
previous orders and would have a negative influence on the
-251-
morale and discipline of his soldiers. The prefect replied
that no orders to prevent occupations at all costs had been
issued. Further evidence of lack of clarity over the strategy
to be adopted emerged in Zola Predosa where a Carabinieri 
marshall fired shots in the air in the hope of dissuading the
occupiers. Indeed the impression gained is that both the
Carabinieri and the army were in no agreement with the
prefectoral authorities as to the exact moves to be taken, so
that police officials' orders not to fire came as a last
minute surprise. 25 Giolitti's strategy, no matter how unclear
it may have been, was based, however, on the full awareness
that he could not count on government forces in the face of
revolution and in this sense was successful.
Examination of agrarian conflict in Bologna, characterized by
braccianti land invasions from the beginning of 1920, reveals
a particularly hesitant attitude on the part of Nitti.
Initial orders received by the prefect to allow the peaceful
occupation of uncultivated land in the province suggest that
the government looked upon the plight of the rural proletariat
with concern. Troops and Carabinieri were given instructions
to check that intimidation and violence was not used to occupy
uncultivated plots of land and that no products were stolen or
alterations made to the land itself. Despite the protests of
employers the prefect himself admitted that occupations had
nearly all been carried out peacefully and that on a few
to
occasions employers had even invited them / take over and
cultivate their land.	 The agriculture minister Falcioni
4
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ordered the prefect to encourage the agrarians to be less
obstinate over the issue so avoiding conflict.26
Falcioni's decree of May 1920 which, in complete contrast to
the above,	 illegalized	 invasions	 is	 almost certainly
	 a
demonstration of the fear the agricultural class, which
according to Onofri had threatened a rebellion, was capable of
instilling in the Nittian government. 27 When Giolitti came to
power in June 1920 the situation was reversed once again. The
new government ordered prefects to reconsider the possibility
of allowing the cultivation by braccianti of land voluntarily
abandoned by the proprietors.	 The Bolognese prefect in fact
wrote to the director of Federterra requesting a list of
properties	 to	 which	 this	 could	 be	 applied.28Similarly
Giolitti's	 decree	 of	 27	 July	 1920	 which	 ordered	 the
requisition of all crops in the face of persistent braccianti 
strikes may, in Onofri's opinion, be considered a victory for
Federterra since it mobilized forces of braccianti and
sharecroppers - paid at higher than normal rates - 	 for this
purpose • 29
Government hesitallon if not acquiescence in the face of land
invasions may only have encouraged greater reserve on the part
of the prefectoral authorities. What is more, the prefects'
appeasement of the working classes through economic support
may have misguided party and union leaders into believing that
the government was wholeheartedly on their side so increasing
their determination to win their battles.
	
Quaranta's efforts
at keeping down the prices of essential foodstuffs may, for
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example, have encouraged Bazzano's leagues to ignore official
ceiling prices which they further reduced on the authority of
the socialist council and forced landowners to accept."
If one is also to consider the reality of police absenteeism
in several parts of the province, the unprecedented heights of
violence	 which the rural leagues allegedly reached is not
beyond comprehension.
	 Indeed the prefect, Pericoli, warned
the agriculture minister in May 1920
	 that he did not have
enough forces to enforce the decree banning land occupations.
Only weeks after its	 issue the APA complained of the
government's failure to apply it. 31	On occasions rural police
nuclei were even reported to have been physically overpowered
by the leagues.
	 In June 1920 in San Giovanni in Persiceto,
for example, Carabinieri were forced to free the arrested
league leader because of violent protests by 1200 workers.32
By the summer of 1920 Bologna's agrarian forces had lost all
faith in the ability of the government to curb league
activities.
	 In September the 'commissario prefettizio' warned
the prefect that the agrarians considered the law:
soltanto scritta e non osservata e fatta osservare e non Si
confidano piD; le AutoritA ritengono una forma rappresentativa
di forza senza forza, 	 l'Arma dei Carabinieri addirittura
impotente a proteggere la libertA ed il diritto dei cittadini
come a reprimere i soprusi e le giornaliere intimidazioni.33
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Similarly the Imolese agrarian paper Ii Diario accused the
prefect, Visconti, of using 'decreti e supplementi di
decretini' which, however, the police forces were unable to
apply (22 August 1920).
Indeed from the end of the First World War the conservative
and Interventionist forces blamed the prefectoral authorities
for their general failure to repress subversion. Prefects for
their part were particularly critical of the literal desire of
these elements for conflict with the local PSI. When in
February 1919 the prime minister, Orlando, informed Quaranta
that the local Moderate deputy and agrarian, Tanari, had urged
that the prefectoral authorities call together the
constitutional forces and break off relations with Zanardi,
the prefect retorted that:
La sua sensibilita patriottica cui non risponde la massa del
partito costituzionale del tutto inerte . lo spinge talvolta ad
una specie di esasperazione che nuoce alla esatta percezione
di delicati posizioni politiche.34
Similarly the Questore criticised the anti-Socialist
activities of the Fascio Democratico per la Resistenza
Nazionale, founded in June 1918 since the PSI 'pur non
aderendo alla guerra ha fatto e fa opera costante di
assistenza	 civile'. 55	The	 influence	 of	 these
constitutional' forces is demonstrated by their successful
lobbying for the removal of the Questore, Gaudin°, in December
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1919. 36	According to L'Avvenire d'Italia of 10 October 1919
he had ordered his forces not to intervene during a _Socialist
procession.
The ill-feeling of such forces towards the prefecture was
obviously a result of their failure to understand the motives
underlying government strategies of tact and reserve in the
face of strikes and demonstrations. Hence the ABDS condemned
the prefect Pericoli's refusal to allow the publication of a
manifesto inciting the citizens to repress a PSI festival.
Indeed, during the January 1921 parliamentary enquiry into the
Palazzo d'Accursio massacre the organization claimed that
prefects had shown little favour towards it, reserving its
preferences for the Socialists. 37 Such feeling was only part
of the nationwide resentment towards postwar governments over
their failure to crush Socialism and fulfil the territorial
aspirations for which the nation had joined the First World
War in 1915. The banning of demonstrations in protest at the
Treaty of Versailles in August 1919 by Nitti and the
prohibition of demonstrations or 	 the recruitment	 of
volunteers for the liberation of Fiume and Dalmatia 	 by
Orlando, Nitti and Giolitti throughout the postwar years
almost certainly outraged patriotic Italians, especially since
few measures	 seemed to	 be taken	 against revolutionary
forces."
One of the main problems facing prefects in postwar Bologna
was the open participation of members of the army in street
conflicts
	
between	 Socialist	 and	 Interventionist	 forces
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dominating the period and the general opposition of army
leaders themselves to any attempts on the part of the
prefectoral authorities to remain neutral in these conflicts.
As early as May 1918 Quaranta informed the interior minister
that disabled soldiers ('mutilati') and non-injured uniformed
soldiers and officers had scuffled with the police when a
meeting of the Associazione Bolognese dei Mutilati e Invalidi
di Guerra (disabled soldiers' association) turned into an
attempt to storm Palazzo d'Accursio - the seat of the
Socialist city council. Two lieutenants led an attack on a
police commissar whom they insulted with the words 'austriaco,
vigliacco, difensore del ladri' and a Guardia di citta was
injured trying to rescue him.
	 The prefect claimed that the
army officers had obstructed policemen in their duties."
This issue brought Quaranta into direct conflict with the
regional military command which was less kindly disposed
towards the PSI.
	 When the prefect informed the interior
minister in April 1919 that mostly uniformed soldiers (some
of whom were still active in the army) had been present at the
constitution of the 'Fascio di Combattimento' the local
military authorities defended their men on the grounds that
such organizations were not, as Quaranta had claimed, of an
anti-constitutional, republican nature but were
	 simply
opposed	 to	 anti-national	 parties	 and	 particularly	 the
revolutionary programme of the PSI. Though they had
prohibited soldiers in active service or uniform from taking
part in political demonstrations and had arrested one of the
)
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founder members of the 'Fascio', Captain Bergamo, they warned
that they were limited in the extent to which they could
control or prevent the activities of their men, especially
since: 'moltissimi sono costretti ad uscire anche per ragioni
di	 servizio e non sarebbe possibile 	 impedire che essi
passeggino e si soffermino in certi punti della citta'. In
view of Quaranta's persistence over the matter the regional
commander very subtly informed him that though grateful for
the information he provided:
Le intenzioni degli ufficiali possono p10 attendibilmente
apprendersi dai superiori che ne vigilano costantemente
l'azione, che non dai giornali che possono essere mossi da
fini particolari."
Evidence suggests, however, that in reality military leaders
exercised little control over the activities of their
subordinates and hardly took seriously the implications of
their behaviour. On 15 June 1919 off-duty officers attacked
a Federterra demonstration and in the ensuing conflict killed
a bracciante. If the Questore claimed that anarchists had
provoked the incident and that the officers had used their
fire arms in self-defence Avantil of 2 July 1919 accused the
military authorities of	 fkftnn9 	to	 incriminate	 the
socialist, Giuseppe Tamborelli, for the incident.	 Indeed
following protests from Bentini he was acquitted.41
On the same day however, officers and 'mutilati' led an
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attack on the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. Army officers
entrusted to guard the building from such attacks sided with
the assailants and violently obstructed the efforts of
Carabinieri to prevent conflict and protect workers from being
assaulted.	 The prefect Bladier complained that though the
military division commander had initially punished the
officers responsible, the regional commander had reduced this
to a 'ticking off' without even registering the incident.
What is worse, he continued:
Tale soluzione 6 tanto pi0 grave in quanto sembra che il
Comando del Corpo d'Armata le abbia accompagnate con frase che
suonano approvazione all'operato del colonello il cui contegno
6 giustificato pienamente e solo ritenuto un poco eccessivo
nella forma.	 Si rileva come il contegno dei Carabinieri non
abbia distinti i sovversivi dai patriottici dimostranti
rilevandosi in tutta l'intonazione il preconcetto da cui parte
che le repressioni possono e devono essere violente quando si
tratta di cosi detti sovversivi ma assai blande e toleranti
quando si tratta dei cosi detti patriotti cui evidentemente si
vorrebbe fosse lasciato mano libera.42
That the military and prefectoral authorities disagreed over
how to handle political conflict in the province was clear
well before the First World War had ended. The regional
military commander who during the war period was the highest
police authority tended to ban all PSI demonstrations to the
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objection of the prefect who felt that overzealous measures
were politically counterproductive. When during the peace
celebrations of 5 November 1918 an improvised Neutralist
demonstration had to be quelled the military commander
announced a ban on further non-patriotic demonstrations and
ordered Quaranta to find evidence of provocative behaviour on
the part of Zanardi and arrest those who had organized the
demonstration. Quaranta warned, however, that since there was
no proof that the demonstration concerned had been an attempt
at revolution arrests could not be carried out without
provoking a reaction from the left. With regard to Zanardi
the prefect stated that though the mayor could indeed be
accused of 'ommissioni certamente gravi e patriotticamente
deplorevoli' this was a moral and not a legal question.43
Quaranta was quick to note the involvement of high-ranking
army officials in postwar Interventionist groups and the
obvious dangers this posed, given that under continued
wartime regulations the army exerted authority over the
political life of the province. In November 1918 he warned
Orlando that the 'mutilati':
hanno, purtroppo, continui contatti con le Autorita Militari a
mezzo dell'Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda che prende iniziative
di indole politica e a capo del quale vi 6 un Colonello gia
commerciante e bolognese che ha rapporti coi gruppi radicali
facenti capo al Giornale del Mattino.
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The military authorities had, he claimed, fallen under the
influence of groups and individuals who under the guise of
'national interests' exploited the army for their political
ends. He concluded that the army high command should be
relieved as quickly as possible of its war-time role of
highest political authority in the province.44
The participation of soldiers and army officers in violent
political street conflicts obviously had a negative impact on
policemen whose duty it was to repress disorderliness. They
almost certainly felt embarrassed at having to repress fellow
representatives of the state many of whom were dressed in
uniform and some of whom may have even been on police duties
at that moment.
	 The 'patriotic' activities of these elements
may have	 psychologically or even physically coerced them
into showing greater tolerance towards the Interventionist
forces in general. If, for example, during the above-
mentioned demonstration of May 1918 policemen were assaulted
and humiliated when they tried to prevent the storming of
Palazzo d'Accursio,	 Zanetti claims (p. 329) that on the
following occasion - a war victims commemoration organized by
Zanardi in June 1918 -
	 they remained indifferent when
Interventionists forcefully took over the rally. This may
also account for the freedom with which Arditi were alleged by
Avanti! to have attacked demonstrations during the general
strike of July 1919, as mentioned below. Relatively weak and
unprotected groups of policemen may on occasions have
preferred to remain aloof to avoid injury. Others may indeed
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have been taken in by the moral force of these patriotic
occasions, their indifference becoming a form of connivance.
From the autumn of 1920 there were signs of systematic
police collaboration with the agricultural employers in the
face of near lawlessness in rural areas of the province.
	
In
October the secretary of the Camera Confederale del Lavoro
informed	 the	 prefect,	 Visconti,	 that	 police	 officials,
Carabinieri and Regie Guardie were beginning to offer the
landowners criminal means of defence against the Socialist
syndicates.
	
In Granarolo, Carabinieri were reported to have
fired at pacifist demonstrators, in support of their employer
during strikes.	 A police official also complained that his
forces allowed	 the use of 'krumiri' during the strike, in
defiance	 of	 the	 prefect's	 orders	 to	 the	 contrary.45
Individual cases of police connivance with the agrarian forces
had by now become a tradition in the province, as was revealed
in the previous chapter.	 That such action may have been
dictated by	 not only political sympathies but also the
relative physical weakness of rural forces during this period
is demonstrated by a meeting that very month of 150 agrarian
employers who claimed their readiness to arm themselves and
place themselves	 at the disposal of the police in order to
restore law and order."
The escalation of the Fascist movement in the city of
Bologna in the autumn of 1920 as the ABDS turned to Arpinati's
second Fascio di Combattimento 	 in preparation for the
administrative elections in October was matched by increased
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indiscipline and partisanship among the ranks of the police
forces. According to the Questore, Poli, the Regie Guardie 
were so badly led by their officers that during a Nationalist
demonstration they disobeyed the police officials and
abandoned their posts in order to participate. Poli's report
concluded that the absence of two superior officers left the
responsibility of the division in the hands of lower ranking
officers from outside Bologna who had 	 limited knowledge or
experience of the provincial political situation and little
influence on their subordinates. Those responsible for acts
of indiscipline were reprimanded while their officers were
punished.47
On another occasion Carabinieri and Guardie were reported to
have applauded a group of particularly violent Milanese
Arditi. Poli warned Visconti that many policemen, their
officers and even some officials did not conceal their sense
of outrage at having to repress political groups dedicated to
the destruction of Bolshevism.	 Many police officers and
officials were in fact ex-Arditi. The Questore warned that
he could no longer guarantee police protection of Socialist
party and union headquarters against attacks from nationalists
or fascists	 and feared
	
that disciplinary	 action would
dramatically alter the situation.48
A series of events in the autumn of 1920 led up to the
explosion of large-scale Fascist violence in the province. On
14 October a conflict between a group of Anarchist
demonstrators and Regie Guardie in front of San Giovanni in
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Monte prison ended in the death of three demonstrators and two
policemen. Following the funeral of Salvatore Colamasi (Regia
Guardia) and Giuseppe La Volpe (vice-commissar) fascists
tried to invade the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. La Squilla 
of 17 October 1920 claimed that though policemen prevented
this they looked on with relative indifference as the fascists
set fire to a Socialist newspaper stand and fired in the
direction of the Borsa restaurant - a Socialist meeting place
- killing a passer-by and injuring another three. They then
entered the restaurant with the fascists to carry out arrests,
assaulting those whom they arrested.49
On 4 November 1920 on the occasion of the second anniversary
of the allied victory Poli allowed a procession of
nationalists, fascists and uniformed army officers, despite a
prefectoral ban on demonstrations, because otherwise he feared
a violent reaction on the part of the local population and, so
he claimed, because of the orderliness of the group. At its
termination fascists managed to enter the tower of Palazzo Re
Enzo to ring the bells. The Questore defended the failure of
his men to repress this action on the grounds that the
incident had taken them by surprise.
	 The fascists, on
descending from the tower, managed to mix with the crowds so
swiftly that they could not be identified. On the same
occasion fascists were able to invade Palazzo d'Accursio to
fly the national flag and they also attempted to take
possession of trams in the main square, though this was
prevented by the police.50
f
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On the night of 4 and 5 November 1920 a shooting incident
outside the Camera Confederale del Lavoro provoked a police
raid on the union headquarters, resulting in the arrest of 96
Guardie Rosse, who had formed to protect the PSI from Fascist
attacks, along with the union secretary Ercole Bucco and the
Socialist deputy, Quarantini.
	
Though
	 Poli accused the
Guardie Rosse of provoking the incident when they fired shots
from inside the building at an army officer, the Avanti! 
report of 1922 painted rather a different picture. It claimed
that fascists had shot first and that Regie Guardie guarding
the entrance to the building had actually abandoned their
positions to facilitate this. The involvement of the fascists
in the incident is also proven by the ransacking which
followed the police raid.	 The Vice-Questore limited himself,
however,	 to declaring that the fascists might have been able
to break into the building.51
The Palazzo d'Accursio massacre of 21 November 1920 is by
far the most important event demonstrating police connivance
with the Fascist movement prior to its definitive launching in
Bologna. During the ceremony inaugurating the newly elected
socialist city council an armed conflict between fascists and
socialists broke out in the square in front of Palazzo
d'Accursio.
	 The terrified crowd of mostly workers that had
gathered for the ceremony took refuge in the courtyard of the
council	 building. Guardie Rosse stationed there fatally
mistook their own side for fascists and reacted by throwing
grenades at them.	 A total of nine were killed
	 either by
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bombs or bullets.
	 In the ceremony room inside Palazzo
d'Accursio someone who was 	 never identified, shot and killed
the liberal councillor, Giulio Giordani.52
If literature published in the years immediately following
the tragedy supported the hypothesis of a Socialist attack,
recent	 publications	 claim	 that
	 the	 incident	 had	 been
masterminded	 by the local fascio with the collaboration of
the Questore, Poli. Most significantly, the Fascists had
put up posters threatening to put an end to the Socialist
forces on the day of the inauguration of the council, advising
women and children to stay at home and the men to prepare
themselves for the decisive battle. 53	This threat was taken
seriously by the Socialists - who used Guardie Rosse, 	
Urbani (municipal police) and Vigili del Fuoco (firemen) for
defence purposes - and by the prefect, Visconti, and Poli.
Visconti claimed in a report to the interior minister on 21
November that he had ordered Poli to mediate between the
Fascists and Socialists in order to come to some agreement so
as to prevent conflict of any kind. Onofri claims, however,
that the Questore either took advantage of this to conspire
directly with the Fascists or indirectly caused the conflict
by misleading the Socialists about the conditions by which the
Fascists agreed not to attack.
	 After the incident, so local
PSI leaders claimed, Poli was quite careful to direct
investigations so that neither the injured victims, nor the
Carabinieri and soldiers on duty in the square, nor those
living	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 Palazzo	 d'Accursio
	
were
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questioned.54
Avanti! articles of 26, 27 and 28 January 1922 even
suggested that Poll had planted a secret collaborator in
Palazzo d'Accursio with instructions to kill Giordani. The
individual concerned, a certain Angelo Galli, was noted inside
the ceremony room by witnesses. La Squilla of 11 february
1922 confirmed a few weeks later that the Camera Confederale
del Lavoro had suspected Galli of being a confident of the
Questura,
	 'sospetti confermati
	 in piD di una occasione
essendosi potuto constatare che delle operazioni di cui
Galli veniva a conoscenza era informata molto bene anche
l'autorita'. At the trial of the Socialist council, held in
Milan in February 1923, two agenti investigativi stated that
Galli was a confident of the Questura though unknown
personally to Poll (Avanti!, 11 February 1923). Poll himself
denied the allegations in an interview with Il Resto del 
Carlino on 31 January 1922.55
Both the Questore and his forces contradicted themselves on
several occasions during the trial, however, in an effort to
prove that the conflict had been provoked by the Socialists
and that the Fascists and police forces had at most acted in
defence. Hence a Carabiniere witness claimed that he had seen
someone throwing a hand-grenade from the balcony of Palazzo
d'Accursio, though it was later proven that he would not have
been able to see this from the place in which he claimed he
had been. What is more it was revealed that immediately after
the incident	 he had identified this individual as Zanardi,
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though at the trial he promptly corrected this assertion
(Avanti!, Ii Resto del Carlino, 8 February 1923).
Though Poli claimed that the Socialists had provoked the
conflict by firing, he was unable to state against whom they
had fired, given that he had previously claimed that police
cordons had prevented fascists from getting into the square
(Avanti!, 22 February 1923). Other police witnesses admitted,
however, that shots were 'returned' from the windows of
Palazzo d'Accursio, suggesting, therefore that fascists
managed to force their way through the police cordons and
fired at the moment when the newly elected mayor came out on
to the balcony to greet the crowds, as in fact several press
articles of the time reported (Avanti!, 8 February 1923).
Though there is little evidence of a full-scale, premeditated
Fascist-police operation Carabinieri witnesses admitted that
they had no hesitation in firing at the windows of Palazzo
d'Accursio when the conflict broke out. Regie Guardie in the
courtyard of the building fired at the Guardie Rosse above
them and people, who entered from the square with 'aggressive
intentions'.	 There is no evidence to suggest that the
fascists were in any way repressed. 56 One cannot, on the
other hand, deny the possibility of a confused reaction on the
part of police forces, as in the case of the Guardie Rosse.
The Questore was held responsible for other cases of Fascist
violence during this period, however. The PSI attributed the
Fascist attack on the Camera Confederale del Lavoro on 24
January 1921, for example, to his reducing the number of
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policemen guarding the building on the previous day. This is
in fact confirmed by a message Poll sent to the prefect
informing him that he had reduced the number of Carabinieri 
with this task from 25 to 8 in order to better protect the
railway union headquarters. 57 Other evidence shows that Poli
was dedicated to the anti-Socialist cause and admired by many
sections of society for this. Indeed Valente praised him as
one of the few people in Bologna still determined not to give
in to the threats and demands of the city council, as compared
to the prefect, Visconti, who was criticized for compromising
with Zanardi (p. 175). Poll himself complained during the
trial that Visconti had practically been at the disposal of
both Zanardi and Bucco. He claimed during an interview with
Ii Resto del Carlino of 31 January 1922 that:
Un bel giorno, ad esempio, dei sovversivi bruciarono un
tricolore davanti alla questura, li feci arrestare, ma per
l'intervento	 dell'On. Zanardi	 che	 minacciava	 una	 mezza
rivoluzione dovetti rilasciarli. Da quel momento decisi di
fare da me, perché non mi sentivo di continuare in simili
condizioni.
That the government took allegations of Poll's connivance
seriously is demonstrated by a telegram Visconti received from
Giolitti at the end of January 1921 ordering him to warn the
Questore that if he did not act correctly he would be
dismissed. Indeed only days later he was removed from Bologna
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and transferred to Porto Maurizio (now Imperia), Liguria.
The following March the Vice-Questore, very much present
during the Fascist attacks of October and November, also left
Bologna on suspicion of having passed information to the
Fascio.58
In analysing the events characterizing October and November
1920 one may conclude that the Bolognese Fascist movement was
more or less able to carry out its violent attacks
undisturbed, if not with the cooperation of the police forces.
There are several possible reasons for this. Police personnel
may on occasions have preferred to turn a blind eye to Fascist
activities to avoid conflict. The moral force behind the
movement, as with any anti-Socialist movement, may easily have
intimidated policemen into remaining inactive in the face of
violence which, if committed by socialists, they would have
had no hesitation in repressing.	 Physical weakness was
obviously a serious phenomenon during the period concerned, as
we have established, 	 though as was demonstrated throughout
the years of Fascist ascendancy,	 this often provided a
perfect alibi for connivance.
	
If Poli, referring to the
incident in which fascists broke into Palazzo Re Enzo tower on
4 November,	 claimed that his forces had been ill-prepared,
archival evidence shows that in reality the Questore had
warned	 police	 officers	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 hostile
demonstrations on the previous	 day and had sent for
reinforcements."
By far the most serious factor during this period, political
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aversion towards the PSI was by no means uncommon among
policemen, as demonstrated by the attitude of Poli, himself.
By no coincidence policemen remained indifferent to a Fascist
attack on La Borsa restaurant and even carried out random
arrests on its Socialist 'clientele' following the funeral of
two of their colleagues, killed by Anarchist demonstrators on
14 October. Allegations in La Squilla of 17 October 1920 that
Regie Guardie had caused the conflict of 14 October were in
the Questore's opinion typical of many mindless insinuations
fabricated by the PSI which only further embittered the police
forces."	 The feeling, as experienced by Poli, that the
authorities were literally expected to tolerate the insults of
the Socialists, exasperated many policemen, who felt weak and
exposed.
	 Both De Felice and Fabbri indicate initial police
collaboration with the Fascist movement in terms of the hard
experiences
	 extensive	 strikes	 and	 land occupations
	 had
bestowed upon them during the "Biennio Rosso", forcing them
into overtime.
	 De Felice mentions the frequent attacks
policemen received in the Socialist press.
	
He cites two
articles	 in	 Avanti!	 one	 insulting	 policemens'	 wives,
daughters and lovers and the other urging shopkeepers to
boycott policemen. Fabbri indeed saw these excesses as one of
the fundamental errors in the Socialist strategy
	 since the
main victims of these systematic insults were lower rank
policemen who were too ignorant to realise that they were
instruments of repression of the bourgeois regime."
1
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(ii)	 Cesare Mori and the Fascist conquest of the province of
Bologna, 1921-22.
The events of the autumn of 1920 marked the beginning only of
the Bolognese Fascist revolution.	 The appointment of the
career prefect, Cesare Mori, 	 in Bologna in February 1921
reflected the desire of the Giolittian government to place a
strong-minded police official, entirely capable of enforcing
law and order and keeping Fascism within legal confines, in
the province. The spring of 1921	 saw, besides the new
prefect's	 insistence	 on	 greater	 efficiency	 from	 his
provincial forces in curbing political violence and constant
demands to the government for increased 	 numerical strength
and better officials, the implementation of special government
or prefectoral decrees to render prevention measures all the
more efficient.
Giolitti's ban on arms permits in January 1921 is an example
of this. The government in fact demanded weekly statistics on
the number and type of arms handed in or confiscated by the
police authorities in order to check that the decree was
properly applied.
	 The following March Mori ordered greater
efficiency from his forces in controlling the movement of arms
through the searching of property belonging to political
associations and travel luggage. The ban was also extended to
cudgels (usually used by fascists for beatings and workers for
more defensive purposes) in October 1921 by a prefectoral
decree which refused release on bail of those arrested for the
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illegal possession of arms, as Mori had previously urged upon
the interior minister as the only guarantee that the arms ban
would be taken seriously .62
In March 1921 a similar decree banned the circulation of
private vehicles without the necessary permits, in order to
limit the possibilities the Fascists had of rapidly moving
through the province or indeed into surrounding provinces on
their punitive expeditions. 	 To complement this roadblocks
manned by Carabinieri were set up at various points in the
province, particularly in the northern confines, from June
1921 to the prevent Bolognese fascists from leaving the
province and fascists from elsewhere entering.63
The new prefect also controlled the movement of Fascist
squads by censoring telegrams between fasci asking for
reinforcements, etc. Telegraph stations were ordered to wait
for a	 'nulla osta'
	 from the prefecture or nearest PS
authorities before sending messages of this kind." 	 Notably
the above ordinances were accompanied by strict orders from
the government that the prefect warn his subordinates that
they would be held personally responsible and punished for
their failure to observe instructions correctly.65
Another fundamental aspect of controlling political violence
during this period lay in sufficient cooperation between
prefectures over the repression of Fascist squads, given their
tendency to move from province to province on punitive
expeditions.	 This became particularly important from the
summer of 1921 onwards when Modenese and Ferrarese fascists
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aided their Bolognese companions in imposing new agricultural
syndicates on the peasantry. Between November 1921 and
February 1922 Mori was endowed with extraordinary powers over
the political and military authorities of the Po Valley
provinces in an effort to reduce all levels of political
violence throughout the region. Prefects were obliged to ask
his authorization for the use of reinforcements and inform him
of all matters concerning public order in their provinces."
In reality, however, such measures were of limited effect in
controlling the Fascist movement in Bologna. To a certain
extent this may be attributed to the tradition of numerical
weakness and technical and bureaucratic inefficiency inherent
in the Italian police system, as revealed throughout this
study so far.	 If anything numerical deficiencies were
accentuated during this period. If from the autumn of 1920
there was a significant increase in reinforcements of both
Carabinieri and Regie Guardie allocated to the province, the
intensified scale of violence meant that they were still
insufficient. 67	The army in fact found itself having to
reduce drastically the number of available reinforcements for
police duties	 at the end of 1921 when a whole levee was
discharged."
The negative effects of numerical weakness on the repression
of political violence are all too obvious. In May 1921, for
example, the prefect of Ferrara informed Mori that he did not
have enough forces to prevent fascists from invading the
Bolognese province. Low numerical strength may have accounted
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for cases of policemen being literally overpowered by the
squads, especially during periods of major Fascist
mobilization. During the invasion of Bologna of May 1922 (see
Chapter II, pp. 131-2) small police nuclei were unable to
prevent the burning and ransacking of Socialist cooperatives
and societies by groups of between 50 and 1,500 Fascists - so
police reports claim - given the concentration of all
reinforcements in the city of Bologna.
	 The inefficiency of
roadblocks may also be attributed to numerical weakness, as
during the invasion when a small Carabinieri nucleus at the
Ferrarese border was unable to prevent the entrance of three
thousand fascists."
On occasions lack of cooperation and bureaucratic pettiness
on the part of other police authorities (army, Carabinieri,
Regie Guardie) as so often in the past hindered Mori's efforts
to curb the high level of violence in the province. In June
1921, for example, the military division commander objected to
his use of soldiers to guard the Camera Confederale del Lavoro
and man roadblocks on the grounds that this violated circular
3630 of 14 April 1920 which limited the use of troops for
policing purposes, demonstrating obvious indifference about
the emergency situation in the province, which, according to
Mori, justified these measures."
The stress which intensified political violence placed on a
traditionally weak police organization was obviously quite
considerable. Indeed, following the elections of May 1921 in
which Fascist crimes reached unprecedented levels police
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forces were reported to be in a state of physical exhaustion
and therefore unfit for duties.	 Their morale was further
weakened by the announcement that shortly three army regiments
would be leaving the province without substitution.	 The
constant use of reinforcements meant that decent living
accommodation was scarce. In January 1922 	 Mori warned the
prefect of Ferrara, for example, that 	 bad living conditions
risked causing indiscipline among Regie Guardie.71
Renzo De Felice points out that one of the problems which
Fascism posed to	 the police forces was	 its use of large
bands of armed men who had their own means of transport for
moving swiftly about the countryside.
	
As the historian
states:
L'organizzazione e ii modus agenti delle forze di polizia
nell'21	 erano quelli tradizionalmente usati nei decenni
precedenti, quando sul piano politico e dell'ordine pubblico
in genere, Si trattava di fronteggiare scioperi, agitazioni,
manifestazioni anche'essi di tipo tradizionale, dei quali cioê
la polizia era informata, dai suoi agenti e confidenti e
spesso della stessa stampa 'sovversiva' con giorni di anticipo
(...) bastavano pochi colpi d'arma da fuoco per sbandare masse
anche numerose di dimostranti (  Mussolini il fascista	 Vol.
1, cit., pp. 33-4 ).
Mori indeed attributed lack of experience to the failings of
his forces and officials.	 In June 1921, for example, he
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forces were reported to be in a state of physical exhaustion
and therefore unfit for duties.
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risked causing indiscipline among Regie Guardie.71
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Fascism posed to the police forces was its use of large
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admitted
	
that one of the problems inherent in policing in
rural
	 areas	 was the	 control	 of territorial	 zones	 by
inexperienced Carabinieri. Given the constant arrival and
departure of reinforcements, often from other regions of the
country, policemen were never given	 time to familiarize
themselves with the political situation in a particular
location. 72
	An insufficient communication system may have
accounted for the late signalling of departures of Fascist
squads on punitive expeditions, so that forces in the location
to which they were destined were unable to take the necessary
measures in time.	 On occasions fascists actually cut
telegraph wires, as during the invasion of Bologna in May
1922.	 Finally, a problem associated with the identification
of Fascist offenders was that they were usually from other
areas of the province, if not other provinces, so that local
policemen were unable to recognise them.
	 It was often
impossible to tell the locations from where expeditions had
set off.73
The arms and vehicles ban issued
	 by Giolitti in the first
months of 1921 proved to be inefficient. One of the
principal reasons behind the failure of the arms ban was the
fact that it was not extended to all categories of persons
previously in possession of arms.
	 Many avoided the ban
because they owned arms for hunting purposes.
	 Families of
soldiers killed during the recent war were allowed to keep one
gun as a memento. Persons whose moral conduct was guaranteed
were also exempted from the ban.	 Mori himself asked the
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undersecretary of state for the interior, Corradini, in March
1921 for a revision of arms permits for people living in
isolated areas and the following month even proposed the
return of arms to the majority of those previously holding a
licence.	 Vigliani, the police chief granted this request,
though advising prudence. By the summer of that year Mori was
complaining that	 police officials and officers were too
liberal in the issuing of permits. 74	Similarly a possible
setback in the decree of March 1921 banning the circulation of
vehicles may have been the exemption of those vehicles used
for commercial purposes. 	 Given the support if not employment
that the property-owning classes gave to Fascism it is very
likely that such vehicles transported fascists under the guise
of business trips.	 Roadblocks also proved to be very
ineffective. The main fault here seemed to be the failure to
put them up at all border points.	 As the prefect of Modena
informed Mori in August 1921 fascists had no difficulty in
getting past them since they could use roads without blocks.
Otherwise fascists would get out of their transportation van
and walk round the roadblock through the fields continuing
their journey in the van on the other side.75
If there are no doubts, therefore, as to the serious
technical	 and	 bureaucratic	 difficulties	 encountered	 by
Bologna's police forces in repressing Fascist violence - as
indeed
	 experienced	 in	 the	 face	 of	 socialist	 league
intimidation	 in	 1920 - the archival documents	 suggest,
however, that on occasions these weaknesses may have provided
n
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a perfect alibi for police indifference if not acquiescence
towards the Fascist movement. This would explain, for example,
excessive lack of cooperation in the summer of 1921 from the
Ferrara's	 prefect, Pugliese, towards Mori over the invasion
of Molinella by Ferrarese fascists. On several occasions he
refused to take responsibility for failing to prevent this and
even denied that the squads were from his province. 76 Indeed
weaknesses inherent in the Italian police forces cannot alone
account for the near total failure of Bologna's police forces
to repress political violence. Not only did Mori complain of
the freedom with which Fascist squads carried out their
illegal activities but also he deplored the absence of his
forces from scenes of conflict, their lateness if not failure
in reporting incidents and the poor results of his prevention
policies.
The overall impression gained through examination of the
vast quantity of documentation is that unlike the previous
period of league violence, policemen usually put up no
physical resistance to fascist criminal activities. To quote
one of countless examples, a Carabinieri officer preferred to
walk away when in October 1921 a member of the Socialist
council of Ozzano Emilia was assaulted by fascists. 77	On
occasions policemen directly disobeyed orders by failing to
repress Fascist illegalities.	 As the Questore informed Mori
in April 1921, his officials:
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mi hanno concordemente fatto rilevare che allorche debbono
essi esplicare azione energica o repressiva verso gruppi di
dimostranti fascisti o simpatizzanti con questi, trovansi
isolati perche le forze di polizia non rispondono esattamente
al loro inviti.78
Statistics on the arrests of fascists, the confiscation of
their arms and searching of their property, indeed strongly
suggest that many policemen were well disposed towards the
movement. This is particularly evident when comparing these
with similar figures on socialists.
Those produced by De Felice (Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1,
cit., pp. 36-9) demonstrate that at least initially Mori was
particularly successful in repressing violence in comparison
to other provinces. For a total of 73 cases of conflict
between socialists and .fascists up to 8 May 1921, 124 fascists
were prosecuted, of whom 84 were arrested, whilst 76
socialists were prosecuted and 52 of these arrested. In the
other provinces the number of fascists prosecuted or arrested
was significantly lower than similar figures for socialists.
Further figures found in the prefect's files show that in
Bologna itself, however, socialists involved in political
conflict faced harsher treatment from the police authorities
than their fascist counterparts.
	 Between 8 and 31 May 1921,
for example, only 9 out of 49 socialists were released on bail
in comparison with 37 out of 61 fascists.
	
Figures compiled
1
-280-
from monthly reports which the prefecture sent to the interior
minister between March and September 1922, again showed that
311 out of 427 fascists were released on bail in comparison
with only 73 out of 155 socialists.79
The conclusion drawn from these figures is confirmed by
Mori's instructions to his forces. He noted, for example,
that following a conflict between communists and fascists ten
of the former and only one of the latter were arrested by
Carabinieri though the majority of those	 injured were
communists." He	 also became suspicious	 of the number of
Fascist offenders reported 'in hiding'. 	 In November 1921 he
complained to his subordinates that:
Ricorre con troppa frequenza nelle relazioni delle SS.LL. per
fatti di violenza provocati da fascisti la motivazione di non
essersi potuto procedere all'arresto dei responsabili perchê
'datasi alla latitanza' cià che invece non avviene con la
stessa frequenza per violenze quando i responsabili ne sono
persone appartenenti ad altri partiti.
In January 1922 he indeed informed the Questore that three
individuals sought after by the police and allegedly 'in
hiding' were living free in their own homes. 81
 Further
information shows that many fascists released on bail were
accused of such crimes as murder and assault. Many names
appear more than once on the lists. According to a report of
August 1922 on crimes committed, 9 fascists accused of murder
-281-
or attempted murder were on bail.
	 Another two accused of
murder were 'in hiding'.82
Similarly, figures on the number and type of arms
confiscated as part of the government ban suggest that the
police forces were lenient towards the Fascist movement and
that this increased as time went on. Indeed, if between 27
December 1921 and 8 January 1922 a total of 242 licences were
banned, 153 applications rejected, 82 weapons confiscated and
26 people prosecuted, by March 1922 figures were disastrously
lower with only 12 banned licences, 8 rejected licence
applications, 3 confiscated weapons and 3 arrests in one week.
Significantly from May 1922 (the period of intensified
fascist violence) the figures illustrated that police measures
in enforcing the arms ban were almost non-existent, though
again this may reflect to a certain extent the weakness of the
forces in the face of large scale Fascist operations.83
The evidence also implies that even if fascists were brought
to trial they were not necessarily condemned for their crimes.
The police forces almost certainly played a significant role
here. Given that the majority of acquittals were for lack of
evidence one may assume that Fascist violence and intimidation
prevented witnesses from coming forward. Indeed in January
1922 Mori deplored the failure of Carabinieri present during
the trials of fascists to protect key witnesses from fascists
either inside or outside the courtroom. 84 He also complained
that his forces failed to carry out the necessary enquiries on
fascists	 awaiting	 trial,	 claiming	 that	 such	 negligence
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deliberately aimed at preventing their incrimination. As a
result of this, for example, 32 fascists accused of attempting
to ransack a Socialist club in San Donato in March 1921 were
acquitted.85
Perhaps the most reveak.23 case of this kind was that of
Emilio Marchesini, Fascist 'ras' of Budrio, prosecuted for a
total of 6 crimes varying from assault to resisting arrest
between August 1921 and February 1922, but always acquitted,
despite the fact that the Questura considered him a dedicated
criminal! Indeed, during one of his many hearings he was
reported to have beaten a prosecution witness. The impression
gained from rather vague and inadequate documentation on
Marchesini is that though continually sought after by the
police and conveniently reported 'in hiding', he led a normal
public life in Budrio.
	 Indeed in April 1921 the Questore 
informed Mori that a Regie Guardie officer had seen and
recognized Marchesini,
	 but
	 'non sapendo che egli	 fosse
ricercato non lo aveva tratto in arresto'. In the case of
Budrio, the facility with which Marchesini was acquitted may
have been a result of rascist influence within the local
judiciary itself. Indeed in January 1922 the Questore advised
the removal of a court official from the town - as in fact
happened - for his passionate Fascist sympathies and 	 use of
false witnesses during trials."
The documentation quoted above implies that members of the
police and judiciary protected Fascist offenders without
making it too obvious, however, that the law was not being
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upheld,
	 This is	 indeed epitomized in the case of a
Carabiniere who in October 1921 arrested a fascist in Borgo
Panigale. A witness came forward to claim that he had seen
the fascist secretly hand over his revolver to the policeman
so that on arriving in the local Carabinieri headquarters he
was promptly released, not having been found in illegal
possession of a weapon. There is also strong evidence to
suggest that elements within the Questura or prefecture warned
the fascio of imminent arms searches. An anonymous letter to
the prefect accusing the Vice-Questore of such activities was
almost certainly the cause of the removal of the official
concerned, as was mentioned above.87
Discrepancies in existing legislation almost certainly
protected Fascist offenders from serious punishment as well.
Notably article 372 of the penal code stated that should
deliberate bodily injuries be curable within ten days,
judicial action could only be taken if desired by the victim
and the prison sentence did not exceed three months - this
latter point meaning that offenders were automatically
released on bail. If, therefore, it could be proven that
injuries inflicted by the Fascists were light - and given the
intimidatory nature of Fascism this would not have been
difficult - even if the aggressors were reported by their
victims - again very unlikely - they escaped imprisonment
while awaiting trial. Indeed, La Squilla reported on 10
September 1921 that despite Mori's orders for the arrest of
fascists in Budrio the local Carabinieri chief replied that
)
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'Noi non possiamo farlo perche la legge permette che si
bastoni purche non vengono prodotte delle lesioni guaribili
oltre il decimo giorno'.
On many occasions policemen obviously protected fascists,
and indeed themselves from accusations of incompetence, by
playing down the seriousness of incidents. An enquiry into
political violence in Molinella, for example, concluded that
the workers were over-anxious about the possibility of
encountering Fascist punitive expeditions and were prone to
exaggeration, therefore. In reply to allegations of
connivance on the part of the police the report stated that
policemen 'gave the impression' of being partial towards the
Fascists, though in reality there was nothing to criticise in
their	 conduct. 88
	There are also documented incidents of
policemen coercing the victims of assaults into denying that
they had been injured by fascists. The Imolese Camera del
Lavoro informed the sub-prefect in December 1921, for example,
that following a beating by fascists a worker had been ordered
by the local Carabinieri commander to declare either that he
had fallen off his bicycle or that he had been attacked in a
different location - so relieving the commander of any
responsibility for the attack. When Mori made enquiries the
policeman naturally denied the whole incident, accused the
Camera del Lavoro of slander and even produced a declaration
by the victim stating that the whole incident was based on a
'misunderstanding' . 89
' There were naturally cases of police collaboration far
.1
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surpassing the mere protection of fascists. In April 1922
Mori complained to the Carabinieri legion commander that
Carabinieri had accompanied fascists on punitive expeditions,
for example.
	 Reports of open 'cameraderie' between fascists
and policemen were not uncommon either. Mori particularly
deplored the friendship between an extremely violent fascist,
Cavedoni, of Bertalia and the local Carabinieri commander, for
example, just as he deplored Carabinieri of Bazzano spending
their evenings in the 'osterie' in the company of fascists
with whom they sang anti-socialist songs."
	 In December
1921	 the Imolese Camera del Lavoro claimed that fascists and
Carabinieri	 searched
	 property	 and
	 carried
	 out	 arrests
together. Mori on several occasions had to warn his
funzionari not to carry out investigations with the assistance
of fascists for the obvious reason that this would give the
public the impression that the authorities protected one
political	 faction to the detriment of
	 the other. 91	The
latter examples illustrate the policeman-like
	 semi-legal
nature of the Fascist movement in the aftermath of what many
had considered 'red tyranny' in Bologna. The impression
gained is that on occasions the assistance of fascists in
police operations may have been beneficial to the local police
forces, rendering collaboration reciprocal, therefore.
	 This
is even more evident in the post-March on Rome years when
Fascist squads aided the prefectoral authorities in
persecuting socialists and communists who had become official
enemies of the Mussolinian regime.
3
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Serious efforts were made by Mori to remove those members of
his forces suspected of connivance. Bertalia's Carabinieri 
commander left Bologna in view of his continued friendship
with Cavedoni, for example. The prefect made little
distinction, however, between cases of open collaboration and
general negligence on the part of police officers who might
have been simply too incompetent or weak to cope with the
Fascist onslaught or at the most intimidated into showing
greater tolerance towards Fascist violence. On applying to
the prime minister, Bonomi, for the transfer of Imola's sub-
prefect in September 1921 he noted that:
Non 6 legato agli agrari ma pub averne dato localmente la
sensazione in quanto una certa timidezza C...) lo portano
anzich6 a reagire ad accostarsi di preferenza a chi pi0 grida
e minaccia e cio6 in questo momento al fascismo agrario.92
The task of removing or punishing those suspected of
connivance - whether active or passive - proved to be
difficult on many occasions, however. Those under accusation
were often able to defend themselves for technical failings or
bureaucratic complexities.	 Policemen were often supported by
their superiors against the will of the prefect. In April
1922, for example, Mori complained to the Carabinieri legion
commander that despite proven acts of connivance on the part
of Carabinieri in Castel San Pietro and Sesto Imolese the
local division commander claimed that their action had been
3
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'meritevole'.	 The legion commander in turn defended the
division commander on the grounds that his subordinates had
obviously	 'not	 given	 him	 all	 the	 details	 of	 their
activities'.
	
The prefect had limited power over the removal
or punishment of Carabinieri or Regie Guardie because of the
limited dependence of the two corps on the prefectoral
authorities, especially in disciplinary terms.
	 On many
occasions Carabinieri or Regie Guardie commanders were able to
decide on their own authority, over and above Mori's, that it
was not convenient
	 to remove or transfer their men, as in
fact happened in the above incidents.93
It has already been established in the first half of this
chapter that at least initially police connivance with Fascism
may have been strongly based on anti-socialist feeling
deriving from the period of conflict of 1920.
	 The deaths of
six workers, mostly at the hands of the Carabinieri, at the
end of 1920 and during the following year support this
hypothesis.	 Medardo Vannini was killed at point-blank range
by	 Carabinieri during a quarrel on 14 November 1920.
	
Luigi
Longhi mysteriously died in prison in December 1920 after
being arrested for political reasons.
	 Of the other four
cases, Aldo Vecchi was shot at point-blank range in the
stomach by a Carabiniere for no apparently justifiable reason
in Budrio in September 1921. 	 Primo Sibani was mortally
injured by Carabinieri in an attempt to arrest him in Grizzana
in November 1921. The most serious cases were joint Fascist-
Carabinieri attacks.
	
Enrico Bonoli was beaten to death by
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fascists and Carabinieri in Castel Guelfo in May 1921 and
Emilio Zardi suffered the same fate in Fontanelice in December
that year (Arbizzani, Lavoratori ed antifascisti, cit., pp.
12-14).
It would be an error, however, to conclude from the above
that connivance was in all cases motivated by political
identification with the movement. The Questore, Luigi Poll,
mentioned in the first half of the chapter, is again a clear
example of political connivance within the higher ranks of the
police organization.	 Yet, few other funzionari in Bologna
shared his enthusiasm for the Fascist movement. Indeed,
further archival evidence shows that police connivance with
Fascism, though a widespread phenomenon, was not necessarily
motivated by political feeling. Among top rank policemen
especially connivance may have been motivated by personal
opportunism. This may have been the case with the prefects in
the neighbouring province of Ferrara, Pugliese and Bladier,
both suspected of collaborating with the fascists and
temporarily	 relieved	 of	 their	 duties	 (collocati	 a
disposizione) but then reinstated following the March on Rome!
Adrian Lyttelton indeed gives the example in his work on the
rise to power of Fascism of the Questore of Cremona who, in
anticipation of a future Fascist government, compromised his
office, becoming a client of the ras Farinacci, in the hope
that this would improve his career. He was in fact nominated
prefect under Mussolini ('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., p. 45).
The documentation also suggests that passive collaboration
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may often be attributed more to pressure and coercion - both
physical and psychological - from the Fascist movement and
less to political identification, especially among police
officials.	 It also shows that the relationship between the
police and the movement was often all but cordial. The
documentation consulted shows that on many occasions the
Bolognese fascist movement used methods of coercion in an
effort	 to keep the prefectoral authorities and provincial
police forces under its influence.
	 An example of this
	 is
the reaction of Bologna's Fascists - and much of the
conservative population - to the arrest of their leader
Arpinati, accused of attempted murder, in March 1921. Violent
anti-government demonstrations and the closing of the city's
shops aimed at securing Arpinati's release. This was
supported by a violent press campaign by the Fascist local
daily L'Assalto which, in an article dated 19 March 1921,
accused	 the	 prefectoral	 authorities	 of	 Bolshevism	 and
ridiculed Mori.	 It concluded:
I prefetti di Giolitti credono sul serio che l'impero della
legge altro non sia che ordine pubblico? 	 Ma si sbagliono
grosso.	 Per noi l'impero della legge significa la moralita
nei rapporti e nei costumi politici, moralita che tutti gli
organi	 dello	 stato,	 senza	 distinzione	 alcuna,	 hanno
prostituito vendendo lo stato e la cosa pubblica a tutti i
venduti allo straniero.
	
No.	 Non c'4 nessun regio o
prefettizio decreto, nessun aumento di forza politica, nessun
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provvedimento poliziesco che possa ormai far riacquistare alle
nostre popolazioni la perduta fiducia negli organi di stato.
Le nostre popolazioni, sane e laboriose, sanno benissimo che i
soli, che al di sopra di tutte le apparenti procedure
poliziesche
	 abbiano	 ristabilito	 la	 legge	 sono	 stati
	 i
fascisti.
These words clearly illustrate the moral force with which the
Fascist movement justified its criminal acts and the obvious
pressure this placed on policemen who risked accusations of
anti-patriotism for trying to uphold the law. This would
almost certainly account for the quick release on bail of
Arpinati by the Ferrarese judicial authorities. Mori deplored
this move as illegal and motivated by 'pressioni piazza'.
	 He
added that such action did nothing to enhance the prestige of
the judiciary. The socialists arrested for the Palazzo
d'Accursio massacre in November 1920 and not released on bail
for the same charges obviously accused them of partiality.95
Accusations of maltreatment of fascists during police
interrogations, which Mori denied, may have formed part of
general manoeuvres to discredit and thereby pressurize the
prefectoral authorities. A petition demanding that the police
forces prove themselves 'di non essere solo severa esecutrice
della	 legge,	 ma	 rispettosa
	 della	 volonta	 popolare che
continuamente viene invisa nei suoi sentimenti di Italianita'
signed by the fasci, merchants', employers' and citizens'
' associations of Budrio and Mezzolora, demonstrates the support
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of conservative classes in this."
If such pressure - epitomized in the Fascist invasion of
Bologna and ostracism of Mori in May 1922 - did not affect the
prefect himself, who remained remarkably steadfast in the face
of Fascist protest,
	 other policemen may have been influenced
by it. The manner in which police commanders gave in to the
arrogant authoritarian attitude of Fascist elements is much in
evidence on several occasions. In December 1921, for example,
Mori complained to the Carabinieri division commander that his
men had released a fascist immediately after his arrest in
Bologna after a crowd of fascists protested.
	 Avanti! of 23
April 1922 claimed that in Molinella those police officials
who refused to collaborate with local fascists were treated
with such hostility that they were forced to ask for transfer
to another area.	 Police funzionari did not always have the
support of the Carabinieri or Regie Guardie.
	
When, for
example, in August 1921 fascists accused Molinella's vice-
commissar	 of	 partiality	 towards	 the	 Socialists,
	 after
threatening to take legal action against their assailants, the
local military	 commander	 intervened	 in support of the
Fascists,	 stating that the functionary was	 in fact a
'subversive sympathisert.97
Policemen were on occasions victims of violent personal
attacks in the Fascist press. Molinella's vice-commissar,
Bovolo, was accused in L'Assalto (1 July 1922) of being over-
friendly towards the local Socialist leader Massarenti, to
quote just one exami)le of this (see Appendix 2, Document 33
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for a	 similar example of this).	 On rarer occasions the
Fascists even resorted to physical attacks on policemen who
refused to cooperate with them.
	
Indeed in May 1922 the
Questore had to order the protection of a vice-commissar
following threats.	 His colleagues did in fact have to defend
him against a Fascist assault in the Modernissimo cafe in
Bologna on 29 May 1922. 98	Again, as during the immediate
post-war period, the attitude of army officers on police
duties counter-acted efforts on the part of the police
officials to maintain law and order and was almost certainly a
contributory factor to police connivance - active or passive -
with the Fascist movement. In June 1921, for example, an army
captain tried to prevent a commissar repressing a Fascist
invasion of the Imolese town council headquarters.99
The case of the vice-commissar of Porretta,
	 Mazzoni,
illustrates the obvious physical and psychological effects of
the pressure of the local Fascist movement. In April 1922 the
official	 requested transfer for family reasons.
	
The sub-
prefect of Vergato informed Mori, however, that in reality
Mazzoni desired to leave Porretta because of the hostility he
faced from the local population, particularly the Fascists.
The following month Mori informed the interior ministry police
chief that:
Il Sig. Mazzoni ha reso utili e lodevoli servizi in questa
provincia, nell'attuale sua residenza, ma da qualche tempo
eccessivamente impressionato dagli attacchi mossigli sulla
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stampa dai fascisti, e dalla loro ostilita per l'opera di
repressione alla quale il Mazzoni ha dovuto provvedere in
vane occasioni di violenze fasciste nel territorio del
Circondario di Vergato, Si va mostrando alquanto indeciso e
perplesso.
Mazzoni himself declared that the local Carabinieri had sided
with the Fascists, isolating him completely and undermining
his authority.	 He alleged that their commander disobeyed his
orders to protect a socialist from Fascist assaults.	 The
Carabinieri division commander defended his forces on the
grounds that Mazzoni connived with the Socialists. 	 The sub-
prefect of Vergato	 later admitted,	 however,	 that the
Carabinieri commander of Porretta was a close friend of two
local fascists and recommended his transfer. 	 In the case of
vice-commissar Bovolo, accused of having fallen under the
influence of Massarenti, a slight nervous breakdown was
diagnosed. 100
If policemen were not necessarily coerced into actively
supporting the Fascist movement they may have preferred not to
put up resistance to the violence, where possible. 	 The
Questore De Silva, though initially praised by Mori for his
efforts to repress political violence in the province, had by
the summer of 1922 become the object of severe criticism by
the prefect for his incompetence. In August he was accused of
having failed to prevent fascists from requisitioning a train
which they drove to Ancona, despite his having been warned of
1
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this in advance.	 Similarly it took him three quarters of an
hour to send forces to defend the Camera Confederale del
Lavoro in Bologna from yet another Fascist attack, despite the
closeness of the building to the Questura. 101	Policemen may
have feared punishment under a future Fascist government for
repressing the movement in the past.	 Where a policeman's
superior sympathised with the Fascists he was almost certainly
reluctant to repress Fascist illegalities.
	 Where the police
forces were genuinely weak in the face of the Fascist
onslaught they may have passively accepted violation of the
law in order to save their skins.
Further light is thrown on the above issue by considering
the reaction of police forces to the Fascist invasion of
Bologna at the end of May 1922.	 The documentation suggests
that the Regie Guardie and police officials
	 responded
particularly positively to Mori's general mobilization of
police and military forces for defence of the city.
	 Indeed
the Questore reported scuffles between funzionari and fascists
refusing to disband.
	 Cases of hostility between fascists and
Regie Guardie were so frequent that the Questore seriously
considered the idea of employing Carabinieri only since, he
claimed, they might be more able to uphold the law without the
need for conflict.102
Several significant points emerge from the above.
	 Firstly,
the rather unsteady relationship between the Regie Guardie and
the Fascist movement, as evident in this instance, was not
uncommon in other areas of the peninsula.
	 In September 1921
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Regie Guardie in the neighbouring province of Modena killed
seven fascists after opening fire on an apparently p_acif-ist-
demonstration against police measures after fascists assaulted
two police officials.
	 The Communist daily L'Ordine Nuovo 
attributed this to the physical exhaustion of the corps in the
face of daily episodes of Fascist violence as had been the
case	 with	 the	 socialists	 in	 1920.	 The	 anti-police
demonstration and assault of two policemen may have been the
last straw.103
Secondly, the use of Carabinieri as a 'soothing agent' was
again not uncommon.
	 Indeed Giuseppe Beato in his essay of
1938 on the contribution of the Carabinieri Reali to the
Fascist cause in Tuscany states that though the corps and
Fascist movement collaborated in repressing 'subversion':
tuttavia la prima, per il suo stesso istituto, dovette essere
la moderatrice degli impulsi generosi del secondo e riusci con
delicato tatto, e qualche volta con pronta energia, ad
impedire od a limitare le conseguenze di spiegabili reazioni,
colla serenita ed il prestigio della propria inalterabile
disciplina.104
This implies, therefore, that emphasis was placed not so much
on repressing the Fascist movement but more on keeping it
under control.
	
In this sense the Carabinieri were considered
useful on the basis of their cordial relationship with the
movement.	 Such policies only risked increasing the extent of
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police connivance and further undermining state authority,
however. They also illustrate the extent to which the
prefectoral authorities were fearful of provoking rather than
preventing conflict through repressive measures.
The above points indeed suggest that
	 certain distinctions
may be made between the various police authorities over the
question of their support of Fascism.
	 It becomes clear, as
generally emerges from this study, that
	 police connivance
with	 the	 movement	 was	 particularly	 strong	 among	 the
Carabinieri and less so among police funzionari and the Regie 
Guardie. The documentation suggests that the Carabinieri for
their sympathetic view of the Fascist movement were easily
encouraged into collaborating with it, ignoring directives
from the Questura and prefecture. Only on rare occasions did
the Fascists resort to serious psychological or physical
pressure on Carabinieri. The support individual Carabinieri 
received from their superiors when Mori tried to have them
transferred for their alleged connivance with the Fascist
movement is further proof of the extent to which the corps
sympathized with Fascism. As will be revealed below,
however, the Carabinieri as other police authorities would
have maintained their loyalty to the state, despite feeling
sympathy towards
	 the Fascist movement, had the state itself
shown more decisiveness in
	 curbing the political violence
dominating the period.
In view of this last point, the attitude of Bologna's police
forces towards the Fascist movement may also be attributed to
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the generally ambiguous moves taken by the pre-Fascist
governments of Giolitti, Bonomi and Facta which obviously
continued down the ranks of the police authorities. Giovanni
Giolitti, though issuing decrees with the aim of restoring law
and order, was concerned more at taming the movement, which he
failed to see as subversive, through the repression of
individual cases of violence, and less at outlawing a serious
threat to state integrity. 	 According to De Felice, he may
even	 have	 quietly	 approved
	 of	 anti-Socialist	 counter-
revolution if this would help maintain the political status
quo.	 The historian states that, in the prime minister's
opinion:
L'importante era che il fascismo potesse essere mantenuto
sotto controllo e incanalato nell'alveo delle forze medie: la
routine politico-parlamentare avrebbe fatto il resto, gli
avrebbe dato sfogo legale e lo avrebbe integrato nello stato
liberale. Intanto bastava che l'apparato amministrativo fosse
in grado di far rispettare l'autorita dello stato, assicurando
la punizione del reati specifici da qualsiasi parte politica.
(Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1, cit., pp. 35-9).
On the above grounds Giolitti included fascists on the
government list at the May 1921 general election. Though the
prime minister deplored the high level of Fascist violence
characterizing the election campaign and the general failure
of the police to prevent this (see Appendix 2, Document 27 for
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an example of this), examination of the archival documentation
suggests that government directives may have indirectly
encouraged the police forces to tolerate Fascist excesses.
Evidence shows that the election was carried in traditional
'Giolittian' style with the usual government interference in
favour of its own forces. Thus, for example, the sub-prefect
of Vergato asked for the removal of the electoral president of
Grizzana because of his Socialist ties and for the
substitution of the president of Marzabotto who was considered
more beneficial to the government by 	 fighting the electoral
campaign in the Communist-dominated town. 105 One should
seriously consider the possibility that in the light of the
'Giolittian' electoral tradition in which the prefectoral
authorities were usually expected to fight the opposition and
support the 'constitutional' parties the inclusion of Fascist
candidates on the government list was almost an indirect
invitation to police connivance.
Under Bonomi, who succeeded Giolitti in July 1921, the
Socialist movement came under attack not only from the
Fascists but also from the provincial police forces following
the prime minister's outlawing of the Communists and the
Arditi del Popolo, a left-wing paramilitary organization
founded in defence against Fascist violence, on the grounds
that they provoked the Fascists. Though ordering the
repression of Fascist violence alongside this, Bonomi gave his
forces the impression that the government continued to see the
left as the main 'threat and almost justified the Fascist
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counter-reaction as a form of self-defence. Indeed, according
to Neppi Modona (pp. 249-61), ministerial directives ordered
the repression of the Arditi del Popolo under specific
articles of the penal code - including article 253 on the
formation of armed associations and article 248, 'associazione
a delinquere' - articles which had never been applied against
the Fascist movement. 106
These policies had the effect of placing undue emphasis on
the repression of the left so that while Arditi del Popolo 
were arrested in organized police operations and their
headquarters closed the fasci remained open and the majority
of Fascist offenders went
	 unpunished. Mori himself, who
cannot	 in any way be suspected of favouritism towards the
Fascist movement,
	 initially failed to see the dangers
inherent in Bonomi's policies. He defended his forces from
accusations that they limited the repression of political
violence to the Arditi del Popolo which, he claimed, was more
than a defensive organization, citing an attack on the fascio 
of Mezzolara. In August 1921 he reported hearing from Fascist
sources about the secret recruitment of Arditi among Bologna's
bricklayers and tram-drivers and took repressive measures on
the basis of this information, suggesting that the police and
Fascists	 collaborated
	 in	 repressing	 this
	
paramilitary
organization. A month later, however, he had to warn his
forces that their action had degenerated into unjustified
persecution of the left while the Fascist movement thrived.107
De Felice (Mussolini ii fascista, Vol. I, cit., p. 211)
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indeed states that the Arditi del Popolo served as an
excellent	 alibi	 for	 Fascist	 violence,	 appeasing	 public
anxieties about the high level this had reached. He
continues, however, that with this a new form of connivance
was created:
quella dell'accordo con i fascisti per cercare di tenerli
calmi, di contenerne la violenza e, in qualche caso, laddove i
comunisti, gli arditi del popolo erano pi0 attivi, per
servirsene contro di essi
De Felice concludes that this type of connivance:
minava pi0 al fondo quel che rimaneva dell'autorita e del
prestigio dello stato, rendeva i fascisti sempre pit sicuri di
sê e tracotanti, influenzava col suo esempio pernicioso uno
dopo l'altro gran parte degli organi periferici, scoraggiava
coloro che avrebbero voluto applicare mezzi pi0 idonei alla
bisogna e opporsi ai fascisti in nome della legge e delle
istruzioni impartite dal governo. (pp. 204-5).
The repression of the Arditi del Popolo is a perfect example
of how ambiguous state directives continued down the ranks of
the police forces and gradually subverted the state
institutions from within.
The Facta government represented the pre-Fascist state at
its weakest.	 This is indeed illustrated by the prime
.1
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minister's insufficient defence of Cesare Mori when the
province of Bologna was occupied by fascists from the
Bolognese and surrounding provinces in protest against his
handling of the political violence. Facta clearly compromised
Mori's position by promising Mussolini's forces that an
inquiry into the prefect's conduct would be carried out.
This allowed him to avoid ending the occupation with emergency
measures. 108
 The July 1922 interior ministry report on
policing in Bologna clearly aimed to discredit Mori, who was
portrayed as having behaved excessively in the face of Fascist
violence, so justifying his removal from Bologna the following
August.	 Much space was used to argue that the prefect had
isolated himself from Bolognese high society because of his
undiplomatic attitude.
	 Much of the report was centred on the
corruption of the Vice-Questore and Mori's alleged failure to
punish him.	 Alongside this	 testimonies by local prominent
fascists accused the prefect of overzealousness. The
parliamentary deputy, Oviglio, for example, claimed that he
had arrested too many fascists, meddled in their trials and
even tolerated beatings inflicted upon them by the Vice-
Questore.
Contributions to the report by various police authorities
were equally critical of Mori. The local Carabinieri claimed
that they had lost their prestige after he had ordered them to
fire at Fascist demonstrators.
	
The prefectoral authorities
had over-interfered in their operations. 	 The corps was also
bitter that he had ordered agenti investigativi to carry out
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enquiries	 into	 allegations
	 that	 they	 had	 maltreated
socialists. Many police funzionari claimed that Mori was so
fanatically opposed to the Fascists that he tended to order
their arrest even if they had a firm alibi, which was
naturally of embarrassment to local magistrates. Police
commanders even resorted to the arrest of fascists and their
prompt freeing for lack of evidence in the hope of satisfying
the prefect that his forces were sufficiently repressing
political
	 violence.	 Policemen were transferred on the
slightest
	 suspicion	 of	 connivance	 with	 the	 Fascist
movement. 109
 Though it is difficult to tell whether the
police testimonies used in the report represented the feelings
of the majority of policemen, the impression gained is that
for some Mori posed a serious threat since he did not give
them any leeway to cover up for connivance which in many cases
may have been forced upon them by the moral pressure fromn1(
Fascism.
This attitude was of obvious embarrassment to the Facta
government which, according to Veneruso, limited its policies
to declarations of firm stands which were never actually taken
in the face of Fascist occupations of several towns during the
summer of 1922. This was because the prime minister, like his
predecessors, was conditioned by the pro-Fascist feelings of
what remained of the traditional liberal ruling classes.
Unlike Mori, the majority of police officials - and here the
historian quotes a ministerial police report on the province
of Cremona - were, by the summer of 1922, hesitant about how
i
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to deal with Fascist violence which they now fully realised
was a serious subversive threat. It was the attitude of the
government which, instead of taking decisive action, granted
political favours to Farinacci's movement which forced them to
adopt a 'teoria del non intervento' .110 In this sense Mori's
measures were not consistent with the general trend of the
government.
Lyttelton indeed notes that the freedom of Fascist action
was facilitated by the weaknesses and ambiguities within the
Italian state structure. Prefects and police funzionari 
'dovettero agire secondo la discrezione politica pit) che in
base	 a	 precedenti	 amministrativi'.	 He	 adds	 that	 from
unification onwards the Italian state authorities:
avevano adottato sia forme di connivenza con la criminalita
sia forme arbitrarie di intervento repressivo. E ancor peggio,
entrambi queste reazioni di disordine furono deliberatamente
sfruttate	 contro	 gli	 oppositori	 politiche.	 La	 violenza
politica fu in qualche misura accettata dalla opinione
pubblica, nonche in molti casi dai custodi della legge e
dell'ordine ('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., pp. 37-8).
If Lyttelton correctly points out the traditional
discrepancies in the Italian state authorities as a serious
factor upon which police connivance with Fascism depended,
Veneruso just as accurately notes that 'i funzionari mai
avrebbero osato disattendere alle istruzioni governative se
;}
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queste fossero state chiare e precise'. (pp. 321-2).
The manner in which the Bolognese prefectoral authorities
and police forces reacted to the mobilization of Fascist
forces for the March on Rome during the last days of October
1922, long after the departure of Mori, in fact demonstrates
that even if the province had formally ceded its powers to
Fascism over the summer months the loyalty of the police
forces to the state could generally be relied upon if
decisive, unambiguous government orders were given.
	 Before
Facta formally ceded his powers to Mussolini,
	 Bologna's
police forces followed the prime minister's orders to
maintain public order and the security of persons and property
at all costs with considerable assiduity. The prefectoral and
military authorities collaborated, occupying the prefecture,
telephone exchange, post and telegraphic offices and state
bank on 27 October.
	 The local Regie Guardie commander
reported that his forces defended the telephone exchange from
a Fascist attack on 30 October. On the previous day military
forces injured two fascists while fighting off an attempt to
occupy the city aerodrome and Carabinieri were involved in an
armed conflict, defending their San Ruffillo headquarters.
	 A
fascist was killed before the Carabinieri were forced to
abandon the building.
	 In another conflict in the centre of
Bologna a Regia Guardia was killed.
	 If the sub-prefect of
Imola allowed fascists to occupy the municipal and PS
headquarters, the occupation was formal only.
	 A few fascists
were given permission to stand at the entrance of the
i
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building.	 The main offices continued to function without
interference.
In rural areas of the province police nuclei tended to give
in more easily to Fascist forces. It seems, however, that in
the majority of cases they were disarmed by large numbers of
armed men.	 In San Giorgio di Piano, for example, 1500
fascists occupied the Carabinieri headquarters after a short
exchange of fire.	 On the road between Molinella and Bologna
fascists took possession of two Regie Guardie transportation
vans and the arms it carried, without resistance. 111 In such
cases it remains to be seen to what extent the police forces
were seriously overpowered by the fascists. They may have
preferred to save their skins by surrendering without putting
up a fight. The overall impression created, however, is that
the government was successful in generally mobilizing its
forces and defending the province from a true Fascist take-
over. This suggests that police connivance with Fascism on
previous occasions was to a great extent dependent on the
failure of the pre-Fascist governments to show sufficient
determination in repressing the illegal activities of the
movement.
The above documentation demonstrates that the complicity of
the police with Fascism cannot be entirely attributed to its
identification	 with	 the	 anti-Socialist	 feelings	 of the
movement.
	
The rise of Fascism indeed took place in the two
year period following the occupation of the factories in which
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the threat of revolution proved itself to be limited. In
Bologna itself Zanardi's socialist city council was ousted in
November 1920, before the provincial movement had reached its
heyday.	 From this	 one may	 conclude that	 individual
policemens' anti-Socialist feelings may have been played upon
by Fascism.	 Indeed the force of the movement lay in its
capacity to exploit a threat which in reality no longer
existed. To conclude, however, that the whole police
structure accepted Fascism as a genuine solution to the threat
of revolution would on the other hand be far-fetched.
Nevertheless, one should not undenoowz, the moral force of
the movement which almost certainly encouraged many policemen
to turn a blind-eye to their illegal activities. This is
appreciable if one is to consider that pre-Fascist governments
themselves did not move whole-heartedly against Fascism.
Policemen were obviously fearful of not receiving support from
their superiors over their curbing of political violence.
They were certainly conditioned by a past in which it was
usual for the state to resort to arbitrary methods in
defending	 itself	 against	 political	 enemies,	 particularly
Marxism.	 Nitti's employment of civilian squads to oppose
revolution during the H Biennio Rosso" is a clear example of
this. Indeed, it is during the post-March on Rome years
(1923-5) that the cooperation of the MVSN and the traditional
police forces may be considered a culmination of such forms of
semi-legal	 civilian policing,	 as	 discussed in the final
chapter.
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Finally, the traditional deficiencies of the Italian police
forces are a factor of some significance here. 	 Initially
collaboration with the Fascists may have been attributable to
a sense of weakness in the face of revolution and a genuine
solution to police absenteeism in the countryside.	 When it
came to repressing the Fascist movement, however, many may
have preferred not to provoke a patriotic force which was
almost certainly superior in strength to police nuclei in
local situations.
	
Indeed, on several occasions weakness may
have served as an ideal alibi for failure to prevent Fascist
violence.
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pubblica, ciO dal punto di vista rivoluzionario, era
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4
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72. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to interior minister, 12
June 1921.
73. ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., prefect to Questore,
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prefect, 14 June 1921.
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undersecretary of the interior to prefect, 23 February
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76. For relationship between Mori and the prefect of Ferrara,
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(henceforth 1922 Bonifica), prefect to prefect of
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that it was physically impossible.	 See ASB., 1921 Dati,
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77. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit., prefect to police chief, 21
March 1921. ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico 
(A-B) (henceforth 1921 Comuni: A-B) Questore to prefect, 8
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80. ASB., 1921
	
Dati, cit., prefect to Carabinieri external
division coraiiiTe-r, 24 April 1921.
81. Ibid., prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri and
Regie Guardie commanders, 4 November 1921 (see Appendix 2,
Document 30); ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Dati della forza e 
ordine pubblico (henceforth 1922 Dati), prefect to
Questore, 8 January 1922.
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83. ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., prefect to Questore, sub-
prefects, Carabinleri division commanders, 14 March 1922,
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Similarly the imprisonment of the mayor of Ozzano Emilia
for illegal possession of a fire arm during a period in
which he and his colleagues faced daily intimidation from
the Fascists who wanted the Socialist village council to
resign, may be considered a form of connivance. See ASB.,
1921, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (Mol - Mor) 
(henceforth 1921 Comuni: Mol - Mor), Vice-Questore to
prefect,	 2	 March	 1921;	 ASB.,	 1922,	 Cat.	 4-5,
Amministrazioni comunali	 elezioni politiche (henceforth
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84. ASB.,	 1922 Personale, cit., prefect to Questore,
	 10
January 1922.	 See alsoASB., 1922 Dati, cit., prefect to
Carabinieri legion commander, 13 March 1922.
85. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, prefect to Questore, 5 July 1921.
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86. ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., Questore to prefect, 11
October 1921; ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico 
(A-B) (henceforth 1922 Comuni: A-B), see Budrio file for
Marchesini's illegal activities. The attitude of the
judiciary towards the Fascist movement deserves brief
attention here. According to Neppi Modona, the judiciary
tended, at least initially, to support Fascism as a means
of countering revolutionary violence which the postwar
liberal governments were incapable of controlling. This
more or less coincided with orders by the justice ministry
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article claimed, the mere participation of a peasant at a
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Vulterini retorted that the statutes were 'contrari al
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Modona's opinion, have been interpreted as an indirect
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLICE FORCES IN THE
PROVINCE OF BOLOGNA, 1923-25
The final chapter examines policing in Bologna during the
immediate post-March on Rome years. 	 It considers the
relationship between the Bolognese police forces and Fascist
movement during	 what was indeed a very difficult
	 period of
conflict for provincial Fascism as a whole.
	 The period
spanning Mussolini's rise to power and his establishment of a
dictatorship may in many ways	 be considered continuous from
the	 preceding	 period	 of	 Fascist	 ascendancy,
	 as	 the
documentation reveals.	 The necessary conditions for police
connivance with the fascist movement were as present as they
had been prior to the March on Rome.	 Squadrismo flourished
if not intensified, yet	 the prefectoral authorities were
still officially expected to repress this - as part of
Mussolini's overall attempt at placing provincial Fascism
under better control - as in the past.
	 Again, however,
directives ordering the suffocation of political opposition to
the Fascist government together with the government's general
hesitancy over how far it could attempt to oppose provincial
Fascist	 leaders	 made	 this	 virtually	 impossible	 in	 the
provincial	 context,	 as	 is	 illustrated below.	 On many
occasions the provincial police forces were caught up in the
struggle between state and provincial Fascism dominating the
period.
	
In this sense the March on Rome in no way rescued
them from the dilemmas and ambiguities of prece,ding years.
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Before examining the role of the police forces, however,
analysis of the effects of structural changes the Italian
police system underwent with Mussolini's rise to power, as
described in Chapter I, is essential to this study. What is
again significant here is that what may in many ways be
considered dramatic modifications nevertheless failed to solve
the traditional problems of physical weakness and dualism
inherent in the liberal police institutions which the Fascist
movement itself had on so many occasions scorned and exploited
during the years prior to the March on Rome.
The abolition of the Regie Guardie at the end of 1922, for
example, had serious repercussions at the provincial level.
Lorenzo Donati (pp. 481-4) notes that the apprehension and
sense of panic of the Guardie is evident in their attempts at
mutiny, the most serious of which happened in Turin and
Naples.
	 In the Piedmontese capital a fierce battle between
the Regie Guardie and Carabinieri, the army and Fascist
squads on the night of 30 December 1922 caused the deaths of
four Guardie and a fascist before the revolt was finally put
down.	 In Naples, Guardie set fire to the Fascist trade-union
headquarters.	 In some urban centres Mussolini ordered the
constitution of Fascist squads alongside the traditional
police forces. In Milan, for example, a 'Corpo Fascisti' of
500 men was formed while in Rome 25 'Pattuglioni special!'
each consisting of 2 Carabinieri and 8 fascists were employed
for the maintenance of public order.
	
In Bologna itself the
Questore informed the prefect, Aphel, that on 31 December
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approximately thirty armed Regie Guardie had unsuccessfully
tried to organize a revolt. He also reported rumours that
Regie Guardie intended to attack the local fascio and powder
magazines. He added, however, that he was relying on
'Ufficiali superiori della RRGG di provata fede' to repress
further protests.1
The effects of the abolition of the Regie Guardie and the
Agenti Investigativi on the numerical strength of the
Italian police is evident if one considers that in 1921 the
former numbered over 40,000
	 (the legions of Bologna and
Florence totalled 5,604) and the latter 8,000.
	 10,000 new
Carabinieri in no way made up
	 for these losses, therefore.2
In Bologna there were 1,470 Carabinieri and 1 )097 Guardie 
(reinforcements included in both cases) in March
	 1922.
	 In
January 1923 there were 1,316 Carabinieri only.
	 This total
had further decreased to 910 by January 1924. 3
	Though the
police chief, De Bono, admitted to prefects in April 1923
that police numbers had decreased by 40,000, he stated that
they would have to make do with this, adding that under Nitti
prefects had had too many policemen at their disposal and that
previous to the First World War 25,000 Carabinieri and 15,000
Guardie di CittA had been perfectly sufficient for policing.
This was obviously an unrealistic solution given the
significant population increase, especially in urban areas,
during the intervening period, as well as the tremendous
increase in violence in the post-war years.4
The Fascis1 government tried to account for the lack of
4
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forces by claiming that emphasis should be placed on a small
number of good quality policemen.
	
As De Bono assured
prefects in his circular of April 1923, the solution lay in
the capacity of each policeman to 'imporsi e farsi obbedire
dalla folla'. He also promised them that the government would
support policemen forced to adopt violent measures.
Directives released immediately following the March on Rome
besides abolishing what were considered futile police services
- the guarding of buildings, for example - encouraged a
general increase in	 the prestige of the police.	 Policemen
had to be honest and upright model citizens.
	 Police stations
were to be	 upgraded, though ironically the police chief
admitted that there was no funding for this!
	 Reductions in
police numbers were justified on the grounds that 'Il pubblico
che ha sempre fra	 i piedi gli agenti se ne fa l'abitudine e
soprattutto non impara a rispettarli'.	 Heavy police presence
meant extra work for policemen.
	 Bored and tired-looking
policemen were hardly an asset to the prestige of the force.
De Bono's circular of 21 November 1922
	
concluded, for
example,	 that	 'Non farsi vedere, s'intende, non deve
significare non guardare e non vedere: tutt'altro'.5
Despite	 the optimism of the	 Fascist government the
documentation confirms that under Mussolini prefects faced the
same policing difficulties as they had done throughout the
period studied.	 Police funzionari and Carabinieri were
constantly reported as being numerically inadequate	 for
dealing with political	 conflict	 in the province.	 The
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government was generally unsympathetic, however. 6 The
employment of the newly-founded MVSN alongside the traditional
police forces, which should have accounted for numerical
losses, was no serious solution given the generally
undisciplined and unreliable nature of the corps. Besides, as
illustrated below, the government discoed this on financial
grounds.	 The failure of the government to take prefects'
complaints seriously
	 may well have encouraged continued
police connivance, however.
The founding of a Fascist police force, the MVSN, marked,
among other things, Mussolini's desire to control and
discipline squadrismo, as was mentioned in the first chapter.
In January 1923	 De Bono informed prefects that the Camicie 
Nere - temporarily used for policing alongside the traditional
police forces in November and December 1922 - were in the
process of being absorbed into the Milizia. He clearly voiced
his intention to curb Fascist violence through this, warning
prefects that:
Coloro che oggi commettono violenze in nome fascismo non sono
da considerarsi fascisti ed 6 ora di addivenire disarmo di
tutti coloro che detengono ed usano illegalmente armi.
In view of this De Bono asked for the return of arms which the
Fascists had used for the October 1922 revolution and in
another circular to prefects he stated that in order to join
the MVSN fascists needed a 'certificato penale' or 'attestato
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buona condotta'	 which had to be signed by the 	 local
Carabinieri authorties.7
The archival documentation demonstrates, however, that the
founding of the corps was of little success in taming or
controlling squadrismo.
	
This is evident in the interior
minister's constant reminders to prefects about the importance
of ending Fascist violence. 	 Indeed in March 1923 De Bono
complained to the prefect of Bologna that the Carabinieri high
command had still not received back arms which the Fascists
had borrowed for the March on Rome. 8 Fascist	 membership in
the MVSN was almost certainly a sure means of justifying or
covering up continued violence.	 Distinction should be made,
however, between legal MVSN police operations and off duty
illegal activities.	 There is certainly evidence of legal
collaboration between Bologna's Questura and the local MVSN in
the prevention of Socialist/Communist activities on occasions
- as indeed was stipulated by decree law 832 of 8 March 1923 -
from the spring of 1923 onwards.
	
The Questore in fact
informed his forces that:
All'uopo gli ufficiali e i sottufficiali dell'Arma potranno
valersi anche di militi nazionali, prendendo accordi coi
comandanti delle rispettive zone, ai quail perverranno subito
istruzioni in proposito dal Comando del Gruppo Legione di
Bologna (...)
I
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He emphasized, however, that such operations should always be
directed by t un funzionario di PS o di un ufficiale o
sottufficiale dei RRCC% demonstrating the subordinate position
of the Milizia to the traditional police forces.9
In reality,	 however, the MVSN tended mostly to act
independently of the traditional 	 police authorities and
illegally therefore.	 For one thing, as army leaders informed
the prefect in July 1924, lack of funding prevented everyday
use of the corps for normal policing. 	 It was also the desire
of Mussolini, as is evident in De Bono's circulars, that the
MVSN remain solely a political force. What is more, constant
use of the MVSN alongside the traditional police might create
the impression that the abolition of the Regie Guardie had
weakened the police authorities."	 The autonomy of the
corps was an obvious incentive to indiscipline and often
brought it	 into direct conflict with the traditional police
forces, creating yet another form of dualism and rivalry in
the Italian police system. 	 This is particularly evident if
one considers that on occasions the Questura found itself
having to repress offenders belonging to the MVSN. In October
1923, for example, two Carabinieri tried to break up a brawl
between fascists. One of the main offenders turned out to be
a senior MVSN officer who reported the Carabinieri to the
Questura for abuse of power.	 That a police funzionario 
initially punished the Carabinieri concerned suggests that
policemen could easily be	 intimidated by members of the
Fascist police corps.11
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The above-mentioned incident is a clear example of how the
MVSN	 allowed	 the	 Fascists	 to	 continue	 their	 illegal
activities.	 The fascist involved used his membership of the
MVSN in order to maintain his	 immunity from the law.
Salvemini	 indeed	 states that the MVSN	 allowed	 for	 a
combination of both legal and extra-legal methods in the
repression of political opposition. Militi carried out house-
searches and arrests while fascists administered beatings. If
those assaulted managed to defend themselves the Fascists, as
members of the MVSN, could always arrest them. 	 Fascists as
uniformed multi carried out legal duties, yet off duty and
out of their uniform they turned to violent activities.
Similarly the MVSN allowed the squads to use violence against
the Communists during the general election campaign of 1924.
The Communist daily L'UnitA of 26 March 1924 claimed that
though officially employed to ensure that the election
proceeded in a legal fashion the corps resorted to violence to
ensure a Fascist victory without the risk of punishment.12
Near lack of distinction between MVSN and squad activities
obviously limited the capabilities of the traditional police
forces to curb squad violence. 	 De Bono indeed complained to
prefects in May 1924 about their failure to distinguish
between fascists and militi when reporting incidents. 13	The
police chief's orders that militi should never be permitted to
wear uniform when off duty may well reflect his full
realization of the true implications of MVSN activities and
his opinion that if such illegal activities could not be
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controlled they should at least not be identified with the
MVSN. 14	MVSN offenders usually managed to avoid serious
punishment, even if caught red-handed. De Bono clearly
ordered disciplinary action and there is indeed evidence of
Bologna's prefect suggesting the expulsion of uncontrollable
militi from their corps. This in fact happened to Alberto
Marchetti of Vado who had on two occasions been reported to
the local judicial authorities for acts of intimidation using
fire-arms 15
Action taken against the MVSN Consul, Marchesini, who
organized a squad to rescue Fascist prisoners being escorted
between jails, demonstrates, however, that senior officers
mostly went unpunished. Both the MVSN and prefect reported
their failure to track him down after De Bono ordered his
arrest.	 The prefect in particular expressed his fear of
violent repercussions	 should he be arrested, given his
popularity in the province. This suggests that the provincial
state representative	 was	 not	 totally	 impartial	 in	 his
handling of the situation. He was eventually placed under
arrest by his superiors. This was reduced to house-arrest for
reasons of family and health and because an MVSN enquiry had
'escluso ogni sua responsabilita di carattere giudiziario' .16
Though the ambiguous nature of the MVSN allowed squadrismo 
to flourish, as during the pre-March on Rome years police
support of Fascist illegal activities continued, if not
intensified, especially where it directly involved persecution
of state enemies (communists, etc.). 	 Indeed	 De Bono had to
I
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remind prefects in December 1923 that 'l'avere la tessera
fascista non deve ritenersi come un mezzo di impunitP. He
warned them that this would bring Fascism and eventually the
government into disrepute. 17
	In Bologna local police forces
clearly
	 remained	 indifferent	 to	 beatings	 received	 by
'subversives' or workers. They answered for their failure to
arrest violent fascists on the grounds that the victims had
only been lightly injured or did not wish to take action
against their assailants. If potential victims attempted to
defend themselves they risked incrimination. This happened to
a communist who tried unsuccessfully to pull a gun on his
attackers who subsequently dragged him to the nearest
Carabinieri station where he was prosecuted for illegal
possession of a fire-arm. His claims of self-defence were not
taken seriously because he was 'subversive' and therefore 'non
degno di fede' .18
The prefectoral authorities clearly did their best to
conceal the sad reality of continued Fascist violence from the
government. The prefect tended to wave aside reports of
violence received by the interior ministry as 'subversive
fabrications'.
	 This was probably due less to political
fanaticism and more to the rather delicate position in which
he stood.	 On the one hand he may have feared punishment
(transfer/retirement) for his failure to curb violence.
	
On
the other the pressure of provincial Fascism probably did not
allow him to repress the violence wholeheartedly.
	 After all
he could not afford to be identified as an anti-Fascist under
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a Fascist government.	 His attitude was more likely to have
been, at the most, opportunistic, therefore.
	
On occasions,
well aware that Fascist violence was embarrassing for the
government, he may have preferred to use legal powers in an
arbitrary fashion to the advantage of the Fascists in the hope
that this would reduce the amount of violence.
	
This was
particularly evident in the prefect Aphel's support of the
Fascist syndicates in the summer of 1923 when he abolished
the Paglia-Calda pact by decree on the basis of article 3 of
the Provincial and Communal Act. This aimed to appease those
sharecroppers who had joined the Fascist syndicates and were
bitter at the fact that despite their patriotic discipline
they received a worse economic deal than Socialist workers.
Indeed, following abolition of the pact he ordered Molinella's
commissar to end the violence.
	 He also supported the sacking
in May 1924 of Bonifica Renana socialist workers in the hope
that their forced unemployment would coerce them into joining
the Fascist syndicates.19
If generally indifferent towards Fascist violence where
enemies of the state were concerned, where political factions
officially respected by the government	 were assaulted the
prefect tended to urge Fascist leaders to control the
violence.	 In August 1923, for example,	 Aphel informed the
provincial party secretary that attacks on the Giovent0
Cattolica Italiana were to stop since the organization was not
political.	 He tactfully informed local Catholic leaders,
however, that the attacks had obviously been a mistake
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'conoscendo i sentimenti di rispetto per la religione ai quali
si	 ispirano	 i	 principali	 dirigenti	 del	 grande	 partito
fascista' .20 On other occasions he even offered such
political groups protection from Fascist violence. Following
an article criticising the provincial ras, Baroncini, in Il
Corriere della Sera in September 1923, for example, 	 the
Questore	 ordered	 the	 police	 to	 guard	 the	 newspaper
headquarters from a possible Fascist attack.21
The ambiguities inherent in government directives are
understandable if one considers that the Mussolinian
government demanded total repression of opposition political
and syndical activities.	 This almost certainly accounted in
part for continued police tolerance of squadrismo.
Legislation in 1923 abolished Socialist May Day celebrations
and allowed the sacking of politically dangerous workers, as
mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 II.	 Socialist	 and	 Communist
institutions, though not officially outlawed, took on an
illegal	 character as they faced	 frequent police raids,
especially following the Matteotti crisis when the opposition
clearly attempted to regain ground. The prefectoral
authorities were particularly concerned to prevent the Camera
Confederale del Lavoro from persuading those who had defected
to the Fascist syndicates to return to the socialist trade
union.22
Though De Bono argued that Fascist violence would cease if
the police forces demonstrated themselves to be capable of
repressing subversion 23 it seems that, in reality, the police
1
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forces, possibily aware of their weaknesses, may have
benefited from the anti-Communist/Socialist activities of
squadrismo which, as a result of this, flourished despite the
police chief's orders to the contrary. On occasions, specific
ministerial orders contradicted De Bono's circulars.
Indeed in December 1923, following the publication in the
Communist newspaper, La Giustizia (4 December 1923), of
several thousand signatures of Molinellese workers in protest
at continued Fascist violence, Mussolini ordered the prefect
to confer with Emilian Fascist leaders over possible
repressive measures to counter an anti-Fascist resurgence.24
The Questore permitted Fascist reprisals against communist
leaders responsible for organizing the petition, which had
been an embarrassment for both the government and the local
ras Baroncini.25
Perhaps the most clamorous incident	 demonstrating the
support which the squads received from the prefectoral
authorities during this period involved two British
journalists, Aubrey and Lina Waterfield of the 'Manchester
Guardian' and 'Observer' who, in March 1923, paid a visit to
Molinella to investigate allegations of coercive methods
employed by the Fascist syndicates. Lina Waterfield informed
the Bolognese prefect, Aphel, on 24 March that during their
visit they were arrested by armed fascists - in her report to
the 'Observer' of 18 March she mentioned Carabinieri alongside
them - for interviewing a group of labourers. She complained
that the town police official detained them for hours without
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explanation, ignoring their protests. In concluding she asked
the prefect whether steps had been taken against the fascists
and whether her safety as a journalist was guaranteed. Aphel
asked the prefect of Florence to inform the Waterfields:
nel modo che riterra piD opportuno, che essa ed il marito,
nella circostanza di cui trattasi, ebbero, per loro
imprudenza, a circondarsi degli elementi sovversivi pit) in
vista di Molinella, ingenerando sospetti sui loro fini e
ponendosi cosi in una situazione falsa e difficile, tale da
poter determinare conseguenze gravissime, sia per l'ordine
pubblico, che a loro danno, che fu vera fortuna non avessero a
deplorarsi incidenti ben pit) incresciosi di quelli avvenuti ed
imputabili ad essi stessi, non conosciuti a Molinella. Ad
ogni mod°, solo in considerazione della loro qualita di
sudditi inglesi, e per un doveroso riguardo alla Nazione
arnica, si potê, malgrado l'accaduto, usare in loro confronto
un trattamento speciale di favore.
The following month the prefect, on hearing that the
Waterfields had published an article on the state of violence
in Molinella in the 'Manchester Guardian' (5 April 1923),
confided to a friend that 'Conosco gia la vicenda dei
corrispondenti del Manchester Guardian. Ed ho proposto che
siano espulsi dall'Italia. Sono indegni dell'ospitalita del
nostro paese' .26 
 
This incident is obvious proof of the desire
of the prefectoral authorities to conceal Fascist activities
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from the public eye and thereby protect the movement. 	 The
attitude of the prefect may well also be attributed to his
fear of possible reprimand from Rome for his failure to
enforce government directives ordering the repression of
squadrismo.
Even in cases of murder the police authorities were prepared
to protect fascists.
	
This is obvious in the case of Augusto
Regazzi, ras of Molinella, accused of murdering the Socialist
sharecropper Pietro Marani in August 1923. Even the government
intervened in his case demonstrating that it was prepared to
protect him if this would prevent violent repercussions in
Molinella.	 In September 1923 the undersecretary of the
interior, Finzi,	 ordered Aphel to make sure that Regazzi was
not excessively punished for the crime in order to maintain
political calm in the town. The prefect assured him that:
Mi	 sto	 interessando e continuerel interessarmi vivamente
affinche siano evitate eccessive sanzioni rigore nei confronti
fascista Regazzi Augusto et altri suoi compagni indiziati
responsabilitA fatti Molinella.
The following November Aphel wrote to the justice minister
advising against the arrest of Regazzi given the violent
reaction this might cause. 27	In July 1924 Aphel's successor,
Bocchini, warned the interior minister that on occasions
Regazzi had caused embarrassment by appearing in public while
officially 'latitante'.
	
Once he even took part in a
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provincial council meeting at which the justice minister,
Oviglio, was present. He suggested that he maintain a lower
profile.28
Regazzi's trial in March 1925 was farcical. The prefect,
Bocchini, almost certainly tried to influence the proceedings
by refusing to grant the prosecution counsel's request that
it be held outside Molinella. 	 He brushed aside the police
chief's fears that the verdict would be influenced by the
violence of Regazzi's local supporters. He later was in fact
forced to deny allegations in La Giustizia, Ii Mondo and
L'UnitA that during the trial fascists had assaulted the
prosecution witnesses. 29	Regazzi was inevitably acquitted
though his guilt was well proven. Indeed the public
prosecutor urged the jury to condemn him for murder and
denounced Molinella's police commissar for false evidence.30
The Regazzi affair clearly illustrates the strength of
provincial Fascism which even the government was unwilling to
oppose on occasions. Mussolini's use of amnesties for
Fascist offenders, in the hope of appeasing provincial forces,
almost certainly had the opposite effect of encouraging the
continuation of violence and was obviously counterproductive
to any attempts at bringing these forces under control. (See
Note 30). The government's failure to repress squadrismo 
whole-heartedly, despite official directives to that end, was
almost certainly yet another factor in the general failure of
the provincial police authorities to put an end to Fascist
violence.
	
Further investigation indeed reveals that the
i
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government aimed less at repressing violence but 	 more at
controlling and coordinating it.	 On occasions	 it clearly
used violence for its own political ends.
This is evident during the general election of 1924. Indeed
Bocchini suggested to Mussolini in January 1924 that Fascists
should be allowed to control voters' choices inside polling
stations. The following March he expressed his intention that
the Fascist Party play a serious part in instructing the
masses how to vote. As he informed Mussolini's undersecretary
'Si	 6	 ritenuto
	 (..)	 utile	 larga	 distribuzione	 schede
propaganda	 ed	 insegnamenti	 ed	 ammaestramenti	 fatti
personalmente'. 31
 The Communist press confirmed the dangerous
implications of such measures.	 L'UnitA	 reported violence
inside polling stations in front of Carabinieri, soldiers and
electoral officials who remained indifferent.
	
Opposition
voters were beaten up, their voting cards destroyed. 	 Many
were even imprisoned during the voting period. 	 The Questura 
was even accused of referring the names of those who had
placed their signatures on the opposition candidates' lists
to the fascio. The fascist syndicates ordered their members to
vote for government candidates (21,26 and 27 March, 6, 9 and
10 April, 1924).	 Mussolini limited his orders to prefects to
the	 avoidance	 of	 unneccessary	 violence.
	
However,
reiterations alongside this of the importance of a government
victory were
	 sufficient to create the impression that
political violence would be tolerated.32
The government was particularly anxious, on the other hand,
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to	 limit	 Fascist violence	 at times	 when	 international
conferences were taking place for fear that foreign visitors
might read about it in the papers, as during the Emigration
conference held in Rome in May 1924. 33	On another occasion
the interior minister, Federzoni, warned prefects that the
publication in the press of the names of government opponents
due	 for	 beatings	 would	 cause	 serious	 political
repercussions. 34	The above again suggests that the
government was	 more concerned to	 control and conceal
violence than repress it totally.	 In certain situations it
could be beneficial to the government. In others it was to be
carefully avoided.
In Bologna, conflict between state and provincial Fascism
was particularly	 dominated by the struggle for supremacy
between Fascist Syndicalism and employer-dominated Fascism, as
was	 outlined in Chapter II. 	 Examination of the role of the
police authorities in this provides further evidence of the
difficulties	 faced	 by	 the
	 prefectduring	 this	 period.
Aphel's support of the Syndicalists is particularly evident
during the clash in March 1923 between the employers and
syndicates
	 over	 the	 constitution	 of	 a farm machinery
cooperative to which the employers objected. The dispute was
violent as both sides resorted to squad warfare. The prefect
supported the Fascist ras, Baroncini, by closing the Mezzolara
fascio for having attacked the local syndical leader.35
Aphel clearly favoured the Syndicalists who at that particular
moment dominated provincial Fascism.
	
That the government
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considered	 the	 Syndicalists	 dissidents,	 however,	 is
demonstrated by the removal of Baroncini at the end of 1923.
The abrupt retirement, during the same period, of the prefect
was almost certainly because of his identification with such
dissidence.	 He had continued to support Baroncini even after
the Bolognese ras had fallen foul of the government. This is
demonstrated by several telegrams he wrote to Mussolini
advising him that Baroncini's continued office in Bologna
would be of benefit to the provincial Fascist Party. 36
Baroncini's successor, Arpinati, clearly aimed to bring
Bolognese Fascism into line with the PNF and this is
illustrated by his moves to eliminate Baroncini's Syndicalist
dissidence.	 Again,	 there	 is	 clear	 evidence	 here	 of
collaboration between the new leader and Aphel's successor,
Bocchini,	 though	 again	 this	 was	 almost	 certainly	 for
opportunistic motives.
	 Indeed the prefect recommended the
new Fascist leader as the right man for the task of cleaning
up provincial Fascism.	 In February 1924 Bocchini supported
Arpinati's use of violence to break up a meeting of dissident
Syndicalists.	 This is a possible example of the
government's justification of squads if used as a means of
controlling the	 provincial movement, though it seems that
Bocchini did his best to minimize allegations of violence on
the part of Arpinati.37
Naturally, however, the use of squad violence to crush
dissidence was no solution to the desired end to squadrismo as
a whole.	 Indeed, particularly following the Matteotti crisis,
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the prefect resorted to other remedies 	 to keep the
Syndicalists under control. He obviously realised that
unreasonable behaviour on the part of the employers allowed
the persistence of disputes, to the advantage of the
Syndicalists, and risked causing an exodus back to the
Socialist unions. In August 1924 he warned the undersecretary
of the interior, for example, that attempts by the brick
industry management to disrupt negotiations with the Fascist
syndicates 'produce viva agitazione specie in questo momento
in cui muratori	 cercherebbero tendere nuovamente verso
Confederazione Generale Lavoro'.
	
Though stressing the need
for as much moderation as possible on the part of the
syndicalists, this line was supported by the government until
the summer of 1925 when syndical power was removed from the
control of the provincial Fascists and centralized under the
Palazzo Vidoni pact of the following October.38
The success of Bocchini's career - he became police chief in
September 1926 -	 almost certainly lies in	 the generally
positive relationship between Arpinati's provincial Fascism
and the central government.
	 This enabled him, for the most
part, to support the government without risking conflict with
local Fascism and vice-versa. The government itself may well
have been prepared to turn a blind eye towards Arpinati's
squad activities if they were in line with government Fascism.
Aphel's position was more unfortunate in that during his
office in Bologna the province was dominated by dissident
Fascism.	 There are several possible motives behind his
1
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support of Baroncini, which obviously put him in conflict with
the government and affected his career.
	 He may simply have
felt	 extreme	 pressure	 from	 provincial
	 Fascism	 and
opportunistically have become a client of the ras.
	 This is
probable in view of the fact that he was a normal career
prefect.
	 He may have supported Baroncini for political
motives.	 His reinstatement by the Fascist government after
retirement in 1919 suggests that he may have been invited back
to work for his Fascist sympathies. It is unlikely, however,
that he was chosen for fanatical support of provincial Fascism
at a time when Mussolini was concerned to gain better control
over squadrismo.39
The disappearance of the Socialist parliamentary deputy,
Matteotti, and his presumed murder on the orders of the
Fascist regime in June 1924 clearly affected the attitude of
the	 government	 towards
	 both	 political	 opposition	 and
provincial Fascism.
	 The Mussolinian regime, which seriously
risked downfall, found itself in the dual position of having
to	 create the impression that the opposition parties were
respected, yet preventing them from politically defeating
Fascism.	 It was obviously hesitant as well about the extent
to which	 it could safely crush squadrismoithou3h
such a measure would
almost certainly save the Fascist regime. What is more,
Mussolini's initial mobilization of the MVSN in complete
contrast to interior ministry directives - as noted in Chapter
I, p. 65 - is a clear reflection of the divisions within the
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regime itself. Hence conflicting government directives to
prefects	 ordered discipline on the part of the provincial
fascists and yet counted on them to prevent an opposition
resurgence.	 Though the interior minister, Federzoni, banned
provocative	 demonstrations	 ;,..	 support	 of Mussolini	 and
ordered the provincial Fascist unions to take part in a 10
minute work stoppage organized by the Camera Confederale del
Lavoro on 27 June, the police chief, Moncada, had previously
ordered the syndicates to use their influence to prevent the
strike from being prolonged to one hour."
The Bolognese prefect, Bocchini, was solely concerned with
suffocating the political opposition, however. 	 Indeed, in a
report to the interior minister he claimed that both the
police and fasci reacted harshly to political anti-government
demonstrations, suggesting that squad violence, which he made
little effort	 to curb, was useful to him. 41	He may well
have interpreted ambiguous government directives as general
acquiescence of squad activities if directed against an
opposition resurgence.	 He may equally have feared conflict
with the provincial Fascist forces.
	 Further documentation
shows that he did his best to play down episodes of Fascist
violence, featured in the left-wing press, to the government,
suggesting that he was aware of the government's intentions of
clamping down on squad activities and yet was reluctant to
take firm steps in that direction. His denial of allegations
in Avanti!, L'UnitA and La Giustizia of 20 August 1924 that
fascists stamped on flowers, sent to Bologna railway station
3
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to be placed on Matteotti's coffin as it passed through the
city, was almost certainly motivated by the fact that he had
previously assured Federzoni that police forces on duty at the
railway station had prevented incidents. 42
	He claimed that
allegations of this type were merely a form of 'speculazione
politica' which risked causing a violent reaction among the
Fascists and MVSN.
	
In June 1924 he even prosecuted two
socialists, one of whom was a journalist for Avanti!, who
claimed to be victims of Fascist assaults, for 'simulazione
reato1.43
One cannot totally rule out the possibility here that
Bocchini was forced to rely on the squads to counter the
numerical weakness of the police.
	
Indeed he complained to
the police chief in June 1924 that he did not have sufficient
Carabinieri	 to	 cope with
	 a renewed	 onslaught by the
subversives following the disappearence of Matteotti.
	
His
continued use of the MVSN alongside the traditional police
forces, despite orders from the government in July 1924 to
restrict
	 this,	 was	 an	 obvious	 encouragement of	 squad
activities, given the near lack of distinction between them.44
The crisis of the summer of 1924 had serious repercussions
on the role of the MVSN since the corps was only too evidently
associated with the violence culminating in the murder of
Matteotti.
	 The circular which
	 Bologna's MVSN
	 zone
commander sent to local leaders on 2 July 1924 demonstrates
the government's awareness of the need to place this political
police force under greater control. 	 Militi were ordered to
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adopt a low profile, so avoiding further embarrassment for the
government.	 They were to employ legal policing methods
(arrests, etc.) instead of violence and provocation and show
greater respect towards the army and prefectoral authorities.
Commanders had to be clearer in their instructions to
subordinates so as to avoid misunderstandings and the most
violent elements in the corps were to be controlled with
greater efficiency, even if this necessitated their arrest.45
Though the institutional alterations to the MVSN brought
about by new legislation in August 1924 were minimal - as was
outlined in Chapter I, p. 66
	 - archival documentation shows
that members of the corps felt seriously threatened by
possible changes. The effects of the legislation are evident
in instructions sent by the zone commander to local prefects
requiring information on the social and moral qualities of
officers,	 which	 a	 special	 commission	 would	 take	 into
consideration when deciding whether or not they could remain
in the MVSN and retain their present rank." The archival
documentation, though rather limited here, suggests that
towards the end of 1924 the corps was on the point of revolt,
signalling its desired independence from the authority of the
state, its opposition to the threat of Fascist normalization
and its total degeneration into original forms of squad
violence.	 Indeed	 Avanti! (3 October 1924) reported militi
stealing arms - which were usually deposited in Carabinieri 
barracks - though this was denied by Bocchini. 47 The Emilian
MVSN consuls claimed that they had no control over their
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subordinates who remained loyal to their old squad leaders.
Officers and militi were generally depressed at the future
ahead of them and demanded specific guarantees concerning the
August legislation which obliged them to take up their former
usually much lower army rank. Their morale was further
reduced when the MVSN chief, Italo Balbo (ras of Ferrara), was
forced to resign following the revelation in La Giustizia (27
November 1924)	 that the judicial authorities were at his
disposa1. 48
 Subsequent documentation shows, however, that
the institutional changes brought to the MVSN were of little
serious effect on the discipline or controllability of the
corps.
It was indeed MVSN and squad pressure at the end of 1924
which prompted Mussolini to outlaw political opposition to the
government and endow the police with super powers for its
repression on and after 3 January 1925. Federzoni's circular
to prefects on that day ordered the dissolution of clubs and
associations posing a threat to state security, the arrest of
subversives suspected of criminal activities, the confiscation
of illegally possessed arms and the frequent searching of
property. The following day he stated that:
i particolarmente necessario che siano impedite e represse
energicamente manifestazioni sediziose in luoghi sedicenti
private e riunioni
	
individui notoriamente sospetti come
eccitatori tali manifestazioni.	 Procedono fermo responsabili
per accertamenti eventuali responsabilitA penali. Avverto che
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saranno	 tenute	 responsabili	 di	 ogni	 negligenza	 od
esitazione.49
In Bologna the Camera Confederale del Lavoro was immediately
closed.	 This was followed by the dissolution of the
Federazione Italiana Operai Edili (bric-kworkers' union) 	 in
March and the Federazione Ferrovieri Italiani (railway
workers' union) in April. The prefect also abolished internal
commissions - founded in November 1924 by Socialist municipal
gas workers on the basis of valid legislation - on the grounds
that they had been undemocratically founded and that their
presence angered the Fascist syndicates and was a public
security risk. 50	In April 1925 Bocchini claimed that he had
increased	 vigilance	 against	 'Maximalist'	 propaganda	 and
petitions.	 On the occasion of I May huge police provisions
aimed at preventing a provincial work stoppage.	 Federzoni
ordered	 the	 confiscation	 of	 newspapers	 or	 pamphlets
encouraging the proletariat not to turn up for work on that
day.	 Public meetings or rallies were to be suffocated
immediately.
	 Forty individuals were arrested on the eve of
May Day as a security measure.51
The MVSN also proved itself to be usefulto the prefect on
occasions in the repression of subversion during 1925. In
October, for example, its zone commander reported a Communist
revival after an MVSN informer actually infiltrated a secret
meeting. In Imola, the 68th legion commander claimed that as
a result of	 combined police and MVSN efforts subversive
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activities had subsided. 52	Left-wing deputies and papers
alleged, however, that police activities were exaggerated.
Federzoni	 was	 accused	 of allowing	 the	 persecution	 of
individuals guilty only of being workers. 	 L'UnitA frequently
reported the maltreatment of workers by the police who worked
in league with Fascist squads.
	
They arrested workers
following	 beatings by fascists.	 One particular article of
July 1925 claimed that a Communist brickworker, Reggiani, was
systematically arrested every ten or fifteen days, thrown into
prison and beaten.53
Ironically,	 the	 outlawing	 of	 political	 and	 syndical
organizations opposed to the government and the increase in
police powers
	
on 3 January 1925 specifically aimed, yet
again, to bring squadrismo under better 	 control.	 Police
operations were to substitute illegal	 squad activities.
Indeed on 4 January 1925 while Federzoni authorized prefects
to act beyond the limits of their legal powers when repressing
enemies of the state, the PNF secretary ordered the Fascists
to end their violence and return to work. Those refusing to
obey were to be severely punished. 54	When Bocchini reported
that on the night of 3 January 1925 fascists carried out acts
of devastation which his limited forces - he had only 100
Carabinieri at his disposal - were unable to prevent, the
interior minister demanded his assurance that the vandals had
been punished. The prefect replied that those responsible for
eighteen cases of vandalism had been notified to the public
prosecutor	 and	 that	 eighteen	 Carabinieri	 had	 received
i
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punishments for making insufficient efforts at controlling the
violence.55
It becomes very apparent, however, that during the course of
1925 squadrismo thrived, despite these measures. Indeed in
April	 the interior minister had to order prefects to remind
Fascist leaders once again that the repression of subversives
was to be left to the police. 55	What is more,	 MVSN
activities remained scarcely distinguishable from those of the
squads. In September 1925, for example, a milite was reported
to the judicial authorities for having injured a communist
during a quarrel. On several occasions the corps proved itself
to be counterproductive, rather than an asset, to policing.
Such a situation arose	 in June when the Questore reported
that	 during	 a	 coordinated	 police	 operation	 militi 
unnecessarily assaulted subversives under surveillance. 57	On
25 June Federzoni warned prefects that in certain areas squad
warfare between fascists and the MVSN took place. Indeed, the
following month, the MVSN section in Marzabotto was dissolved
because of its direct opposition to the local fascio.55
Once again, however, the government's attitude towards
squadrismo was ambiguous and this almost certainly accounted
for its continuation.
	
Though Fascist violence was ordered
to end, the interior minister for obvious propaganda purposes
desired not to publicize continued cases of political crimes
in the press.	 Indeed he criticised the prefect of Bologna in
July 1925 for failing to confiscate newspapers containing
'descrizioni particolareggiate raccapriccianti delitti sangue
1
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avvenuti ultime settiman0. 59 Prefects were expected to issue
their own versions of events. During the days of particularly
violent squad activities in Florence in July 1925 Bocchini
received information from the Florentine prefect about the
version of events he had given to the press. He was advised
to give the same version to the Bolognese press, which clearly
minimized the seriousness of the events concerned and never
used the word 'fascists' .60
Federzoni's censoring of news of squad violence as well as
his public condemnation of accusations from the left as
'speculazione	 politica'	 may	 have	 been	 interpreted	 by
provincial Fascist leaders, as well as prefects, as government
approval of such activities. 	 The co-existence of the PNF
alongside the government only enhanced the contradictory
nature of the Fascist regime. 	 If Federzoni desired, at least
formally, to repress squad violence and use the police in its
place, this contrasted starkly with the PNF leader Farinacci's
invocation of persecution of the 'carnefici del fascismo' over
and above usual PS procedures together with tolerance of
Fascist violence, as reported in L'UnitA on 11 April 1925.
This may obviously have been confusing to prefects.	 On
several occasions Farinacci came into direct conflict with
Federzoni over the question of the maintenance of the squads.
According to Lyttelton his position was relatively weakened by
Mussolini in October 1925 after he ordered Turin's squads to
remain intact, despite the interior minister's orders to the
contrary (La conquista, cit., pp. 458-9).
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The prefectoral authorities clearly continued to tolerate
the activities of the squads on many occasions.
	
Indeed,
L'UnitA's above-mentioned reports of systematic police-Fascist
operations against workers, which seem very characteristic of
punitive expeditions, suggest that the new police powers from
3 January 1925 may have increased connivance. Higher up the
ranks toleration of squadrismo was almost certainly partly a
reflection of the ambiguous attitude of the government.
Indeed, when the police did put up resistance to an attempt by
fascists, led by Arpinati, to raid the headquarters of Il
Resto del Carlino and 11 fascists were injured in the ensuing
conflict, Bocchini obviously felt that he owed the interior
minister an explanation.	 He claimed that counter-orders not
to repress the action of the Fascists had not arrived in
time."	 This illustrates that the prefect was unsure as to
how exactly the government expected him to handle the
situation.	 He may well have feared not receiving the
necessary support from the government in the event of a show-
down with the provincial Fascists.
Events in August 1925 	 indeed show that his	 fears	 were
justified.
	
The Bolognese ras came into conflict with Dino
Grandi's forces which were more closely allied to the central
government.
	
Bocchini obviously felt it imperative to limit
the action of the Arpinatians for their direct opposition to
state Fascism, so demonstrating that	 his primary commitment
was to the government. 	 He in fact banned the publication in
the press of a manifesto protesting at the failure of the PNF
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to respond to the needs of Bolognese Fascism. The hostility of
Arpinati towards the prefect during this period is illustrated
by his public condemnation of the latter for his 'male art!
C..) disgregazione fascisti' and the attempted invasion of the
prefecture which he organized on 24 August."	 If Bocchini
remained firm in the face of the violence until the conflict
was solved by the intervention of Farinacci, the sub-prefect
of Vergato may have been more easily intimidated. 	 Grandi's
supporters in Porretta accused the official of permitting a
punitive expedition against them by Arpinatians, though both
he	 and the	 prefect denied such allegations. 63
	The
declaration by the national party leader, Farinacci, of
Arpinati's supremacy in the province of Bologna may, however,
be considered a victory for provincial Fascism. 	 Indeed,
according to L'Unita:
il potere assoluto delle alte gerarchie 6 un poderoso bluff
che puö essere infranto in qualunque momento da qualsiasi moto
squadrista della provincia.
	
In sostanza la soluzione della
crisi bolognese dimostra che i ras valgono ancora molto di
fronte al Governo e ai van i Farinacci che si illudevano di
tenere il Partito stretto in un pugno di ferro. (4 September
1925)
Though Bocchini seemed to come out of the conflict unscathed
the affair may have been a warning to him about the ease with
which the state was prepared to give in to the bossiness of
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provincial ras.
This case-study of the province of Bologna illustrates that
during the period 1923-5 the phenomenon of police connivance
with provincial squadrismo continued or indeed, increased,
presenting the prefectoral authorities with the same dilemmas
they had faced in the pre-March on Rome years. Such dilemmas
may above all be attributed to the position of the Mussolinian
government with regard to provincial Fascism which it wanted
to bring under control.
	 The contradictions in government
policies are excellently defined by Renzo De Felice. 	 The
historian claims that the government aimed to repress
'1'illegalismo fascista' without eliminating its principal
causes.	 Provincial Fascism was forced to resort to violence
in order to counter both opportunists within the PNF, which
for the first time opened its ranks to the masses, and
political opposition to the Fascist regime.	 It was almost
certainly encouraged by often
	
illegal measures	 by the
government to rid local administrations of non-Fascists. The
government could hardly expect the police authorities to
whole-heartedly repress provincial Fascism if both Mussolini
and the PNF preferred policies of compromise and divide and
rule, to	 repression.	 Indeed police officials	 were aware
that Mussolini and his colleagues:
Come uomini di governo erano per l'ordine pubblico a tutti i
costi; come fascisti non potevano non capire le motivazioni
psicologiche della	 loro base;	 come	 fascisti	 al	 governo
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dovevano imbrigliare il dissidentismo e por fine
all'illegalismo, ma non potevano mettersi contro il proprio
partito.
In this sense the Fascist government was forced only formally
to order respect for law and order." This would obviously
account for possible government tolerance of Arpinati's squad
activities in the Bolognese province, for example. His
opposition to dissidence and subversion was clearly of benefit
to state Fascism and on these grounds the government may have
been prepared to turn a blind eye towards 'illegalismi'.
Indeed, according to Cardoza (p. 431), 	 Mussolini ordered
Arpinati to	 restore party discipline to the province in the
autumn of 1925.
The prefect himself obviously tolerated, indeed 	 benefited
from, provincial squadrismo, given also Mussolini's failure
to solve the traditional phenomenon of a weak police system.
If he clearly tried to play down Arpinati's use of violence
this was almost certainly on account of official directives
ordering an end to squad activities. On very few occasions
did the government actually openly advocate the use of squads.
It was usually up to the prefect to interpret how far the
government was prepared to tolerate the activities of the
provincial Fascists. The ambiguous nature of government
policies naturally left him with a margin of freedom which he
could serve his own ends.
Only with the replacement of elective municipal councils by
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the single authority of podestA in 1926, the reaffirmation
of the supremacy of the prefect over party federali in January
1927, the increased power of the Fascist Grand Councils over
Fascist provincial organizations and, most importantly, the
abolition of elections inside the party structure, was the
power of provincial Fascism curbed, and 	 the party federaU
	
reduced, in the words of Farinacci himself, to 'un prefetto
del partito', a mere bureaucrat dependent on his superiors
(Lyttelton, La conquista, cit., p. 475),
	 Even though the
majority of squads were dissolved after October 1925, many
remained informally	 intact in so far as loyalties towards
former Fascist leaders continued to exist, allowing their
easy re-mobilization, however (Lyttelton, La conquista, cit.,
pp. 462-4).
One may conclude from the above that to a great extent the
Mussolinian regime, in its first years, continued the use of
political discretion over and above the impartial enforcement
of law and order.
	 This was of course very evident in the
manner in which the provincial authorities fought the April
1924 general election. This characteristic, which was
normally associated with pre-Fascist Italian politics, became
much more noticeable in the post-March on Rome years as the
Fascist government declared left-wing parties enemies of the
state long before firm moves were made towards putting Italy
on the road to dictatorship.
Similarly, the traditional identification, between the
police forces and 	 local or provincial ruling social elites,
i
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of a common political enemy 	 was obviously epitomized in the
rapidly developing, yet still unofficial 	 one-party state,
during the period 1923-5. If, during the pre-Fascist period,
Liberal governments officially ordered impartiality on the
part of the police authorities towards all political factions
as long as they remained within the limits of the law and
unofficially	 intervened	 in an arbitrary manner in political
disputes, the Fascist government's declaration of state
enemies simply on the basis of their political colour placed
communists, socialists, etc., at the total mercy of local
Fascist supremacy	 in the eyes of the police	 forces.
This,increased	 the	 tendencies	 of	 police	 partisanship,
particularly at the local level. 	 One may indeed accurately
conclude that squad violence was	 institutionalized by the
formation of a political police force, the MVSN, which, as has
been	 demonstrated above, acted as a facade for Fascist
illegalities.
	
The milizia may also be seen as the logical 	 *
concomitant of another phenomenon so common during the pre-
Fascist period, namely the use of civilians for police
activities.
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to police chief, 24 August 1925.
64. According to Renzo De Felice (Mussolini il fascista, Vol.
I, cit.), PP. 444-5: 'Una cosa era pretendere il
mantenimento e il rispetto formale dell'ordine pubblico,
un'altra cosa era pretenderlo senza eliminare alla radice
- e, anzi, moltiplicandole - le concause della situazione
generale
	 nella
	 quale
	 trovava	 alimento	 l'illegalismo
fascista. Come si poteva pretendere che i vecchi
squadristi potessero stare quieti quando per rafforzare il
fascismo e svuotare gli altri partiti, in primo luogo
quelli "alleati", si accoglievano nel partito centinaia di
migliaia di individui che sino al giorno prima nulla
avevano avuto a che fare con il fascism°, spesso lo
avevano avversato, e ora compivano (specie nell'Italia
meridionale) il passo di diventare fascisti solo per
mantenere o addirittura accrescere le loro posizioni di
potere? Come si poteva pretendere che i fascisti, vecchi
e nuovi, non ricorressero a qualsiasi mezzo per
soppiantare avversari e "alleati" quando era il governo
che per primo rUcorreva a tutta una serie di pressioni e
di espedienti spesso illegali per estromettere dagli enti
locali le amministrazioni non fasciste? E soprattutto,
come si poteva pretendere che le autorita periferiche
agissero con vera energia contro i gregari fascisti,
quando il PNF e lo stesso Mussolini non agivano con
energia verso i capi fascisti, dietro le spalle dei quali
Si annidava la dissidenza e quindi l'illegalismo, e
preferivano invece ricorrere al metodo del compromesso e
del divide et impera? In questa situazione 6 ovvio che le
autorita locali non andassero a fondo nella repressione
degli illegalismi e si limitassero pit) a cercare di
impedirli che a punirli. Tanto pit) che , in ultima
analisi, esse comprendevano che anche a questo proposito
l'atteggiamento di Mussolini e dei suoi collaboratori era
viziato all'origine da tutta una serie di contraddizioni.
Come uomini di governo erano per l'ordine pubblico a tutti
i costi; come fascisti non potevano non capire le
motivazioni psicologiche della loro base; come fascisti al
governo non dovevano imbrigliare il dissidentismo e por
fine all'illegalismo, ma non potevano mettersi contro il
proprio partito.	 Sicchê la conclusione politica non
poteva essere che una, quella del compromesso. Gli
sfoghi, le minacce di Mussolini erano sinceri ma urtavano
contro una realta che era ancora pit) forte di lui'.
:1
CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, foregone
conclusions on the relationship between Bologna's police
forces and the Fascist movement during the period 1920-26 are
to be avoided. My study of the involvement of the Italian
state institutions in the rise of Fascism reveals that police
collusion with the Fascist movement manifested itself in
numerous ways and may be attributed to a whole complex series
of factors.
	 The nature of the primary sources used for the
thesis is such, however, that usually one can at most
speculate on the possible motives for individual cases of
police behaviour.
What do emerge significantly from the archival research are
the fundamental links between the period of Fascist ascendancy
and the preceding two decades. Indeed, examination of the
pre-Fascist and post-March on Rome years is incomplete without
prior study of not only policing in the province of Bologna
during the period spanning the end of the nineteenth century
and the end of the First World War but also general Italian
police history from its origins. Such study demonstrates that
from an institutional point of view factors governing the rise
of Mussolini's movement were certainly deeply rooted in the
past and that in this sense Fascism
	 may be considered
'revelation' as opposed to 'revolution'. This is demonstrated
by	 several	 closely-related	 characteristics
	
of	 Italian
policing, and of	 state administration as a whole (which are
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common to both the 1920-25 period and the Liberal era),
playing a key role in the rise of Fascism.
The Italian police forces were from their very founding the
instrument of an absolutist regime which, though nominally
liberalized during the nineteenth century, continued to safe-
guard its power from the development of mass politics. On such
grounds it advocated the prevention rather than repression of
any form of democratic initiative, particularly Marxism, under
the guise of the maintenance of public order. Indeed, the
authoritarian nature of the Italian Liberal state and its
police forces is demonstrated by the fact that the post-1925
Fascist regime used pre-existing institutions and legislation,
which were only partly modified,
	 as its basis for a
dictatorship. Yet the vulnerability of the Liberal state is
also demonstrated by an undermanned and badly organized
police system which was hardly confident of its ability to
fend off the threat of mass movements, especially those which
were inspired by Marxism. Such weaknesses would account
for a number of rather unorthodox practices adopted in self-
defence by the Italian institutions and of prime importance to
this debate on the role of the state in the rise of Fascism.
Firstly, as pointed out by Lyttelton ('Cause e
caratteristiche', cit., pp. 37-38) and demonstrated in this
thesis the Italian state traditionally used arbitrary forms
of repression and	 connived with	 criminal elements in order
to stifle its political opponents. 	 Political violence was
widely accepted by public opinion and many guardians of law
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and order.	 This is evident, for example, in the employment
by the police of common criminals as informatori.
	
Police
acceptance of political violence and criminal activities, if
used against political enemies of the state, was
epitomized, of course, in squadrismo though here the state
under-estimated the subversive potential of the Fascist
movement.
In view of such forms of connivance and arbitrariness the
state, rather than issuing general directives concerning the
impartial enforcement of law and order to prefects expected
provincial authorities to act according to the political
discretion vested in them and the particular circumstances
pertaining to any given locality. This would account for the
manner in which Giolitti's policies towards syndical
development in Bologna, as well as the attitude of the police
authorities, varied according to the ever-changing political
climate.
	 Similarly, the role of the prefectoral forces in
election campaigns was dictated by this. As again pointed
out by Lyttelton, this was obviously dangerous since it gave
policemen a certain amount of leeway for abuse of power and
risked subverting the state institutions from within, as
indeed occurred during the period of Fascist ascendancy
('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., pp . 37-38).	 On the other
hand, loyal policemen may clearly have been disoriented by
such pratices. On occasions, even if they desired to uphold
the law they may have acted differently for fear that the
government or their superiors would not support them. This is
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obviously the case with the onslaught of the Fascist movement
in the summer of 1922.
Another phenomenon common to the period 1897-1925 was the
collaboration, at the local or provincial level, of the police
and judiciary with the ruling social elite whether for
political or opportunistic motives. Here the psychological,
moral and even physical pressure which such elites exerted on
the peripheral
	 state authorities	 should not be under-
estimated.	 In this particular case-study this phenomenon is
demonstrated by the relationship between the . agrarian
employers and policemen in a local context throughout the
period examined and, of course, by the partisan attitude of
the authorities towards the Fascist squads (which had the
support of traditional social elites) and their leaders. If
this partiality may have on occasions been desired by the
regime as part of its policy of favouring political discretion
over and above the law, on others it clearly ran counter to
government policies.
The employment of civilians for policing purposes was an
obvious consequence of the weaknesses inherent in the police
forces.
	 This was often legal,
	
as in the case of the
'Pattuglie Cittadine'	 employed in 1909 and 1910 and during
the First World War
	 or unofficial and illegal as in the case
of strike-breakers used by the agrarians during the Giolittian
•'4period and on occasions employed during general strikes both
before and after the First World War.
	
Such illegal forms of
civilian
	 policing are, of course, closely linked to the
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above-mentioned phenomenon of the use by the state of criminal
elements. Both forms of civilian policing tended to have
moral, patriotic and anti-Socialist implications and were even
more prevalent in the Fascist period, the former with the
founding of the MVSN and the latter with squadrismo.
The	 motives	 for	 the	 connivance	 of periphery	 state
institutions with the Fascist movement lie in the past,
therefore.	 Bologna's police forces easily accepted, whether
actively or passively, Arpinati's squads just as they had
accepted similarly organized violence over the previous
decades.
	 They had so often witnessed the citizens taking
the law into their own hands well before the emergence of the
Fascist movement.
	 In the eyes of many policemen, Fascism was
quite simply yet another civilian
	 moral and patriotic force
to be used by the state
	 as a counter-weight against the
immoral and unpatriotic aims of Socialism.
	 Its illegal and
violent	 implications	 were	 acceptable	 on	 such	 grounds.
Official government directives ordered the repression of the
movement only in terms of individual crimes committed and thus
political discretion often took precedence over this.
	
The Liberal pre-Fascist governments, however,	 under-
estimated the subversive potential of Fascism. Unlike similar
movements in the past, which were very small in scale and
easily controlled (Interventionism, for example), the Fascist
movement used violence in order not only to destroy its
political enemies but also to overthrow the state. 	 By the
time the reality of Fascism had become apparent state
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institutions had been subverted to the extent that they no
longer had the courage or will to prevent the Fascist
onslaught, as is demonstrated by the ease with which many
northern Italian cities fell to fascist occupations in the
summer of 1922.
	
In numerical terms, however, the police and
armed forces, had they been	 mobilized, would have had the
physical capacity to prevent this.	 Indeed, the invasion of
Bologna in May 1922 and the events of October 1922 demonstrate
that, to a certain extent, loyalties within the police forces
towards the state remained intact and they could be counted on
if clear instructions were given them. One may conclude from
this that the connivance of state institutions with the
Fascist movement, though undoubtedly motivated in many cases
by political sympathy, internal organization, opportunism and
the pressure of local elites, was also to a very great extent
a result of the sense of insecurity created by the ambiguities
inherent in the government's traditional means of maintaining
the political status quo. 	 In a situation where policemen did
not feel the pressure of clear government directives but
rather were expected to rely on their own initiatives
connivance with local ruling elites was inevitable.
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- APPENDIX 1
1. The province of Bologna and its communes.
2. Topographical divisions of the
province of Bologna.
Low Plains
West of
the Reno
High Plains of the Anzola
Low Plains
East of the Reno
Low Plains
of the
Idice & Sillaro
Bolognese Foothills
High Foothills
of the Pianoro
Imolese Plains
& Foothills
Intermediate
Mountains
of the Reno
High Mountains of the
Porretta
Intermediate Mountains
of the Setta & Savena
-373-
3. Agricultural zones of the
province of Bologna.
Rice (9%)
Hemp (22%)
Wheat (22%)
Sugar Beets (56%)
Hemp (39%)
Rice (41%)
Wheat (32%)
Wheat (28%)
Sugar Beets (42%)
Hemp (13%)
Rice (50%)
Hemp (26%)
Sugar Beets (2°Z)
Wheat (18%)
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KEY
=== under 20%
---
"/ between 20% and 30%
between 30% and 45%
= over 45%
4. Population distribution of sharecroppers in the
province of Bologna.
5. Acreage distribution for main crops on Bolognese plains.
KEY
ED up to 50 of 1000 residents
=-:= 50 to 100
:::	 100 to 150
= 150 to 200
///// over 200
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6. Distribution of braccianti in the province of Bologna.
7. Distribution of new small properties in the province of Bologna,
1919-26.
Areas of significant growth
(b) January to February
1921.
PROV. DI MODENA
PROV 01 FERRARA
441
PROV DI RAVENNA
PROV. DI PISTOIA
PROV DI FIRENZE
gr",,
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8. The spread of Bologna's Fasci.
(a) December 1920
PROV DI MODENA
'114$141141:?‘ *:7C.B 4 4 teh;it
411*
4V-i-
,w.
.4t, . • '.7.,- . ...
Atie;
4
	
	 ,
PPOV DI RAVENNA100,1„,
,
PROV. V FIRENZE
	
..‘..'.....'.IIif .....,
PROV. DI FERRARA
PROV. 01 P1STOIA
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(c) March to April
1921.
PRO' DI FERRARA
PROV 01 MODENA
PROV DI RAVENNA
1
PROV 01 FIRENZE
•••••••,
PROV. DI PISTOIA
(d) May to June
1921.
PROV DI MOOENA
PROV DI FERRARA
PROV DI RAVENNA
%...............
PROV. DI FIRENZE
PROV. 01 PISTOIA 1
i
Maps are taken from Antony Cardoza, cit., pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 22,
25, 318, 319, 322.
APPENDIX 2
1. Prefect to interior minister, 28.03.1898.
Stamane una pattuglia Carabinieri e soldati incontrando in
contrada Guarda, presso Molinella, agglomeramento circa 90
donne cercO persuaderle a sciogliersi ma, non essendovi
riuscita, le accompagnava quell'Ispettore di P.S. Ispettore
cola in missione credette bene rimetterle in liberta dopo
aver fatto loro comprendere opportunita desistere qualsiasi
manifestazione per non intralciare azione Autorita nel
evitare (di) comporre dissidi tra possidenti e lavoratori.
Pare che parole funazionario abbiano ottenuto, almeno per
oggi, desiderato effetto.
(ASB., 1898 Operai disoccupati, cit.)
2. Prefectoral Decree, 15.05.98.
Con Decreto Reale del 4 corrente ed in seguito ai disordini
avvenuti in alcune provincie del Regno 6 stato da oggi
affidata al comandante il VI Corpo d'Armata sig: Tenente
Gene;rale Comm. Giuseppe Mini la direzione superiore del
servizio di P.S. nelle Provincie di Bologna, Modena,
Ferrara, Ravenna e Forli.
Per cid	 RENDE NOTA
1. Che il prelodato signor Comandante vieta in modo
assoluto tutte le riunioni e gli assembramenti per
qualsiasi scopo;
2. Che 6 fermamente deciso a ristabilire ad ogni costa
l'impero	 della	 legge	 e che ha	 disposto
	 perche	 sia
energicamente	 repressa	 qualunque	 trasgressione
	 alla
medesima. Annunciando quanto sopra alla patriotica
popolazione di questa nobile Provincia, confido che essa
continui a serbarsi tranquilla e fidente nell'opera del
Governo che pone ogni cura nell'alleviare il disagio dei
bisognosi nel momenta attuale.
(ASB., 1898 Agitazioni tumultuose, cit.)
3. Prefectoral Decree, 01.05.98.
Ritenuto che ad Imola fa corpo un'Associazione intitolata
"Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnola" in cui sono
affiliati tutti i gruppi Socialisti-Anarchici della
regione;
Ritenuto che detto Sodalizio ha affermato la sua esistenza
con i seguenti atti: 1° col manifesto pubblicato nel
novembre 1896 - ed incriminato dall'Autorita Giudiziaria -
contro il progetto di legge sul domicilio coatto, 2° con la
circolare diramata ai partiti affine il 7 febbraio ultimo -
per promuovere proteste contra l'applicazione dell'art. 248
del Codice Penale agli Anarchici, 3 u
 col manifesto, in data
12 marzo p.p. indirizzata "Al Popolo Italiano" distribuito
ai diversi gruppi Socialisti-Anarchici: nel quale
manifesto, pubblicato come la circolare anzidetta, sul
giornale Anarchico "L'Agitazione" Si fa propaganda	 di
,I
-379-
teorie sovversive, e incitano gli affiliati al partito di
costituirsi in vere e proprie associazioni;
Ritenuto che della Federazione in parola fanno parte
individui noti per i loro principi anarchici, ed alla cui
istigazione si attribuiscono le manifestazioni tumultuose
avvenute negli ultimi giorni in diversi comuni del
Circondario di Imola onde parecchi di costoro vennero
arrestati e deferiti all'Autorita Giudiziaria;
Ritenuto che detto Sodalizio non ha altro scopo che di
sovvertire gli attuali ordini sociali e di manomettere la
proprieta dei cittadini, per cui costituisce un permanente
pericolo contro la tranquillita pubblica;
Visto ii rapporto del Sottoprefetto di Imola;
Visti gli art. 3 della Legge Comunale e Provinciale e 281
del Codice Penale;
RENDA:
La Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnola che ha sede
in Imola 6 sciolta per misure di ordine e di Sicurezza
Pubblica.
I contravventori a tali disposizioni saranno puniti a
norma di legge.
Ii Sottoprefetto di Imola 6 incaricato di fare eseguire
il presente Decreto.
(ASB., 1898 Partito Socialista, cit.)
4. Prime minister to prefect, 09.05.01.
Confidando fieramente opera sua la prego agire sopra
proprietari Molinella che rifiutano accordi dimostrando
loro quanto grave responsabilita si assumano. Raccomandi a
tutti massima prudenza se si riesce ora a conciliare anche
i patti per la mietitura se si saranno evitati gravi
pericoli e si sara compiuto un gran passo nella via della
pacificazione degli animi. La prego tenermi giornalmente
informato stato delle cose specialmente a Molinella.
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)
5. Leonida Bissolati to prime minister, 18.05.01.
Onorevole Giolitti
Oggi a Molinella hanno arrestato ancora due operai, fra cui
uno della Commissione operaia. Questi, come gli altri
arresti, si fanno dalle Autorita di Pubblica Sicurezza
appena un operaio e un'operaia si accosti a qualche
compagno per persuaderlo alla solidarieta nello sciopero.
Le autorita educate, in quel luogo, alla scuola
dell'arbitrio dal 97 a oggi, credono di compiere ii loro
dovere impedendo la propaganda dello sciopero anche se
fatta senza violenza e senza minaccia.
In una frazione di Molinella (Alberino) furono arrestate,
giorni sono, per offesa alla liberta del lavoro nove donne
che dalla strada pubblica invitavano 18 tra uomini e donne
di smettere il lavoro.
	 Come si poteva parlare di violenza
o di minaccia in questo caso? E noti, Onorevole Giolitti,
che io andai sul luogo, e dalla bocca degli stessi uomini
raccolsi le testimonianze che nessuna minaccia era stata
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fatta.
Domani probabilmente l'Onorevole Talamo le parlera su
questo argomento.
	
La neutralita del Governo dovrebbe
consistere nell'esercitare
	
il	 suo potere difensionale
dell'ordine soltanto quando si commette qualcosa contro la
legge. L'eccitamento pacifico allo sciopero non 6 . reato;
ma cosl non la intendono nê Prefetto, nê delegati, ne
carabinieri, i quali si sono evidentemenmte assunti il
compito di fare l'interesse dei padroni - come fecero
sempre.
Io non vorrei presentare interrogazioni ne interpellanze
in proposito nê fare attacchi sul bilancio interno - perche
comprendo che Ella non 6 responsabile di queste infrazioni
della legge commesse dagli agenti.
Ma io La prego di voler far sentire a Bologna che Ella
intende la neutralita in senso preciso e leale.
Se Ella 76-1- 7-Farlarmi sono a Sua disposizione domani
(domenica): la sera partirei di nuovo per Molinella.
Con rispettosi saluti
(ACS:PS., 1901, B. 2, cit.)
6. Police delegate (Budrio) to prefect, 23.05.01.
In questi momenti che avevo bisogno di tener alto il morale
6 venuto telegramma odierno di V.S. per gettare massimo
sconforto perche traspare che io non godo pi0 fiducia di
Lei che tanto mi onorava e reggeva. Sommessamente ml
permetto far notare che non credo esser venuto meno al mio
dovere nê di essere stato imprevidente e debole; cid che Si
verifica oggi lo avevo preveduto con rapporto del gennaio
scorso e da quel giorno non feci altro che telegrafare
sempre che avevo bisogno di rinforzi perche con cinque
Carabinieri non si poteva ottenere dietro ad un movimento
in questo comune esteso per altre cinquanta chilometri.
Convinto come lo sono che a Budrio a differenza di
Molinella e Medicina basta la sola presenza della forza per
tenere a freno dal Sindaco all'ultimo del Comune - Rinforzi
mi furono mandati a fatti compiuti quando ve ne era sempre
bisogno reclamati da me.
	 Non mi sono lasciato sorprendere
dallo sciopero che fu precipitato dagli eventi gia
segnalati con telegramma diretto a V.S. del 14 corrente col
quale previdi sciopero generale - Anche ieri chiesi un
funzionario per coadiuvarmi ed anche la ripregö di volerlo
mandare possibilmente questa sera con agenti di P.S.
Sono tre giorni che io non prendo riposo - venendo
funzionario pregola accordarmi udienza personale ore
pomeridiane domani.
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)
7. Prime minister to prefect, 24.04.01.
Ricevuto suo telegramma ho piena fiducia nella opera sua.
Assembramenti e passeggiate possono sempre vietarsi.
Quanto alle riunioni lascio al suo illuminato giudizio di
decidere quando possono lasciarsi tenere, quando per
impellenti necessita ordine pubblico sia indispensabile di
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impedire. Procuri di persuadere i capi delle leghe e
uomini politici che-possono avere influenze sulle medesime
della necessitA di non creare imbarazzi per il governo
mentre questa Si propone di rispettare le pubbliche libertA
e di restare nei limiti della legalitA pi 0 perfetta
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)
8. Prime minister to prefect, 20.05.01
Vedo passare telegrammi da Molinella che accusano
brigadiere del Carabinieri di arresto di donne le quali non
facevano n6 violenze n6 minaccie. La prego di mandare sul
posto a verificare come vanno le cose perch6 non vorrei che
eccesso qualche agente provocasse disordini finora evitati.
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)
9. Questore to prefect, 09.11.09
Organico questa Compagnia Guardie CittA, che nel 1906 fu
fissato a 310, venne, per desiderio locale Sindaco,
ridotto a 272 fino a quando cessasse obbligo comune
contribuire paghe, caserme e casermaggio.
Prego pertanto V.S. Ill.ma invocare dal Ministero
completamento organico per arrivare, almeno in parte, alla
continua insufficienza degli agenti pei servizi ordinari,
data specialmente continuitA ed opportunitA con cui
Ministero dispone rinforzi da questo ad altri luoghi e pei
quali, da oltre un mese, qui non si hanno che 100 agenti,
compresi i piantoni, gli infermi e quelli in attesa di
collocamento a riposo, cosi che, anche a fare un massimo
sforzo, non si pub disporre che di sessanta agenti.
(ASB., 1909 Pratica Generale, cit.)
10. Questore to prefect, 11.04.15
Alle ore 15 ha avuto principio il comizio provato del
Fascio Interventista - sono intervenuti circa 500 persone
tra repubblicani, anarchici, interventisti e radicali. Ha
parlato l'Avvocato Perona Luigi di Milano di parte
radicale. La riunione 6 terminata alle ore 16 circa.
Gli intervenuti uscendo hanno intonato la nota canzone
di Oberdan e altri Inni patriottici mentre un gruppo di
neutralisti di circa 400 persone cantava l'Inno dei
lavoratori.
	
Ne sono sorti dei pugilati nei quail 6
prontamente intervenuta la pubblica forza. 	 In tale
occasione furono eseguiti parecchi arresti per
disobbedienza all'ordine di scioglimento giA intimato nei
modi di legge.
In altri punti della piazza Vittorio Emanuele 	 Si
procedette allo scioglimento di numerosi gruppi che
manifestavano tuttora per ciascun parte in contesa. 	 Alle
ore 17 incirca parte della folla stazionava sulla Piazza
Vittorio Emanuele. Da qualche gruppo specialmente di
interventisti partiva ancora qualche grido e Si 6 percib
dovuto procedere a qualche altro arresto.
(ASB., 1915 Guerra, cit.)
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11. Prefect to prime minister, 24.05.15.
La notizia della dichiarazione di guerra consegnata dal
governo d'Italia al Rappresentante dell'Impero Austro-
Ungarico a Roma produsse in cittA grande entusiasmo.
Alle ore 22 circa, oltre tremila persone, tra le quali
molti autorevoli cittadini, colle bandiere di Trento, del
Belgio e tricolori improvvisarono un corteo che percorse
Via Indipendenza al canto di inni patriottici.
Verso le ore 11 circa innanzi al Palazzo d'Accursio
richiesta la esposizione della bandiera nazionale a questa
Prefettura, subito accordata fra grandi applausi, e quella
del Comune. Non essendo la bandiera del Comune, in cui a
quell'ora non trovavasi n6 il Sindaco, n6 alcuno della
Giunta, stata esposta, un fortissimo gruppo di
dimostranti, rompendo il portone del Palazzo, irruppe nel
cortile e salito nel salone d'Ercole espose ad una delle
finestre una bandiera tricolore tra gli applausi deliranti
della folla. Nel trambusto furono involontariamente rotti
alcuni vetri della sala del Bramante.
Dopo di citi i dimostranti Si recarono al Palazzo di Re
Enzo per far suonare il campanone del PodestA, e poscia
alle chiese di S. Pietro e di S. Bartolomeo, per far
suonare le campane delle chiese stesse, ma avendo trovato
tali localitA difese da Carabinieri e Guardie anche per
amorevoli esortazioni di Funzionari di servizi
abbandonarono tale pensiero.
(ASB., 1915 Guerra, cit.)
12. Prefect to sub-prefect of Imola, 08.08.17.
Trasmetto l'unito esposto V.S.
	 Chiamare il Diotalloni,
eccitando le ragioni della divergenza e facendogli
comprendere la opportunitA di un contegno conciliante che
risponda alla( quesitA) del momento in cui tutti debbono
sentire il dovere di non inasprire piccole questioni che
non fanno che disperdere energie e danneggiare i supremi
interessi della economia nazionale,
Qualora egli, come perà, credesse di impressionare
minacciando l'abbandono delle coltivazioni, Ella vorrA
avvertirlo che un siffatto contegno anti-patriottico non
sortirebbe alcun effetto, perch6 a parte ogni eventuale
responsabilitA in cui incomba si provvederebbe alla
lavorazione coercitiva del prodotti!
(ASB., 1917 Agitazioni agrari, cit.)
13. Minister of war to military factory directors, 04.10.15.
Con Decreto Luogotenenziale in data 26 corrente 6 stata
ordinata la militarizzazione di tutto il personale operaia
degli Stabilimenti Militari.
Per effetti del detto decreto, gli operai effettivi e
straordinari delle Direzioni degli Stabilimenti Militari
saranno assoggettati alla giurisdizione militare, e
quindi, mentre continueranno ad essere sottoposti altresl
alle sanzioni del codice penale militare, nel caso che le
loro mancanze assumessero figura di reato a termine del
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codice stesso.
Specialmente 6 da tener presente che, per effetto della
militarizzazione, gli operai che abbandonassero il proprio
servizio saranno dichiarati disertori.
(ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit.)
14. Prefect to interior minister, 07.12.16
Ritengo opportuno, in relazione alla precedente
corrispondenza di rilevare la crescente attivita dei
partiti sovversivi i quali con ogni mezzo cercano di
sobillare la popolazione per diffondere e accentuare il
malcontento e trarne profitto ai loro fini.
Mezzo esterno pit) sono le manifestazioni di donne per
chiedere sussidi ai municipi o ai Comitati di azione
civile, manifestazioni che raccolgono talvolta, come ad
Imola, centinaia di persone e possono improvvisamente
degenerare in dimostrazioni pit) gravi che turbano lo
spirito pubblico.
Seguo con ogni attenzione tale movimento e ho dato
disposizioni perch6 le autorita prevengono col loro
sincero interessamento i giusti desideri delle classi
colpite dalla guerra, ma siano severe nell'impedire atti
di intimidazione o violenza che costituirebbero pernicioso
esempio.
Debbo fare presente come nel momenta attuale
inconvenienti non lievi siano le scarse forze delle
stazioni del RR.CC . continuamente assottigliati e gravati
per servizi militari e che per ciel assai poco attivita
possono dare ai servizi di polizia che pure hanno oggi pit)
che mai importanza essenziale.
(ASB., 1916 Partiti, cit.)
15. Prefect to interior minister, 21.09.16.
La ostilita degli esercenti contro l'ente autonomo dei
consumi e spiegabile con la efficacia di calmiere
indiretto che gli spacci comunali esercitano.
Tale opera deve essere incoraggiata data la pretesa
assurda del negozianti che hanno spinto il rincaro in
questa citta a cifre pit) alte che in ogni altro luogo
mentre del resto la costituzione degli enti autonomi 6
consigliato dallo stesso Ministero di Agricoltura che Si
occupa del loro funzionamento.
(ASB.,	 1916,	 Cat
	 4-5,	 Amministrazioni
	 comunali, 
congregazioni di carita, etc., cit.)
16. Interior minister to prefect, 16.04.19.
Si 6. preso atto di quanto V.S. ha riferito con la
controindicata nota e col successivo telegramma espresso
11 corrente avvertendo che si 6 subito interessato
nuovamente il Ministero della Guerra perch6 provveda
possibilmente a liberare i CC.RR dai servizi di indole
militare attualmente loro affidate in modo che essi
possano tornare a quelli di istituto.
Quanto	 al	 completamento	 dell'organico	 di	 codesta
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Divisione delle Guardie di Citta ii Ministero 6 spiacente
di non potervi, per ora, provvedere, perchê mancano al
corpo attualmente 3000 agenti, Si che per poter rimediare
a tale deficienza Si 6 dovuto ricorrere alla misura di
ridurre congruamente e temporaneamente l'organico di
ciascuna divisione. E codesta di Bologna 6 una delle meno
ridotte.
Con i nuovi arruolamenti si ha speranza, pert', di potere
presto riportare gli organici in piena efficienza di
forza.
(ASB., 1919, Cat.6-7, cit.)
17. Circular, February 1919. A tutti i colleghi di PS e
Carcerari del Regno.
EGREGI COLLEGHI
Gli Agenti di PS e di Custodia delle Capitali, uniti ed
affratellati da unicita di diritti e da comunanza di
scopi, hanno eletta una Commissione mista per una grande
agitazione, unica, concorde e risoluta che dovra essere
spiegata in tutta Italia.
Detta Commissione, mentre traccia le linee generali
dell'agitazione e Si riserva di comunicare con una
prossima circolare ii programma d'attuare, sente ii dovere
di fare appello ai colleghi di ambedue i corpi, perche
tutti diano la loro adesione e collaborazione pronta,
assoluta, incondizionata.
Colleghi! non c'illudiamo troppo su propositi di chi ci
governa! Se non propugneremo i nostri diritti, come fanno
le nostre classi, saremo sempre del dimenticati. Quail
miglioramenti, infatti, abbiamo noi avuto colla nostra
remissivita durante lo spaventoso cataclisma che si sta
attraversando? Nessuno n6 economico n6 morale! Noi abbiamo
sofferto e soffriamo la fame perché con L.3.80 al giorno
non si puà assolutamente pit) vivere, perche con L.17.85
cent. al mese (L17.85!) non 6. pit) possibile trovare un
alloggio, neanche nelle soffitte e nei sottoscala! Noi
dobbiamo attendere una promozione non meno di un decennio!
L'unico atto di giustizia che ci 6 stato resto,
ponendo fine all'abuso sfacciato che si commetteva a
nostro danno col tenerci obbligati al pagamento della R.M.
si vuole gabellare per miglioramento economico, e come
tale si da a intendere al pubblico, che ignora le nostre
reali condizioni! Ma noi proveremo, e con ogni mezzo, che
questa 6 una volgare menzogna!!!
Noi siamo una potenza ma lo abbiamo ignorato. Ora 6.
tempo di destarci: la forza 6 nelle nostre mani! Sappiamo
adoperare adesso che se ne offre ii destro. Facciamo
nostro ii detto: uno per tutti: per un coraggio!!
Avanti!!!!
LA COMMISSIONE
(ASB.,1919 Personale, cit.)
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18. Prime minister to prefect, 24.05.20.
Agitazioni dei ferrovieri diventano ogni giorno pit)
scandalose. E veramente opera disgragazione che paralizza
vita della industria e avvenire della produzione. In
alcune stazioni si fermano soldati o guardie. In altre Si
rifiutano trasportare armi. In qualche stazione Si usano
violenze a personale non disposto seguire vedute
massimaliste. Gib 6. vero pericolo nazionale e deve finire.
Tenga presente seguenti disposizioni.
1 0 Dove fatti simili Si verificano e vengono a sua
conoscenza li denunci subito all'autorita giudiziaria e
cerchi che si proceda per direttissima. Le prove devono
essere raccolte con cura in modo che non si facciano
processi a caso.
2 0 Cerchi per mezzo della stampa fare che pubblico
reagisca a questi abusi e si formi la coscienza del grave
pericolo.
30 In previsione di scioperi prossimi prepari tutte misure
occorrenti per resistenza e fra cittadini volonterosi Si
stabiliscano comitati non dei soliti chiacchieroni ma
gente abile, operosa, coraggiosa che sappia imporre
interesse nazionale e minoranza faziosa. Mi telegrafi se
ha misure da suggerire o provvedimenti da chiedere.
(ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit.)
19. Prime minister to prefect, 29.01.21.
Mi informi se Autorita Giudiziaria ha preso provvedimenti
contro giornale "L'Assalto li (che aveva minacciato
invasione Prefettura) e contro autori eccitamento alla
guerra civile. Diffidi Questore che se non agisce con la
massima energia contro autori e provocatori violenze
fasciste sara	 immediatamente destituito.
Giolitti
(ACS:UC.)
20. Questore to prefect, 21.09.20.
In re azione a precedente corrispondenza partecipo a V.S.
Ill.ma che, giusta quanto viene riferito, con apposito
rapporto,	 dal	 Vice-Questore	 ed	 hanno	 constatato	 i
funzionari tutti di servizio, Militari della Regia
Guardia, ieri, troppo abbandonati a s6 stessi malamente
inquadrati e diretti dagli Ufficiali, contrariamente a
quanto 6 prescritto e come avevo pure richiesto colla mia
ordinanza di servizio, richiamando precise, tassative
disposizioni, offrirono spettacolo poco edificante di
indisciplina e di disorganizzazione, e Si dovette
all'iniziativa ed allo zelo dei funzionari di PS, se non
si verificano, in seguito a cio, dolorosi eventi.
Essi	 militari,	 infatti,	 malgrado	 anche le	 singole
disposizioni e richieste dei funzionari, preposti alla
tutela dell'ordine, si sparpagliano in
gruppi,abbandonandosi, durante il passaggio del corteo, a
manifestazioni, che, se pure ammirevoli, perch6 provocate
da sentimenti di attaccamento alle Istituzioni, erano in
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perfetta antitesi coi doveri dell'ordine e della
disciplina, tanto necessari nei difficili e delicatissimi
compiti del servizio di ordine pubblico, specie in questi
giorni, ed in questo ambiente. Fra l'altro, muniti di
banderuole,	 essi	 Si	 spinsero	 sulla	 pubblica	 via,
abbandonando	 i	 loro	 posti	 di	 inquadramento,	 colla
manifesta intenzione di unirsi e seguire il corteo.
Si dovette lottare non poco (coi) funzionari, per
ottenere che non Si allontanassero dalla Questura; e
quando, cominciati gli incidenti presso i locali della
Borsa e nell'interno del cortile della Questura stessa, si
richiesero d'urgenza per fronteggiarli, appositi nuclei,
questi non si trovarono pronti e la forza ritardd al
quanto ad intervenire.
Fu merito dei funzionari e degli agenti investigativi,
se si pot6 subito porre un argine all'azione delle parti
avversarie in lotta, e scongiurare fatti molto pi0 gravi
per l'avvenire, con pericoli gravissimi per l'ordine
pubblico; epperi5 prego V.S. Ill.ma compiacersi, ove lo
creda, provocare gli opportuni provvedimenti, in
considerazione delle gravissime responsabilita, che dal
fatto derivano.
Nella circostanza, faccio anche presente a V.S. Ill.ma
che degli ufficiali subalterni del Corpo, i due capitani,
che figurano nell'organico della locale Divisione, sono da
pit) di un mese in congedo per motivi di salute; dei pochi
ufficiali subalterni, assegnati alla Divisione stessa, un
tenente 6 in congedo da qualche giorno, in altro 6 in
missione da parecchi mesi a S.Rossore, e percit, non
prestano servizio che due tenenti qui in missione, ed un
sottotenente i quail, non pratici dell'ambiente, non
conoscono a fondo i militari dipendenti, sui quail percid
non hanno, n6 allo stato delle coseopotrebbero avere alcun
ascendente.
(ASB., 1920 Pratica Generale di PS , cit.)
21. Prime minister to prefect, 27.01.21.
Revoca permessi porto armi 6. fatta secondo legge di PS e
deve eseguirsi a qualunque costo.
Avverta tutti i funzionari della PS e Comandi dei
Carabinieri e della Regia Guardia che governo sarA
inesorabile contro chiunque trascuri esecuzione ordini
ricevuti.
(ACS: UC.)
22. Confederazione Generale Lavoro 	 (Bologna) to interior
minister, 25.01.21.
Distruzione Camera Lavoro Bologna avvenuta ieri sera
dimostra al di fuori qualsiasi inchiesta, che
organizzazione fascista trova conniventi AutoritA locali
per sue imprese.
Truppe e guardie, sufficientissime per impedire assalto
ed incendio, assistettero impassibili per circa due ore,
pur	 apendo che le poche persone rimaste assediate
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rischiavano di essere uccise in caso di assoluta mancanza
di altre vie di uscita. Non giA protesta contra chi
tenta riportarci alla faziositA delle lotte mediovali ma
questa nostra vuole essere denuncia contro chi incita alla
guerra	 civile,	 approfittando	 della	 sua	 qualitA	 di
rappresentante del potere civile.
(ACS: UC.)
23. Prefect to Questore, no date (24.04.21. approx.).
Sembrami che azione svolta dai funzionari e carabinieri ad
Argelato sia deficiente specialmente nei riguardi del
fascisti che presero parte alla nota rissa di quale
soltanto uno 6 stato arrestato mentre feriti sono quasi
tutti da parte dei comunisti.
(ASB.,1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)
24. Declaration by vice-commissar (Baricella) to prefect,
15.10.21.
Reggiani Luigi di Antonio il quale domandato risponde:
"Domenica verso le ore 9 trovandomi nel cortile della
Cooperativa vidi che due carabinieri traevano in arresto
ii fascista Busi. Segul i carabinieri ed ii Busi lungo la
traduzione alla caserma ed a trenta metri distante della
cooperativa notai che ii fascista consegnava ad un
carabiniere un oggetto che aveva la forma di una
rivoltella. Ritornai alla cooperativa per prendere la
bicicletta e ml portai alla Caserma dei RR.CC . per
raccontare quanto avevo visto al Brigadiere che per tutta
risposta dopo una mezz'ora d'interrogatorio fui messo in
libertA. Null'altro sono in grado di aggiungere".
(ASB.,1921 Comuni:A-B, cit.)
25. Carabinieri Reali (Budrio) to prefect, 12.09.21.
Dall'inchiesta praticata in Budrio: le accuse che Si fanno
al Comandante quella stazione - sottuficiale di privata
serietA, attivo e zelante - sono risultate destituite da
ogni fondamento, falso in modo assoluto. Furono smentite
recisamente da tutti 	 gli esponenti	 della PS,	 dalla
portinaia del Circolo e dello stesso On. Fabbri. A
derimere ogni dubbio devesi unire copia delle accluse
dichiarazioni.
Con la circostanza si sommette che lo scrivente sarebbe
grato qualora la R. Prefettura volesse compiacersi far
promuovere pratiche perch6 al lanciatore di dette venisse
rinfacciato ii risultato delle verifiche per sua norma
avvenire, non potendosi ammettere nk permettere che
impunemente Si possono e con tanta frequenza inprospettare
circostanze e fatti destituiti di ogni fondamento.
(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)
26. Questore to prefect, 20.04.21.
Tutti i Funzionari di P.S. che sono stati destinati a
servizi di ordine pubblico in questa cittA, mi hanno
concordemente fatto rilevare che allorch6 debbono essi
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esplicare azione energica e repressiva verso gruppi di
dimostranti fascisti o simpatizzanti con questi, trovansi
isolati perchê le forze di polizia, non rispondono
esattamente ai loro inviti.
Quanto sopra determina situazione difficile e pericolosa.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)
27. Prime minister to prefect, 20.04.21.
Violenza fascista in tempo di lotta elettorale costituisce
reato e disonorano il Paese.
Camera eletta con violenza manchera di autorita morale.
Purtroppo forza pubblica in codesta provincia manca al suo
dovere non reprimendo cosi gravi reati. Occorre quindi
cambiare quei capi della forza pubblica che per debolezza
o connivenza non fanno il loro dovere.(Voglia quindi) lei
indicarmi entro domani, con telegramma diretto a me
personalmente, il nome degli ufficiali, carabinieri,
guardie regie che sia conveniente traslocare.
L'avverto
	 che	 la	 terrei	 personalmente	 responsabile
dell'opera dei comandanti della forza.
(ASB.,1921 Dati, cit.)
28. Prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 20.03.21.
Locale procuratore generale del Re mi avverte avere
inviato
	 Ministero Giustizia rapporto rilevando che a
suo avviso rilascio noto Arpinati avvenuto contro norme
procedurali e con preavviso a giornali
	 i quali	 ne
pubblicarono anticipatamente notizia dã motivo ritenere
che Autorita giudiziaria Ferrara abbia ceduto pressioni
piazza. Da parte mia osservo che a mandato cattura
opportunamente spiccato sarebbe stato bene avesse seguito
normale regolare istruttoria salvo se del caso rilascio a
suo tempo su ordine organo competente. Qui ad ogni modo
malgrado
	 rilascio	 che	 non	 giova	 prestigio
	 Autorita
giudiziaria	 arresto
	 Arpinati	 fu	 per	 fascisti
	 buon
correttivo. Socialisti pert, lamentano disparita
trattamento per negata liberta provvisoria a taluno
imputati fatti 21 novembre scorso ed a qualche arrestato
per taglie.
(ASB.,1921 Dati, cit.)
29. Questore to prefect, 28.12.21.
Partecipo a V.S. Ill.ma per conoscenza che il 22 corr.
alla Pretura Urbana venne discussa la causa contro i
fascisti Cavedoni Celestino, Bonfiglioli Luigi e Bartoli
Marco, imputati di danneggiamenti alla sede della Lega
Braccianti di Bertalia, commesso il 14.11.us.
I primi due vennero assolti per insufficienza di prove,
il Bartoli fu condannato a giorni 20 di reclusione e L.100
di multa.
Con sentenza dello stesso giorno Biagi Arres, Ceroni
Giuseppe e Borsari Luigi imputati di span i di fucili
contro fascisti nell'episodio di Casa Zamboni avvenuto il
3 luglio us. furono condannati a: L.100 ciascuno di multa
i
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ed alla confisca dell'arma per
	 la mancata denunzia
dell'arma stessa.
(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)
30. Prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri and Guardie 
Regie commanders,
	 .11.21.
Ricorre con troppa frequenza nella relazioni delle SS.LL.
per fatti di violenza provocati da fascisti la motivazione
di non essersi potuto procedere all'arresto del
responsabili perche n datasi alla latitanze ciô che invece
non avviene con la stessa frequenza per violenze quando i
responsabili
	 ne	 sono persone	 appartenenti	 ad	 altri
partiti.
Sarei lieto se la stessa pia lodevole attita sia
dimostrata in confronto dei responsabili di tutte le
violenze a qualunque partito essi appartengano.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)
31. Prefect to
	 Questore,	 Carabinieri	 and	 Regie Guardie 
commanders, 25.08.21.
Da fonte fascista ml viene riferito che le locali due
camere del lavoro stanno arruolando arditi del popolo che
trovano di preferenza tra i muratori ed i tramvieri. Mi 6
stato inoltre assicurato che tale arruolamento si occupano
attivamente ii Gamalero segretario della Camera del Lavoro
ed i noti Ramboni e Boni della lega tramvieri i quail in
proposito avrebbero tenuto una importante adunanza la sera
del 6 corr. in Via Rivareno 77-72. Mi 6 stato infine
assicurato, sempre dalla medesima fonte fascista, che
sarebbero stati gia costituiti 7 rioni ciascuna come sede
propria, che gli arruolati raggiungerebbero sino ad ora
numero di 2300 e che altro arruolamento stanno facendosi
ad Altedo e Reale. Prego le SS.LL. di riferirmi le pia
ample informazioni in proposito e con la massima possibile
sollecitudine e di procedere con ogni energia a norma
delle istruzioni date con espresso riservatissimo in data
23 corr. N4645.
(ASB., 1921 Associazioni, cit.)
32. Prefect to police chief, 14.04.22.
Trasmetto a codesto On. Ministero per debito d'ufficio
l'unita domanda con la quale il V. Commissario di P.S.
Sig. Mazzoni Raffaele chiede di essere trasferito in altra
residenza dell'Italia Meridionale e, possibilmente del
Molise.
Ii Sig. Mazzoni ha reso utili e lodevoli servizi in
questa provincia, nell'attuale sua residenza, ma da
qualche tempo eccessivamente impressionato dagli attacchi
mossigli sulla stampa dai fascisti, e dalla loro ostilita
per l'opera di repressione alla quale il Mazzoni ha dovuto
provvedere in vane occasioni di violenze fasciste nel
territorio del Circondario di Vergato, Si va mostrando
alquanto indeciso e perplesso.
Per quanto Egli, a causa della preoccupazione dalla
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quale 6 stato preso, non dia attualmente quel rendimento
che ha finora dato, pure ritengo sia ii caso di
trasferirlo.
(ASB., 1922 Personale, cit.)
33. From L'Assalto, 3.05.21.
Tempo faoccasione di occuparci del Delegato di
Molinella e riferimmo qualche episodio a prova della sua
incapacita a coprire ii delicato ufficio che gli 6
affidato.
Sembra perel che l'Autorita non abbia tenuto in alcun
conto ii nostro articolo ed anzich6 fare un'inchiesta
sull'opera	 di	 questo	 funzionario,	 agli	 ordini	 di
Massarenti, abbia provveduto all'allontanamento del
maresciallo contro cui era stato avanzato un rapporto di
questo bel tipo di Delegato.
Di questo Delegato che si fa vedere ubriaco per le vie
del paese, che minaccia colla rivoltella i pacifici
cittadini, che partecipa alle baldorie socialiste ed odia
a morte i fascisti e tutti coloro che non esaltano l'opera
del Dio Massarenti.
Noi invitiamo ancora l'Autorita a prendere in esame la
posizione di questo ridicolo funzionario trascurando
fatto che egli 6 ii beniamino ed ii protettore di Giuseppe
Massarenti.
Che se poi l'Autorita continuera a proteggere questo
Delegato ed a punire coloro che hanno sentimenti
patriottici, allora cercheremo noi la via per liberare
Molinella da	 questo funzionario	 poco serio e meno
italiano.
34. Police chief to prefect, February 1923.
Col 31 Gennaio p.p., come 6 noto, tutte le organizzazioni
inquadrate militarmente, a qualunque tendenza politica
appartenessero, sono state sciolte in forza di apposito
provvedimento di legge.
Sono rimaste soltanto le camicie nere che vanno
regolarmente iscrivendosi alla "Milizia Volontaria
Nazionale" che 6 organismo statale. Dopo l'epoca suddetta,
percia, ogni azione di camicie nere muterebbe carattere.
Trattandosi di cittadini che abuserebbero di un
distintivo, e pertanto l'Autorita dovrebbe intervenire
energicamente cercando di prevenire o reprimere, quando
non riuscisse la prevenzione.
E poi necessario che tornino allo Stato le armi lunghe
che molte camicie nere,venutene in possesso durante i moti
di ottobre, conservano tuttora presso di loro.
Ritengo tuttavia che i fini di cui sopra si potranno ph)
facilmente raggiungere anzitutto coll'opera di persuasione
e col prestigio dei dirigenti Fasci e dei Comandi della
Milizia	 Volontaria,	 e	 che,	 comunque,	 l'azione
dell'Autorita di P.S. e delle forze di polizia, 	 se
necessaria,	 dovra	 rivolgersi	 in	 pieno	 accordo	 con
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l'Autorita	 della	 Milizia	 Nazionale	 e	 coll'Autorita
Politica del Partito Nazionale Fascista.
Pregherei pertanto vivamente le SS.LL. di volersi
compiacere, ove lo credano, dare disposizioni ai segretari
del Fasci della Provincia ai Comandi locali della M.V.S.N.
di agire nel senso suesposto, e di farmi conoscere 11 loro
pensiero in merito.
(ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit.)
35. Circular 13652, 13.06.23.
Richiamo attenzione V.S. su seguenti punti invitandola
attenervisi massima diligenza rigidita. 1°: Unico solo
rappresentante autorita Governo nella provincia 6 il
Prefetto e nessun'altro infuori lui. Cid ho dichiarato
parecchie volte nonch6 ultimamente Senato. Fiduciari
provinciali Fascisti nonch6 diverse autorita partito sono
subordinate Prefetto. Intendesi che essendo Fascismo
partito dominante Prefetto dovra tenere contatti con
Fascio locale per evitare dissidi e tutto cid che possa
turbare ordine pubblico. 2°: Ho notato questi ultimi tempi
leggera recrudescenza turbamento ordine pubblico. Intendo
che cid finisca pi0 presto quindi ogni riunione, anche di
elementi nazionali che possano provocare incidenti deve
essere proibita nonch6 diffidati energicamente promotori.
Procedere massima diligenza rastrellamento armi nonch6
sorveglianza su elementi sovversivi e movimenti sedicenti
nazionali margine fascismo che hanno titoli diversi come
rinnovamento, rinascita e simile. 3 0 Desidero avere
telegrafiche notizie su stampa locale nei confronti
atteggiamento verso Governo nonch6 notizie su situazione
economica
	 generale	 delle	 popolazioni.	 4 0 	 Fenomeni
illegalismo
	 da	 chiunque	 praticato	 deve	 essere
inesorabilmente represso.	 Confido che V.S.(attengasi)
scrupolosamente queste direttive.
Mussolini
(ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit.)
36. Console Generale MVSV (Baccolini) to ?, 19.07.23.
Riferimento
	 telegramma	 codesto	 Comando
	 N.16237,
	 11
corrente, comunicasi che Seniore Marchesini Emiliano si
est	 costituito	 arresti	 rigore	 et	 per	 disposizione
Divisione Militare trovasi caserma Cavavalleggeri Saluzzo.
Da indagini praticate sua responsabilita appare molto
attenuato	 et	 pare	 debba	 escludersi	 sua	 attiva
partecipazione fatto.
(ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit.)
37. Prime minister to prefect, 5.12.23.
Le segnalo ma Ella avra gia rilevato 11 risveglio
antifascista che avviene in quel di Molinella. Occorre
provvedere ed intervenire senza indugio: Ella ne parli
anche coi dirigenti del fascismo emiliano.
Mi dia relazione della vera situazione.
(ABS., 1923 Comuni, cit.)
-392-
38. Interior minister to prefects, 29.05.24.
E stato rilevato che nel riferire circa fatti ed incidenti
nei quail siano implicati fascisti e militi volontari non
sempre i Sigg. Prefetti fanno esatta distinzione fra la
qualita di fascisti e quella di militi nazionali,
provocando cosi fra i van i organi competenti necessarie
rettifiche ed inutile carteggio per assodare le rispettive
responsabilita.
Ad eliminare il ripetersi di siffatti inconvenienti,
prego le SS.LL. nel riferire sugli incidenti che si
verificassero nel territorio della relativa giurisdizione,
e sulla identificazione delle persone implicatevi, di
volere accuratamente accertarne e quindi indicarne, anche,
la precisa qualita, specificando, cioe, se trattasi di
semplici fascisti o di multi volontari, e
suddistinguendo, in quest'ultimo caso, se siano in divisa
ed in servizio oppure no.
(ABS., 1924 Relazioni, cit.)
39. Prime minister's undersecretary to prefect, 3.04.24.
Con riferimento ad istruzioni precedentemente date circa
gli sforzi da fare per ottenere una forte votazione faccio
presente a V.S. che dalle risposte date dai Prefetti alle
domande fatte sulle presumibili risultanze della votazione
risultano	 che
	 la	 percentuale	 dei	 votanti	 sara
probabilmente minore di quella del 1921. Ci6 non deve
accadere e perci6 prego di prendere accordi con codesto
Federazione Fascista per intensificare gli sforzi perchê
la percentuale dei votanti sia in ogni caso maggiore di
quella del 1921. Nell'occasione torno a raccomandare di
fare in modo che la lista del Fascio abbia una votazione
plebiscitaria cosi che possa riportare la grandissima
prevalenza su tutte le altre liste.
(ABS.,1924 Relazioni, cit.)
40. Interior minister to prefects, 3.01.25.
Rivolgo particolare invito ai Sigg. Prefetti di portare
ogni cura nell'adozione delle misure atte a garantire il
mantenimento ordine pubblico in qualunque circostanza.
Dispongono intanto: 1 u	la chiusura di tutti i circoli et
ritrovi sospetti dal punto di vista politico; 2° 	 lo
scioglimento di tutte le organizzazioni che sotto
qualsiasi pretesto possano raccogliere elementi turbolenti
aut che comunque tendano a sovvertire i poteri dello
Stato. 3 0 	 particolarmente lo scioglimento di tutti i
gruppi dell'Italia Libera vietandone sino da qualsiasi
attivita; 4 0 vigilanza dei comunisti et sovversivi che
diano prova o sospetto di attivita criminosa procedendo a
retate degli elementi pericolosi e avvertendo che ogni
tentativo di resistenza deve essere severamente represso
con ogni mezzo. 5 0
	
rastrellamento armi illegalmente
detenute operando oculate frequenti perquisizioni; 60
vigilanza vigorosissima sugli esercizi pubblici.
	
Per
raggiungimento
	 scopo	 chiedono	 alla	 abnegazione	 dei
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funzionari ufficiali e militari multi il maggiore
rendimento dell'opera loro e diano ordine perche tutte le
forze di polizia siano mobilitate dal mezzogiorno di
sabato alla mezzanotte del lunedl e cioe sino a nuova
disposizione e si valgano se necessario ed opportuno della
facolta di mobilitare la milizia volontaria che deve
naturalmente agire esclusivamente alle dipendenze delle
SS.LL. Assicuri adempimento.
(ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit.)
41. Interior minister to prefect, 4.01.25.
Per norma della S.V. comunico copia ordine inviato da
Direttore Nazionale del Partito Nazionale Fascista alle
Federazioni dipendenti: "a tutti i fascisti d'Italia!
L'azione del Governo Fascista impone a tutti i cittadini
la pia rigida disciplina nazionale. Dopo lo scoppio della
vostra indignazione, ulteriori gesta di violenza sporadica
intralcerebbero l'azione di Govern°, gioverebbero agli
avversari ormai disorientati et dispersi. Tutti i fascisti
hanno l'obbligo morale e Nazionale del ritorno al lavoro
operoso e tranquillo. Il mondo specialmente in questa ora
ci guarda: l'Italia fascista deve mostrarsi ed essere
ordinata e disciplinata in tutti gli ordini dei suoi
cittadini. I primi a dare esempio dovete essere voi! e
Segretari federati debbono garantire la perfetta
osservanza degli ordini del partito. Verranno destituiti
d'autorita tutti coloro che nelle zone dipendenti
lascieranno compiere atti illegali o comunque dannosi alla
disciplina imposta dalle necessita del momento e ritenuti
indispensabili
	 dal	 Direttorio	 Nazionale.	 Dare
assicurazione. Ii Direttorio Nazionale". Poichê tali
istruzioni sono state inviate per via normale V.S. Si
assicuri se siano o no giunte provvedendo caso contrario
dame immediata preventiva visione (aspirandosi) altresi
pronta esecuzione.
(ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit.)
42. Prefect of Florence to prefect of Bologna, 16.07.25.
Circa incidenti verificatisi qui ieri sera e stanotte ho
consentito tre giornali pubblicassero soltanto seguente
comunicato e prego vossignoria provvedere in conformita
per stampa locale:	 "Ieri verso ore diciotto alcuni
individui
	 attesero
	
all'uscita	 dalla corte di
	 assise
avvocato Targetti con propositi violenza. Questore
avvertito invid prontamente funzionari ed agenti i quali
circondato Targetti lo fecero ricoverare in questura.
Detto avvocato potê pia tardi rientrare sua abitazione
senza ulteriore molestie. Intanto alcuni sconosciuti
fecero improvvisamente irruzione nello studio del Targetti
danneggiandolo e dandosi subito alla fuga. Nella serata un
gruppo giovani si rect$ abitazione ingegner Carlo Rosselli
in via Giusti n.18 e successivamente nello studio due
corrispondenti	 dell'Avanti	 in	 via	 Porta	 Rossa	 n.6
danneggiando mobili. Nessuna violenza fu fatta alle
1
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persone famigliari che Si trovavano nell'abitazione del
Rosselli. Pi0 tardi lo stesso gruppo Si reciti pensione
Gozzoli e richiese al proprietario notizie di certo prof.
Zanotti. All'asserzione del Gozzoli di non conoscere
Zanotti ed al rifiuto consegna registro pensionati giovani
stessi lo colpirono con qualche schiaffo allontanandosi
dopo di aver danneggiato l'apparecchio telefonico. Sono
stati eseguiti alcuni fermi ed arresti e sono in corso
ulteriori indaginiu.
(ASB., 1925 Stampe, cit.)
APPENDIX 3
Appointments to the Office of Prefect in Bologna, 1894-1925 
Giovanni Giura
Francesco De Seta
Francesco Serrao
Evandro Caravaggio
Bernardo Ferrari
Antonio Dall'Oglio
Ernesto Dallari
Vincenzo Quaranta
Gennaro Bladier
Agostino D'Adamo
Vincenzo Pericoli
Giuseppe Visconti
Cesare Mori
Enrico Palmieri
Faustino Aphel
Arturo Bocchini
Raffaele De Vita
16.09.94.
01.09.97.
05.11.97.
01.09.98.
16.03.02.
01.07.04.
01.10.06.
16.08.14.
01.07.19.
15.12.19.
20.04.20.
01.08.20.
08.02.21.
26.08.22.
01.01.23.
16.12.23.
24.10.25.
From Mario Missori, cit.
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CORRECTIONS TO TEXT
p. 35
	 "This point is ill-documented, however, and
therefore highly implausible." (to be inser-
ted following sentence ending "1878.")
pp. 64-65
	 In the original English text (see Bibliography)
this quotation reads: "It was a scandal, in
army eyes, that such dignity should be gran-
ted to wartime subalterns, or even to retired
regulars who now obtained ranks in the Militia
higher than those of their contemporaries who
had stayed in active service." (p. 246)
p. 87
	 In the original English text (see Bibliography)
this quotation reads: "The Militia remained at
the direct orders of Mussolini except while it
performed functions of premilitary training.
Its Fascist uniforms, symbols and Aom..cLature
were untouched. Recruitment, although it was
nominally opened to non-Fascists, remained
under the control of the consuls. Finally, a
small concession was made to the Army by ruling
that outside the service the MVSN would enjoy
the same rank as they had had in the Army.
However, within the Militia they could continue
to exercise functions of command superior to
their nominal rank." (p. 249-&)
p. 193
	
"However, the author does not support such
claims with well documented evidence (LaStrage;
cit., pp. 110-18):" (replacing ("(La Strage, cit.,
pp. 110-08).")
p. 265
	 "Again, however, the author does not support
his claims with well documented evidence." (to
insert after sentence ending "attack.")
p. 358
	
",despite being officially designed to curb such
illegalities." (to be added on to sentence en-
ding "illegalities.")
